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ABSTRACT
This dissertation discusses the connections between policies developed in the contraband
camps and the policies enacted by the Freedmen’s Bureau during Reconstruction. It argues that
that contraband camp policies created several models for Bureau agents to follow, and that
Bureau agents failed to learn from the problematic contraband camps and enacted policies and
programs that had already failed in the camps. In addition, it argues that the federal government
failed to provide effective oversight for the camps, which allowed individual camp commanders
to institute policies that often undermined the ability of the contrabands to gain economic
autonomy, and that poor oversight continued under the Bureau despite a structured bureaucracy.
To make these arguments, the dissertation analyzes contraband camps in Virginia, North
Carolina, Washington, DC, South Carolina, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Louisiana, and also
discusses the Bureau across the South. By including multiple camps, it provides a more
complete analysis of connections between the camp and the Bureau and also discusses the
specific local circumstances of each camp, such as the legality of slavery in Kentucky or the
status of Washington as the national capital. Finally, the dissertation concludes by analyzing the
long-term legacies of contraband camp failures during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries to argue that policies which originated in the contraband camps had consequences that
lasted almost a century.
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INTRODUCTION

By December 15, 1864, John Burnside and his family should have had ample reason to
celebrate the holiday season. They had escaped slavery in Kentucky and made it to Camp
Nelson, a former training center turned contraband camp near Lexington, Kentucky. John
enlisted in the United States Colored Troops, and his family therefore gained admission to the
camp, which he hoped would promise them safety from roving slave-catchers.1 His wife found a
job and supported herself, and the family did not need any support from the government, aside
from John’s army salary.2
On November 28, 1864, the camp commander, Speed S. Fry, ordered all contrabands out
of the camp in freezing weather, and tore down their homes to ensure they vacated the premises.3
John was away with his regiment when the army forced his wife and children to tear down their
hut and leave the camp, and they all became sick from exposure due to a lack of shelter in one of
the coldest winters in Kentucky history.4 The children became two of almost fifty contrabands
who died from exposure or disease during or shortly after the expulsion.5 Christmas 1864 was
not a happy occasion for the contrabands in Camp Nelson.
This story, and countless others, demonstrate the ambiguity of military emancipation and
the examples it created for the Freedmen’s Bureau during Reconstruction, which could result in

1

Affidavit of John Burnside, 15 December 1864, in Camp Nelson, Kentucky: A Civil War History, ed. Richard D.
Sears (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2002): 150.
2
Ibid.
3
Report, New York Tribune, 28 November 1864, in Camp Nelson, ed. Sears, 138-139.
4
Burnside, Affidavit, in Camp Nelson, ed. Sears, 150.
5
General Burnett to John Fee, 20 January 1865, in Camp Nelson, ed. Sears, 165.
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vastly different outcomes, depending on the state, the military command in the area, the
exigencies of war, policies formulated in Washington, D.C., and the presence or absence of
northern religious and aid societies in the area. The contraband camp policies did not create
exact precedents for Bureau policies, but created examples and models for Bureau agents to
follow.
These stories and the factors that shaped them provide the basis for this dissertation. Its
major unifying argument is that contraband policy formulated in camps across the South
contributed to the policies of the Freedmen’s Bureau during the beginning stages of
Reconstruction, and how the contrabands, termed freedmen once the war ended, negotiated the
rapidly changing landscape to secure their freedom. It focuses on how policies formulated
during the war created models for policies created by the Freedmen’s Bureau and other agencies
during Reconstruction. It also provides ample comparative analysis to elucidate how the
experiences of contrabands in different locations varied and what factors accounted for these
differences. This dissertation uses numerous perspectives to determine how contrabands shaped
military emancipation, with an emphasis on their agency and impact on events both locally and
on a national scale.
The dissertation makes several claims about the connections between contraband camp
and Freedmen’s Bureau policy. First, it argues that the federal government failed to come up
with a coherent national policy for contraband camps, leaving individual commanders to decide
how to administer the camps, which often resulted in negligence and mistreatment of
contrabands due to incompetence or a lack of concern for contraband welfare. Second, it argues
that Union authorities often mistreated and exploited contrabands due to racism, an overly strict
interpretation of federal policies regarding slavery, particularly in the loyal states, military
2

exigency, economy, concerns of contrabands becoming dependent on the government, and, in the
Mississippi Valley, a lack of sufficient troops to guard against Confederate guerrillas. Third, it
argues that opposition to emancipation amongst the white Northern public, due to racism and
long-term exposure to proslavery ideas, particularly to the idea of sending contrabands north to
relieve crowding in the camps, hampered the ability to provide for the contrabands. Few
alternatives existed to the overflowing camps. Fourth, it argues that many failings of contraband
policy, including labor contracts, employment on plantations, and self-sufficiency, continued into
the early stages of Reconstruction, which indicates that the Bureau did not learn from the failures
of contraband camp policy, which hampered the ability of the freedmen to gain economic
independence after the war.
In addition to discussing the lack of federal oversight, the dissertation makes clear that
the failures of the Bureau cannot be explained by a lack of knowledge of the effectiveness of
their policies and programs, as agents had four years of examples from the contraband camps.
Rather than learning from the failures of the camps, the Bureau introduced the same exact
policies that had caused these failures, which led to the same problems undermining the
effectiveness of the Bureau. The institution of mandatory labor contracts, ration reductions, low
wages, impressment, and the closure of institutions such as hospitals and schools greatly
undermined the ability of the Union army to ensure economic autonomy for the contrabands
during the war, and they still became the cornerstones of Bureau policy. The argument that the
Bureau’s failures stemmed from a lack of knowledge is replaced by the clear connection between
contraband camp policy failures and the shortcomings of the Bureau.
Finally, the dissertation argues that policies and belief systems that seemed beneficial
actually ended up undermining the ability of the Union army and the Bureau to provide for
3

contrabands. Missionaries and aid workers in particular believed that a focus on avoiding
dependency would benefit the contrabands by ensuring they became self-sufficient. The policy
ended up leading to insufficient wages, harsh ration reductions even to families of soldiers, the
rapid closure of the camps without real plans for where to send the freedmen, and the termination
of support for hospitals and schools that still fulfilled the basic needs of the freedmen. In
addition, missionaries focused on instituting their ideas of free labor and religion on the
contrabands and often regarded the wishes of the contrabands as unacceptable and inferior,
which led to friction and undermined the ability of the missionaries to truly help the contrabands.
This argument has relevance today in discussions of limiting access to welfare to avoid
dependency on the government by instituting restrictions such as work requirements and
maximum income limits that clearly reflect policies instituted in the Freedmen’s Bureau almost
one hundred fifty years ago.
This argument also extends to military officers and Bureau agents, who shared the belief
that their policies were beneficial and necessary to ensure the contrabands became self-sufficient.
Rather than harming the ability of the contrabands to obtain economic autonomy, they saw these
policies as ensuring they would end any dependency on the government as quickly as possible.
The overwhelming focus on avoiding dependency and government expenditure that shaped both
contraband camp and Bureau policy indicates how policies seen as beneficial actually ended up
harming the contrabands and freedmen by limiting their ability to obtain the savings necessary to
purchase land and gain true independence. Without the funds to obtain land, the freedmen
mostly had to sign contracts as sharecroppers, meaning that they never achieved economic
autonomy due to the consequences of misguided policies that claimed to make them independent
and self-sufficient. The dissertation makes clear that policies seen as beneficial to the
4

contrabands and freedmen, which formed the cornerstone of camp and Bureau policy, actually
ended up harming the contrabands.
Officers held firm to these policies due to preconceived beliefs about contrabands and
African-Americans in general that pervaded nineteenth century America. As will be discussed in
more detail in chapter four, racist ideas fell into two main categories. The first level of racist
beliefs constituted an outright belief in the inferiority of African-Americans and an unwillingness
to do anything to help them. Officers who held these ideas frequently instituted very
conservative policies such as banning contrabands from army lines, failing to pay wages,
tolerating abuse by soldiers, and impressing laborers. Many Bureau agents also held these
beliefs, which led them to sympathize with planters rather than freedmen even when
overwhelming evidence supported the freedman’s case. Another group of officers, meanwhile,
did not hold such strong racist beliefs but instead only supported contraband policy because it
would help win the war. They often were more supportive of helping the contrabands because
admitting them into Union lines removed their labor from the Confederacy and supported the
war effort. These officers still held ideas such as avoiding dependency and government
expenditure, which, as outlined above, undermined contraband policy, but still were more
supportive than the first group. Outright abolitionist officers and Bureau agents were rare and
most officers held racist ideas, as will be demonstrated throughout this dissertation, and the
Bureau’s failure to weed out racist agents further indicates that it failed to learn anything from
the failures of the contraband camps.

5

The Geographic Scope of the Dissertation
To make these arguments, the dissertation utilizes a wide thematic, geographic, and
temporal focus. It discusses contraband camps in numerous states and regions to provide a
comparative analysis that also demonstrates the consequences of a lack of a federal contraband
policy, as different policies emerged in each camp. Contraband camps began in the Eastern
Theater and often became much more stable than Western Theater camps. The first contraband
camps emerged in the Hampton Roads region of Virginia, which remained under Union
occupation for the duration of the war. At these camps, army commanders instituted policies on
their own that would create examples for future contraband camps. In South Carolina, all the
white planters fled the Sea Islands, leaving the contrabands in possession of abandoned cotton
plantations, which was the opposite of the situation in all the other contraband camps, where
slaves fled their homes to reach Union lines. South Carolina became the testing ground for
policies relating to abandoned plantations and the sale of cotton, which often benefited the
government more than the contrabands. The question of land distribution became a major issue
on the islands, and provides an opportunity to analyze federal land policy, and the lack thereof,
during both the Civil War and Reconstruction. The dissertation also discusses camps in North
Carolina. This area is distinctive due to the high proportion of white Unionists, who sometimes
provided aid to the contrabands, but could also threaten their freedom by claiming the right to reenslave contrabands due to their loyalty. Camps in North Carolina faced a constant threat from
Confederate guerrillas, and the army’s failure to protect the camps foreshadowed similar failures
under the Bureau. Washington, D.C., meanwhile, contained numerous camps. Especially after
emancipation in the District in 1862, contrabands lived in dilapidated and overcrowded housing
due to the plentiful government jobs available, which also contributed to high rates of disease.
6

Washington is just south of the border state of Maryland, which raised the contentious issue of
border state fugitives escaping to the District, where they remained subject to the Fugitive Slave
Act until its repeal late in the war and often faced return to loyal masters, especially since
Maryland remained a slave state for almost the entire war. In addition, Washington provides an
opportunity to truly analyze the development of federal contraband policy, especially since
Congress had complete control of District government during the Civil War, while the military
controlled other regions of the South.
The western theater camps faced much more instability due to nearby military conflict,
the vexing guerrilla problem, and the reality of border states that retained slavery. As a border
state, Kentucky also provides an opportunity to analyze the vexing issue of loyal slaveholders
attempting to reclaim their property, and, early in the war, of handling the contraband issue in a
state that claimed neutrality. The dissertation also focuses on the Mississippi Valley. Camps
here faced instability due to almost nonstop military campaigns, which frequently resulted in
hasty closure of camps. Camps here faced overcrowding and severe shortages of food, clothing,
fuel, adequate housing, and medical supplies, which in turn led to high rates of epidemic disease
and mortality. The overcrowding led the government to institute a system of plantation leasing,
which aimed to alleviate overflow in the camps but which only led to exploitation by lessees,
who often faced no consequences for mistreating contrabands. Also, camps in Mississippi faced
a pervasive threat from Confederate guerrillas that was even worse than that in North Carolina,
which demonstrates the inability of the Union army to protect the contrabands even in a state
with a heavy military presence throughout the war.

7

The Thematic Scope of the Dissertation
The dissertation also has an extensive thematic scope. The chapters include material on
the establishment of the camps, the development of ad hoc contraband policies that often differed
widely across various camps, efforts to put the contrabands to work, the treatment of contraband
laborers, community life in the camp, and efforts to establish schools, hospitals, and churches for
the contrabands. They also discuss the often-rampant mistreatment of contrabands by military
authorities.6 The chapters include extensive material on the efforts of the contrabands and
freedmen themselves to protest mistreatment, maintain their families, and establish communities
in the camps and on both government-run and leased plantations. The chapters discuss the
efforts of missionaries and northern aid societies to help the contrabands. Finally, the chapters
include detail on disease in the camps, which often reached epidemic proportions, and the efforts
of the army and aid societies to establish sanitation practices and hospitals to address rising
mortality rates. The dissertation has an extensive thematic focus that addresses multiple aspects
of the contraband experience from numerous perspectives.
The dissertation has a thorough temporal focus. In addition to discussing the war years in
extensive detail, the dissertation includes material on the early years of Reconstruction to
elucidate what happened to the freedmen when the contraband camps closed and to emphasize
how contraband policy often foreshadowed the policies of the Freedmen’s Bureau during
Reconstruction, particularly in terms of labor and contracts. In particular, it focuses on the years
from the end of the war in 1865 until 1868, when the Bureau slowly began to terminate many aid
programs, provost courts, and labor centers, and shifted its focus to supporting schools for

6

The lack of a coherent contraband policy to guide military commanders is detailed extensively in Chandra
Manning, Troubled Refuge: Struggling for Freedom in the Civil War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016).
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freedmen, which were often run by northern aid societies or supported by the freedmen
themselves via tuition charges. The conclusion includes an overall analysis of the connection
between contraband camps and the Freedmen’s Bureau, and the failure of both to secure the
rights of the freedmen, particularly as Reconstruction ended and the federal government
abandoned the freedmen to white Southerners, who instituted sharecropping, peonage, convict
leasing, and other restrictions that established a system as close to slavery as the Constitution and
federal law permitted. The dissertation, while it mostly focuses on the Civil War years of 1861 to
1865, includes additional material after the war to tell the complete story of the contraband
camps and the Freedmen’s Bureau, and further validates the thesis that policies formulated in the
contraband camps created examples for Freedmen’s Bureau programs.
To provide such a comprehensive analysis of the contraband experience, the dissertation
uses correspondence from army officers, missionaries, aid workers, government officials, local
government officials in Washington, DC, plantation lessees, newspaper reporters, Freedmen’s
Bureau agents, and even masters, both Unionist and Confederate, attempting to recover their
slaves. Although the available source base is extremely limited, it includes sources written by
the contrabands and freedmen themselves, including letters, petitions to government officials,
and testimony before various investigators sent by Congress and other federal agencies to assess
conditions in the camps. While most of the sources are from the perspective of whites, there is
also ample evidence for the contraband experience and viewpoint, which further supports the
arguments made in the dissertation and demonstrates the importance of contraband agency.
The Historiography of Contraband Camps and the Freedmen’s Bureau
The historiography of contraband camps and the Bureau has changed significantly since
the 1860s. The literature has advanced from racist works to monographs that emphasize the
9

importance of African-American agency. Previously ignored topics such as disease, religion,
education, and even the camps themselves are now extensively analyzed in a rapidly growing
historiography. The burgeoning debate over self-emancipation has led to an even greater
emphasis on the role of the contrabands and freedmen in achieving freedom and, if temporarily,
economic autonomy. The literature has also recognized that Reconstruction constituted a failure
not because of its exploitation of white Southerners, but rather due to its failure to ensure
economic autonomy for the freedmen. Finally, the historiography has produced case studies that
provide extensive detail on contraband camps and Bureau activity. The literature has made rapid
progress since the Dunning school, but is still developing and changing as new evidence and
angles of analysis emerge.
The historiography of emancipation and Reconstruction began after the Civil War.7 Most
historians during this time only focus on criticizing African-American contributions to the war,
but a very select group presented the African-American perspective. Republican historians
blame the war on the southern “slave power” that not only denied rights to slaves, but to
northerners as well through the denial of “civil liberties.”8 Other historians, who foreshadowed
the current “self-emancipation” school, focus on “black participation in the conflict,” how
African-Americans played a vital role in achieving their own freedom, and that whites did not
hand it to them.9

7

Michael B. Boles, ed. A Companion to the American South (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002).
Michael Les Benedict, “A Constitutional Crisis,” in Writing the Civil War: The Quest to Understand ed. James M.
McPherson and William Cooper, Jr. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 157-158.
9
Glenn David Brasher, The Peninsula Campaign and the Necessity of Emancipation: African-Americans and the
Fight for Freedom (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 4; Jim Downs, Sick from Freedom:
African-American Illness and Suffering during the Civil War and Reconstruction (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2012), 6.
8
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In his 1935 work Black Reconstruction, historian W.E.B. Du Bois portrays AfricanAmericans not as passive recipients of white largesse, but as active agents in securing their own
emancipation and economic independence, and he argues that they had a “central role” in the
history of the Civil War and Reconstruction.10 He directly contradicts the racist Dunning School
literature, which portrays Reconstruction and Union efforts to help freedmen in general in a very
negative light, and claims that white Southerners constituted the real victims of Reconstruction.
He emphasizes the importance of land distribution and argues that freedmen needed their own
land to become truly independent of white control.11 Since they were not granted land, the
“struggle over the labor of the emancipated slave” became the most significant and divisive issue
during Reconstruction, as freedmen focused on independence faced Bureau agents focused on
the fear of dependency and getting the freedmen to sign labor contracts as soon as possible.12 Du
Bois also pioneered the use of comparative methodology in Reconstruction historiography by
comparing emancipation in the South to abolition in other slave societies, particularly in the
Caribbean.13 While he does include the traditional Marxist dispute between capital and labor, he
mostly focuses on placing freedmen at the center rather than the periphery of Reconstruction
history.14 This initial literature was challenged by Du Bois, but his work failed to make a
significant impact during the post-World War II era.15 His main arguments would be resurrected
during the 1960s, when the Civil Rights Movement compelled historians to reassess the role of
African Americans in the Civil War and Reconstruction.

10

Eric Foner, Nothing but Freedom: Emancipation and Its Legacy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1983), 5.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Eric Foner, “Historiography: The Continuing Evolution of Reconstruction Historiography,” OAH Magazine of
History 4 no. 1 (Winter 1989), http://www.jstor.org/stable/25162634 (accessed November 9, 2012), 11-12.
15
Ibid.
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By the 1960s, historians of the Revisionist school shifted the focus of the literature away
from the racism of the Dunning school to telling the stories of the freedmen themselves. While
the Dunning School depicts the freedmen as illegitimately taking over the South and the Bureau
as encouraging black idleness and dependency, the Revisionists take a much more inclusive
approach. They portray President Andrew Johnson as a racist and praise the Radical
Republicans as “reformers genuinely committed to black rights.”16 In addition, they refute the
Dunning School idea of Reconstruction constituting a “tragic era.” Despite these
accomplishments, Revisionist literature also emphasizes that Reconstruction did not achieve
enough for African-Americans and still left them impoverished and with few rights once the
Bureau withdrew beginning in 1868. That, they argue, is the real reason that Reconstruction was
a “tragic era.”17
The Revisionists also moved from large-scale national histories to local histories that
profile one particular state in order to examine how national debates over Bureau policy affected
a particular group of whites and freedmen, and one author in particular has written a monograph
that is one of the first major works to focus in detail on a contraband camp and the experiences
of its inhabitants.
In her work, written in 1964, Willie Lee Rose profiles emancipation and wartime
Reconstruction in the Sea Islands of South Carolina. As the title implies, the Sea Islands became
a “rehearsal for Reconstruction” because all of the planters fled when the Union Navy conquered
the islands in 1861, leaving the freedmen in control of the large plantations. However,
encouraged by the army, northern missionaries and teachers soon arrived to help the slaves

16
17

Ibid.
Benedict, “A Constitutional Crisis,” 173, 305 n 13.
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transition to freedom, and it is their story that Rose focuses on.18 While the work does support
the actions of the freedmen and criticize southern whites for their attempts to subvert
Reconstruction, it has several shortcomings that reflect those of the Revisionist school as a
whole. The work focuses on missionaries and portrays African-Americans as passive with an
emphasis on what “whites did for blacks” rather than how blacks contributed to their own
emancipation.19 In addition, it also claims that Reconstruction failed, implying that whites failed
to give African-Americans their rights, which further portrays the freedmen as passive victims.20
The work does make critical contributions to the historiography of Reconstruction. It makes a
clear attempt to place the freedmen at the center of the analysis rather than only focusing on
white men. Secondly, it specifically studies wartime rather than postwar Reconstruction, which
breaks with most of the historiography of the period, which states that Reconstruction did not
begin until 1865. Finally, it is another example of the local histories that emerged during the
Revisionist period.
The dissertation improves on the Revisionist literature by focusing on the agency of the
contrabands themselves and how their decisions influenced the creation of policy, rather than
portraying them as passive victims of misguided policy. In addition, it illuminates the
shortcomings of the missionaries in much more detail, especially how they often patronized the
contrabands and failed to acknowledge their needs and desires when they created their own
policies for aid. Finally, it discusses multiple camps rather than individual case studies to
provide a more nuanced discussion of the camps and their connections to the Bureau.

18

C. Vann Woodward, introduction to Rehearsal for Reconstruction: The Port Royal Experiment, by Willie Lee
Rose (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999), xi-xiii.
19
Kolchin, First Freedom, xxiv.
20
Ibid, xxv.

13

In the late twentieth century, the Revisionists gave way to the post-Revisionists, who
portrayed Reconstruction in an even more negative light. They argue that contrabands and
freedmen gained no substantive rights and could not gain even economic autonomy because the
federal government failed to give them access to land.21 They criticize the army and Bureau’s
“reform efforts” as inadequate because army commanders and Bureau officials were actually
racists who only focused on compelling freedmen to sign labor contracts due to fears of
dependency on the government, and worked with the planters rather than trying to protect the
rights of freedmen.22 They directly contradict the earlier historians who saw Reconstruction as a
failure due to the federal government’s mistreatment of white southerners. In his work on
Reconstruction in Louisiana, for example, William F. Messner argues that the army and Bureau
established a system of “quasi slavery” intended to gain profits from the labor of the freedmen,
which laid the groundwork for further repression by planters once the Bureau left in 1872.23 In
her work on education, Jacqueline Jones criticizes northern teachers as “condescending and selfrighteous,” and for teaching subjects such as hygiene and punctuality, which indicated their
paternalistic attitude towards the freedmen.24 The post-Revisionist school does not just criticize
the actions of whites. It also addresses one of the major shortcomings of the Revisionist school
by not only telling the stories of contrabands and freedmen, but by portraying them as active
agents in the struggle for freedom and economic independence rather than passive recipients of
white largesse or hostility. The post-Revisionist school indicates how far the historiography of
emancipation and Reconstruction had come from the racism of the Dunning school and the
midcentury works that ignored the role of African-Americans.

21

Foner, “Reconstruction,” 12.
Kolchin, “Slavery and Freedom,” 251.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid, 242.
22
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Several post-Revisionist works illustrate the new focus on African-American agency that
often remained absent from even the Revisionist works, which tended to focus on the actions of
whites. In his work, James Brewer argues that African-Americans “contributed a sustaining
effort to the War for Southern Independence,” but he does not discuss Reconstruction.25 The
most significant work written during this period that places African-Americans at the center of
the narrative is Leon Litwack’s Been in the Storm So Long, which tells the story of emancipation
from the perspective of the contrabands. As he states, they are the “principal actors” in the book,
which describes “the extent to which blacks and whites shaped each other’s lives and destinies
and were forced to respond to each other’s presence” during emancipation.26 He makes a
concerted effort to gain the freedmen’s perspective on emancipation even with a limited source
base. He describes the “many and varied ways in which the newly freed moved to reorder their
lives” from the perspective of the freedmen themselves, which epitomizes the post-Revisionist
school and demonstrates the progress made since the Revisionists only ten years earlier.27
Another work that places African-Americans at the center of the narrative but also
discusses federal policy is Louis S. Gerteis’s From Contraband to Freedman, written in 1973. In
this work, he directly claims that he is criticizing earlier historians that portrayed AfricanAmericans as “pawns of Radicals” and is solely focused on placing them at the center of the
narrative, even though the monograph is an analysis of federal policies related to contrabands
and freedmen.28 He also follows the post-Revisionist script of censuring Reconstruction by
stating that emancipation did not constitute a “social revolution” and that it did not destroy all

25

Ibid, 244.
Leon Litwack, Been in the Storm so Long: The Aftermath of Slavery (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), xi-xii.
27
Ibid, xii-xiv.
28
Louis S. Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman: Federal Policy Toward Southern Blacks 1861-1865 (Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), 3.
26
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aspects of the antebellum social system.29 In addition, he solely blames the federal government
for this failure because the policies of contraband camps did not allow the contrabands to achieve
economic independence.30 During the war, he argues, government and military officials focused
on preventing a slave revolt and continuing cotton production rather than ensuring that freedmen
received basic civil rights. Federal policy, especially the failure to grant land to the contrabands,
“precluded the possibility of radical social reconstruction in the South.”31 The work is mainly
concerned with how freedmen reacted to federal policy and fought for their freedom and civil
rights despite the intransigency of the federal government. This trend has continued in the recent
works of Reconstruction historiography, which continue to tell the stories of freedmen from
numerous perspectives, but still have several shortcomings that are partially addressed by this
dissertation.
These shortcomings that the dissertation addresses include a clear connection between
camp and Bureau policy, as the post-Revisionist works either discuss the Civil War or
Reconstruction without connecting the two different policy programs. Also, the dissertation
emphasizes the fact that the Bureau did not learn from failed contraband camp policies, which is
an angle of analysis neglected by post-Revisionist works. The dissertation, finally, also gives
much more attention to the role of missionaries and private aid societies than post-Revisionist
works that focuses mostly on the failures of the military and federal government.
The most recent works on Reconstruction, those written in the 1980s and later, also focus
on the agency of contrabands and freedmen, but also take numerous new angles and perspectives
on contraband camps and the Bureau. First, they focus on the fact that Freedmen’s Bureau

29

Ibid, 5.
Ibid.
31
Ibid, 6-7.
30
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agents worked with planters to ensure a steady labor force and to avoid dependency on the
government rather than making sure that freedmen were treated fairly. In addition, they call
even the Radical Republicans “conservative” and argue that Reconstruction did not go far
enough.32 Another new argument during this period is the concept of Reconstruction as a
“revolution.” For example, James L. Roark argues that the South shifted almost instantly from
slavery to free labor, but also focuses on the failures of the federal-run free labor system.33
Others, however, such as Eric Foner, disagree with this argument and state that Reconstruction
did not go far enough to constitute a true revolution since freedmen did not achieve civil rights
or, in many cases, economic autonomy.34 While these works echo many aspects of the postRevisionist school, they differ due to their blame of the Republicans and the argument that
Reconstruction constituted a failed revolution. They address numerous aspects of emancipation
and Reconstruction overlooked by the post-Revisionist school, including education, health care,
gender, and the ongoing debate over whether the slaves freed themselves.
In his 1988 synthesis, Reconstruction, Eric Foner synthesizes the recent and postRevisionist literature. He argues that contrabands and freedmen were “active agents in the
making of Reconstruction” and places their actions at the center of the narrative.35 In addition,
he emphasizes their desire for autonomy, which shaped the “economic and political agenda” of
the period.36 In contrast to most previous historians, he argues that Reconstruction began in
1863 rather than 1865, and calls it an “extended historical process” that began with
emancipation.37 His work is one of the first to discuss contraband camps and federal contraband

32

Foner, “Historiography,” 12.
Kolchin, “Slavery and Freedom,” 255.
34
Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution (New York: Perennial Classics, 2002), 609.
35
Ibid, 13.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
33

17

policy in detail, and the first to connect them to later Reconstruction programs. His account is
not as critical of the Freedmen’s Bureau and other federal officials as some post-Revisionist
works. While he acknowledges that they forced freedmen to sign labor contracts and often cut
off rations for dependents, he also argues that they did attempt to ensure that freedmen received
their rights.38 The main argument of the book is that the war, and emancipation in particular,
constituted an “earthquake” that shattered the Southern social system, but that Reconstruction
was ultimately a failure because it did not ensure that African-Americans gained equal
citizenship in the South and in the nation.39 The final contribution of the work is an extensive
discussion of the North during Reconstruction and how the actions of Northerners influenced
events in the South, which addresses an aspect of Reconstruction that had been almost
completely ignored in the previous historiography.
In his 2012 work Sick from Freedom, Jim Downs breaks new ground by arguing that the
federal government failed to adequately protect the contrabands from disease due to misguided
policies. His work addresses disease and health care, mostly the lack thereof, in contraband
camps and plantations. He argues that military officials who saw contrabands as only a burden
to their campaigns tolerated horrendous conditions, which contributed to the spread of epidemic
diseases.40 He states, “Tens of thousands of freed slaves became sick and died due to the
unexpected problems caused by the exigencies of war.”41 In addition, he argues that
unemployment caused by the military’s refusal to hire women and children only worsened the
problem, as they had no way to support themselves.42 Finally, he states, the military’s decision

38

Ibid, 609.
Ibid; Kolchin, “Slavery and Freedom,” 256.
40
Downs, 4.
41
Ibid, 7.
42
Ibid, 8-9.
39

18

to transfer responsibility for the health of the contrabands to racist state authorities and the
Freedmen’s Bureau, which was only concerned with maintaining the labor force, exacerbated
mortality further.43 In addition, Downs makes an interesting comparison between disease
epidemics in the southern contraband camps and on Native American reservations in the West,
making his one of the first works to integrate the West into the historiography of emancipation
and Reconstruction. Finally, he blames the federal government for failing to take appropriate
measures to improve conditions, which reiterates the main argument of the recent
historiography.44
Another angle of analysis in the recent literature is education of freedmen and
contrabands. Little work was done in this field until recently, and most of it was virulently racist
and only focused on criticizing northern teachers and missionaries. For example, works from the
Dunning school criticized the teachers as incompetent abolitionists who had come to undermine
the South. Revisionists, meanwhile, stated that teachers improved the lives of freedmen, but
were still racists who did not accomplish nearly enough for the students. These works often
focused on the white teachers rather than the freedmen.45 Recent works have focused on the
students and the efforts of freedmen and contrabands to support schools. Ronald E. Butchart, for
example, describes not only northern white teachers, but also freedmen who became teachers,
and he focuses on their efforts to establish schools autonomous of white influence and control.46
He states that his work is about the “educational effort of the freed people to become a free
people.”47 Heather Andrea Williams, meanwhile, covers education in the South from slavery to
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the late nineteenth century and also places the African-American teachers and students at the
center of the narrative. She emphasizes the frequent disputes between African-American
teachers and white northern teachers and missionaries over control of the schools, the
curriculum, and access to supplies. In addition, she discusses education in the contraband camps,
which had been mostly ignored in the literature, and argues that the rise of African-American
schools led to the development of the first public school system in the South.48 Finally,
Christopher Span discusses education in Mississippi during Reconstruction and argues that
African-Americans themselves provided educational opportunities for their people, especially in
rural areas often isolated from the Bureau and northern missionaries.49 While he discusses the
white backlash and violence against the education of freedmen, he keeps the freedmen
themselves at the center of the narrative. Span’s work is an example of a local history, and such
local, state, and regional studies have flourished in the last thirty years.50
The new works of local history provide not only detailed analyses of particular camps,
but also valuable perspective on the vast scope of contraband camp and Freedmen’s Bureau
policy during the war and Reconstruction. In her work, for example, Patricia Click profiles the
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Roanoke Island colony in North Carolina. She discusses how missionaries, the army, and other
federal authorities set up and ran a system of camps, but also the lives of the freedmen and their
efforts to maintain economic, religious, and educational autonomy. She argues that the federal
government abandoned the freedmen when they closed down the colony and left them in an area
with few economic prospects and no chance to truly gain economic autonomy.51 She also
compares Roanoke Island to other camps across the South, making the work a comparative as a
well as a local history. In her work, meanwhile, Susan Eva O’Donovan discusses slavery and
emancipation in southwest Georgia, and argues that this region is distinctive because the Union
army never arrived there during the war. She states, “Reconstruction was a revolution that
failed, but it failed with shocking speed in a region where slave society arrived fast, ferociously,
and late.”52 She argues that freedmen had no choices but sharecropping, which led to
exploitation of the freedmen and even debt peonage, and that they received almost no civil rights
during Reconstruction.53 John C. Rodrigue, finally, profiles Reconstruction in the sugar regions
of Louisiana, where wage labor emerged instead of sharecropping, meaning that freedmen had
significant control of their work regimen. He also contrasts the free labor system in Louisiana
with that of the cotton South to highlight its distinctiveness.54 These illustrative examples are
only a few of the local histories that have emerged in the recent historiography of
Reconstruction.
The most recent works on contraband camps and the Bureau approach the topic from
numerous perspectives, which makes the field much more comprehensive and wide-ranging than
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the Revisionist and post-Revisionist literature. In her work, Chandra Manning focuses on the
issue of citizenship and how it shaped the relationships of contrabands to the federal government.
In particular, she emphasizes how contrabands used their service to the federal government and
the Union military to argue for increased citizenship rights and independence.55 The work uses a
wide range of sources and includes the story of contrabands and freedmen themselves, but the
central focus on citizenship obscures other issues, such as economic dependency, racism, and the
lack of a federal policy, that also contributed to the failure of the camps. In his work,
meanwhile, Kristopher Teters focuses on the experiences of officers in the Western Theater, and
their often-reluctant participation in ensuring the freedom of contrabands. He argues that they
participated in emancipation as a military necessity rather than from any real sympathy for the
contrabands, and that many officers had the same racist views that would plague the Bureau after
the war.56
Amy Murrell Taylor, meanwhile, uses multiple case studies to analyze the contraband
experience and demonstrate the low priority of contrabands for the Union military. She argues
that the military only truly cared for contrabands due to military necessity. The book also
focuses on the contrabands themselves and their efforts to maintain their freedom and economic
independence. The work mostly focuses on the Civil War and does not include extensive
material on Reconstruction to truly connect camp policy to Bureau policy, but still makes a
significant impact as the first true overview of several contraband camps that focuses on the
contrabands themselves.57 Finally, in her newly published work, Thavolia Glymph focuses on
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women in the contraband camps and how their experiences differed from those of men, and she
overcomes a severely limited source base to understand their agency and role in shaping
contraband camp policy. The historiography of emancipation is rapidly diversifying, but still
contains a major gap in connecting contraband camp and Bureau policy that will be addressed by
this dissertation.58
The final trend to emerge in the recent historiography of emancipation and
Reconstruction is the debate over “self-emancipation,” or whether slaves achieved their own
freedom by fleeing to Union lines. This debate is very relevant to the camps because it analyzes
the importance of the contrabands in the creation of federal policy and whether they had
significant impact in the army and government’s decision-making process. In his essay, James
McPherson argues against the idea of “self-emancipation.” He states that emancipation could
not have occurred without Union victory in the Civil War.59 As evidence, he argues that Lincoln
had always opposed slavery, and the fact that freedom for the slaves who did not reach Federal
lines depended solely on the outcome of the war. As he states, only Lincoln’s re-election in
1864 precluded the rise to power of proslavery Democrats, who would have likely nullified the
Proclamation.60 He also argues that Union retreats, especially in the Mississippi Valley, led to
the re-enslavement or even death of contrabands, further demonstrating that they could not
emancipate themselves. As he states, “Slaves did not emancipate themselves; they were
liberated by Union armies” commanded by Lincoln.61 Finally, he argues, since the Union army
emancipated so few slaves, abolition did not become official until the Thirteenth Amendment in
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1865.62 Allen Guelzo also takes this side of the argument by claiming that Lincoln freed the
slaves with the Emancipation Proclamation. He states that even contrabands who did reach
Union lines could not have remained free after the war without legal emancipation since the
Proclamation only constituted a wartime measure.63 These historians clearly disagree with the
concept of self-emancipation in favor of the more traditional narrative of political and military
emancipation. Newer works give much more focus to the role of the contrabands themselves in
achieving emancipation.
Ira Berlin is the first example of a clear self-emancipation argument. He argues that the
contrabands “rendered untenable every Union policy short of universal emancipation” and
focuses on the “evolution of emancipation” rather than only the Proclamation, the Thirteenth
Amendment, or other political actions.64 He further states that the contrabands were the “prime
movers in securing their own liberty,” indicating that they, rather than Lincoln or the army,
secured their own emancipation.65 He criticizes the Proclamation and calls it insufficient
because it exempted so many areas of the Confederacy and all of the Border States and did not
have any real authority to compel Confederate masters to free their slaves.66 Berlin does
acknowledge that emancipation could not have been achieved without the assistance of the
Union army. The contrabands themselves forced the army to appreciate the benefits of
emancipation by acting as laborers, scouts, guides, and spies, and by providing crucial
information about the Confederate army.67 Glenn David Brasher echoes this argument in his
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work, which discusses the role of contrabands in the Peninsula Campaign, which he describes as
more important than Antietam in influencing Lincoln’s decision for emancipation due to the vital
assistance they provided to the Union army.68 In his work, James Oakes includes extensive
detail on contrabands and their contributions to emancipation, even though the work focuses on
Republican confiscation policy and still ascribes an important role to the federal government and
military. He states that policies passed in Washington failed to alleviate atrocious conditions in
the camps, as unprepared military officers often made their own decisions without guidance from
the federal bureaucracy. He argues that slaves fleeing to Union lines forced the government to
create a uniform contraband policy, clearly indicating his focus on the contrabands as active
participants in their own freedom.69 The debate is far from resolved, as new scholarly works
continually emerge on both sides, which indicates the amount of work still to be done in the
historiography of emancipation and Reconstruction.
This dissertation, meanwhile, takes a moderate position against self-emancipation. It
emphasizes the importance of the contrabands and freedmen to shaping federal policy, but also
focuses on the importance of government actions and policies. The contrabands could not have
achieved or maintained their freedom without the protection of the Union military, as the
dissertation demonstrates by emphasizing the devastating and often fatal consequences for
contrabands when the Union army abandoned their camps and left them without any protection
from slaveholders and Confederate guerrillas. It also analyzes the shortcomings of federal action
on emancipation, as the lack of an overarching national policy for contrabands until the
formation of the Freedmen’s Bureau in 1865 led to mistreatment, neglect, and even the danger of
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re-enslavement by Confederate guerrillas. Finally, it discusses how the military, the federal
government, and even missionaries often ignored the desires of the contrabands and created
policies that undermined the ability of the contrabands to gain economic autonomy. The
dissertation takes parts of both sides of the debate to emphasize the role of contraband agency in
influencing, even in a limited way, the formation of national policy and programs, but also the
vital importance of Lincoln, the military, Congress, and the federal bureaucracy to enforcing and
protecting emancipation.
Despite the large number of recent works, some gaps remain in the historiography, and
the dissertation addresses a few of them. First, the dissertation analyzes how policies and
programs developed in the wartime contraband camps shaped Freedmen’s Bureau policy during
Reconstruction and how the freedmen resisted federal policies they viewed as undermining their
economic autonomy both during the Civil War and Reconstruction. Since the literature up to this
point has almost completely ignored the importance of often ad-hoc policies enacted in the
contraband camps to the development of Freedmen’s Bureau policies, the discussion of early
Reconstruction will be a major intervention in the historiography. In particular, it argues that the
lack of a federal contraband policy during the Civil War led to the emergence of numerous adhoc policies across the various camps. It also discusses the difficulties faced by the Bureau in
organizing the localized ad-hoc policies into a uniform program, and how the inadequate Bureau
staffing made the enforcement of federal policy even more difficult. The dissertation focuses on
the contrabands and freedmen and how their actions helped to shape federal policies, and it
addresses one of the most significant gaps in the literature on emancipation and Reconstruction.
Second, it provides significant detail about multiple camps, while also including ample
comparative analysis to elucidate how the situation at each camp influenced the contraband
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experience. Many works exist that examine particular camps or states during the Civil War and
Reconstruction, but the dissertation breaks new ground by not only providing comparative
analysis of seven regions but also connecting them all to the development of federal policy in the
camps and how the disparate policies influenced the Freedmen’s Bureau. A comparative
analysis allows for the exploration of various contraband experiences, from urban camps in the
District of Columbia to plantation leasing in Mississippi to colonies in North Carolina to
government plantations in the South Carolina Sea Islands. The inclusion of Kentucky permits
analysis of how the federal government focused on maintaining the loyalty of the Border States.
A discussion of Washington, D.C., meanwhile, allows a clearly detailed analysis of the
development of federal policy. The dissertation addresses significant gaps in the literature by not
only providing wide-ranging comparative analysis of numerous camps, but by focusing on how
the policies developed across these camps led to the programs and policies of the Freedmen’s
Bureau during the early years of Reconstruction.
Third, it includes discussion of both the on the ground reality at each camp and the
development (and lack thereof) of policy at the national level. While many works exist that
address one side of this angle or another, almost none thoroughly address both sides. In
particular, the historiography has ignored the connections between policy in the camps and
Freedmen’s Bureau programs. The impact of the contrabands in the development of both
contraband and Bureau policy needs to be examined in more detail and is a focus of this
dissertation. In the final chapter, the dissertation discusses the dissonance between policy
enacted by the Bureau office in Washington, DC and the actual policies enacted by Bureau
agents across the South. In addition to federal policy, meanwhile, the dissertation addresses the
role of missionaries in the creation of policy, another aspect of the field that the literature has
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largely ignored. The dissertation combines traditional political history and new social history to
analyze both high politics and on the ground programs at each camp, and therefore addresses
multiple gaps in the existing historiography.
Finally, the dissertation extends the narrative into Reconstruction to examine what
happened to the contrabands in each camp after the war as the Bureau took over the camps and
plantations. Most works either cover the Civil War or Reconstruction and fail to address the
often-difficult transition that the freedmen faced as camps closed and government support slowly
dwindled. The dissertation addresses Bureau failures in detail and connects them to labor
programs initiated in the contraband camps to clearly delineate the relationship between
contraband policy and Bureau programs. The dissertation also discusses the fate of aid society
efforts in the contraband camps and the continued efforts of missionaries to assist freedmen
during Reconstruction. In addition, the dissertation discusses the impact of Congressional
debates over the Bureau and Reconstruction policy on local Bureau agencies, and how local
agents attempted to influence debates in Washington. The dissertation makes numerous
improvements in the historiography of the Civil War, emancipation, and Reconstruction.
Organization of the Dissertation
The first chapter covers the period from the beginning of the war in April 1861 to the
issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation in January 1863. It analyzes the development of the
first contraband camps in Virginia and, North Carolina, and South Carolina, and the rampant
confusion and unpreparedness across the Confederacy as Union military officers, Congress, the
President, and missionaries grappled over what to do with the thousands of contrabands
streaming into army camps. While the chapter necessarily includes extensive top-down
discussion of military and government policy, it elucidates how missionaries and even the
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contrabands themselves contributed to the formation of government and military policy by
protesting for their definition of freedom, which often differed from that of the army.
Chapters Two, Three, and Four continue the analysis of contraband camps during the
war. The second chapter discusses the eastern theater camps during the second half of the Civil
War. Chapter Three, meanwhile, continues the analysis from chapter two but also discusses
Kentucky, in order to keep the analysis of contraband camps together in one chapter, and also for
ease of comparison between Kentucky and eastern theater camps. During this period, most of
the contraband camps became more established. The enlistment of black troops into the Union
army, sometimes due to impressment, resulted in most of the military-age men leaving the
camps, which meant that their families often had no means of support since pay was irregular at
best in the United States Colored Troops and few jobs were available for women and children.
The military had to find a way to support a dependent population, and their policies, such as
home farms, orphanages, and taxes on wages, would create models for the Bureau. Fears of
dependency led officers to cut rations and even attempt to close camps, and these fears would
continue to shape Bureau policy during Reconstruction. The second through fourth chapters
clearly demonstrate how policies formulated during the war created important models for
Reconstruction programs.
Chapter Four briefly discusses the problematic contraband camps in Mississippi and
Louisiana before moving on to a detailed analysis of plantation leasing and how the leasing
program served as a model for Bureau policy after the war. Leasing set an early example for
sharecropping, mandatory labor contracts, and the requirement to stay in a job for the entire year
that formed Bureau policy beginning in 1866. Discussing leasing directly before the analysis of
Reconstruction makes clear the connections between the policies and problems of the leasing
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program and the early policies instituted by the Bureau. The second through fourth chapters
clearly demonstrate how policies formulated during the war created important models for
Reconstruction programs.
The fifth chapter covers the early Reconstruction period to analyze continuities and
disjuncture between contraband camp policy and Bureau programs. It discusses the period from
May 1865 to 1868, when President Andrew Johnson, the military, and Congress grappled over
almost all aspects of Reconstruction, including the Freedmen’s Bureau. This chapter focuses on
the formation of the Bureau and the development of Bureau programs across the South and
Border States, with an emphasis not only on debates in Washington but also on how freedmen
shaped the development of Bureau policy. This chapter also discusses the closing of the
contraband camps and what happened to the contrabands as the army forced them out of the
camps. The chapter also analyzes the violence against freedmen that pervaded the South from
1866 to 1868, and how the Bureau largely failed to protect the freedmen due to a lack of staff,
which demonstrates the lack of true federal commitment to the freedmen. The dissertation
utilizes evidence from several contraband camps and regions to argue that policies formulated,
often haphazardly, in the camps during the war created numerous models for Bureau policies and
programs during Reconstruction.
Conclusion
Overall, the dissertation is a wide-ranging history of contrabands, freedmen,
emancipation, and Reconstruction in the South, the Border States, and the national capital. It
focuses on the experiences of the contrabands and freedmen themselves and how they attempted
to overcome exploitation and mistreatment by the Union army, the federal government,
missionaries, and plantation lessees, while also utilizing top-down political analysis to discuss
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the development of policy in the contraband camps and the Freedmen’s Bureau. The story
begins in early 1861, when three slaves who had escaped the Confederate army approached a
Union fort in Hampton, Virginia and became the first of thousands to earn the status of
contraband of war.
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CHAPTER 1
CONTRABAND CAMPS IN THE EASTERN THEATER, 1861-1863

In early December 1861, Massachusetts Governor John Andrews faced a dilemma.
Soldiers from his state had been ordered to return contrabands who had run to Union lines to
their owners. The fugitives had run from Maryland, so General Stone, the military commander
in the area, assumed they ran from loyal owners and therefore remained ineligible for contraband
status.1 Andrews, in his letter to Secretary of War Simon Cameron, stated that he “cannot for a
moment believe that the War Department will countenance such proceedings” and continue
returning fugitive slaves to their owners.2 In even stronger language, he stated that
“Massachusetts does not send her citizens forth to become the hunters of men” in any region of
the South, whether border state or not.3 Andrews’s letter demonstrates the hesitant and often
non-existent federal contraband policy at the beginning of the Civil War, and he would be one of
many northern voices, including abolitionists, missionaries, and even some military
commanders, opposed to the federal government’s inability to adequately protect the freedom of
contrabands across the South.
This chapter discusses the formation of contraband camps in Virginia, South Carolina,
North Carolina, and Washington, DC, and the contraband programs enacted in each camp during
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the first half of the Civil War. Due to the lack of a coherent federal contraband policy, local
camp commanders and superintendents created their own policies and programs, which often
remained well ahead of federal regulations and would create models for both policies in later
camps and the Freedmen’s Bureau during the early stages of Reconstruction. Military exigency,
racism on the part of federal and local officials, the chaos of war, and bureaucratic infighting all
undermined attempts to create a federal contraband policy throughout the Civil War, which gave
greater responsibility to local camp commanders to create their own policies. These same
problems, meanwhile, plagued the Bureau after the war, as individual agents often created their
own regulations despite the national Bureau bureaucracy. The establishment of wage labor, a
focus on avoiding dependency, the impressment of contrabands, and the placement of
contrabands on government-run farms all started as contraband camp policies and would become
the basis of Freedmen’s Bureau policy in 1865 and 1866.
In particular, each region created its own models for Bureau policy after the war. In
Virginia, the concept of contraband and the initial acceptance of fugitive slaves at Fortress
Monroe set the first precedent for contraband policy, and created the legal justification that
would be used across the South and Border States to support contraband programs. The
employment of contrabands by the military created an example that would be followed in almost
every contraband camp, as did the all-too-frequent failure to pay these contrabands the wages
due them for their labor. In South Carolina, meanwhile, the first attempt at setting up a farming
program for contrabands became the model for several other contraband camps that used
abandoned plantations to both provide jobs for contrabands and raise money for the Union war
effort. The widespread presence of missionaries in South Carolina created another precedent, as
aid societies and missionaries would flock to the contraband camps and impose their own ideas
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of uplift, which often contradicted those of the contrabands. North Carolina, meanwhile, saw the
first attempt at establishing a freedmen’s colony, and also the army’s first attempt to fight off
guerrillas that constantly harassed the contraband camps. The army’s inadequate response would
foreshadow the guerrilla problems that plagued western contraband camps throughout the war,
and also the Bureau’s inability to stop violence against freedmen during Reconstruction.
Washington, DC, meanwhile, was a distinctive case due to its status as the national capital,
especially after slavery became illegal there in 1862. The army had to sort out whether fugitives
came from loyal Maryland or disloyal Confederate states, and also attempt to find them housing
in the already overcrowded capital. The camps in Washington, finally, provide the clearest
demonstration possible of inadequate federal oversight, as the camps located within blocks of the
War Department still remained overcrowded, disease-ridden, and plagued with abuse throughout
the war.
Such mistreatment can be explained in part by the pervasive racism in the North during
the Civil War. Many northerners, not just lessees or army officials, held racist attitudes and did
not support programs to support contraband laborers in the South. A significant portion of
Northerners, according to Rose, opposed charity for anyone, including the contrabands, due to
the “implications of paternalism and condescending benevolence that it conveyed” despite the
fact that the contrabands clearly were destitute.4 Many saw the contrabands as “children”
incapable of making their own decisions, and these attitudes remained prominent among those
charged with helping the contrabands.5 Such opinions led to the focus on self-sufficiency, as
military officials implemented contract labor programs that required contrabands to work for
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wages, and that only those who worked would receive assistance from the government, even
though many contrabands were physically unable to work.6 Any assistance would only be
temporary to avoid the specter of permanent dependency, and many officials truly believed that
such strict measures helped the contrabands learn how to survive in a free labor economy.7 The
army and missionaries failed to realize the scale of the poverty and destitution amongst the
contrabands, and even made it worse by failing to pay wages and then refusing to provide
assistance, clearly indicating how the idea of self-sufficiency became devastating for the
contrabands.8 According to Gerteis, emancipation worsened northern racism, as many white
Northerners opposed a war they perceived as being fought solely for emancipation and rights for
African-Americans, which only worsened the situation for the contrabands. Such attitudes
would continue into Reconstruction, as opposition to the Freedmen’s Bureau and any aid to
freedmen remained a constant problem even in the North.9
The story of Reconstruction policy begins not in 1865 but in 1861 at a Union outpost on
the coast of the Confederate state of Virginia. Bureau policy is discussed in ample detail in
chapter five, but the connections to the contraband camps became clear as early as 1861. The
institution of wage labor rather than land ownership, the curtailment of rations and other forms of
support, the impressment of laborers, and the institution of labor contracts all began in 1861 in
one or more camps in the Eastern Theater, and formed the backbone of Bureau policy during the
early phases of Reconstruction. The problems that plagued these camps, such as a failure to pay
wages, inadequate protection from violence, the failure to address employer exploitation, and the
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separation of families, would also undermine the Bureau during Reconstruction and inhibit its
ability to institute a free labor system across the South. The camps in 1861 set both positive and
negative precedents for the Bureau after the war, meaning that an understanding of Bureau
policy has to begin with an examination of the contraband camps in 1861, and the true starting
point of contraband policy in southeastern Virginia.
Virginia: The Foundations of Contraband Policy
In the summer of 1861, the Union Army maintained control of Fortress Monroe on the
Virginia Peninsula, but the Confederacy held all the territory surrounding the fort, including the
nearby city of Hampton. To prevent the Union troops from utilizing food and other resources in
Hampton, the Confederate troops burned the city to the ground. The resulting chaos had the
unintended consequence of allowing Hampton’s slaves to flee their owners and reach the fort,
which created the first major fugitive slave crisis for the federal government during the Civil
War.10
At this early stage of the war, the Union troops in the fort remained unsure of whether
government policy permitted them to accept fugitive slaves into their lines, especially since the
Fugitive Slave Act remained in force. The fact that Confederate troops in Hampton forced slaves
impressed from their owners to work in horrific conditions near the front lines increased Union
willingness to accept the fugitives, both for humanitarian reasons and to deny their labor to the
Confederacy. When three of the slaves, Frank Baker, James Townsend, and Sheppard Mallory,
heard rumors that they would be sent further south to work in even worse conditions, they fled to
the fort and offered to work for the Union Army in exchange for protection from the Confederate
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army.11 General Benjamin Butler, the commander of the fort, who faced a “great need of labor
in [his] quartermaster’s department,” agreed. He justified his actions as taking “property
designed, adapted, and about to be used against the United States” away from the enemy, which
led to the term “contraband of war,” meaning enemy military property liable to seizure by Union
forces.12 Butler argued that since Virginia claimed to be a foreign country, then the Fugitive
Slave Act did not apply and Virginia masters could not come to the fort and reclaim their
slaves.13
While Butler had acted on his own and without any guidance from the federal
government, he soon informed Lincoln of his actions and asked if federal policy permitted him to
accept fugitive slaves. Lincoln ordered Butler to accept all fugitives without regard to whether
their owners were disloyal, which saved the Union Army the nearly impossible task of
determining the loyalty of a fugitive slave’s master. Lincoln ordered Butler not to separate
families, even when the women and children could not perform any useful labor.14 These
policies might have set a precedent for federal contraband policy, but these policies would not be
reflected on the ground. In Washington, DC, Kentucky, and Missouri, Union commanders sent
back fugitives who could not prove that their masters were disloyal in order to maintain the
loyalty of the Border States of Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland, and commanders in Virginia,
North Carolina, and Mississippi separated families when they impressed men for labor, often
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unpaid, away from the contraband camps, due to the desperate need for labor on military
fortifications.15 These failures reflect the difference between federal policy formulated in
Washington and on the ground reality, which continued to persist even after the formation of the
Bureau in 1865, which further indicates the important role of contraband policy in formulating
Bureau programs.
Once the three contrabands successfully gained shelter at Fort Monroe, hundreds more
began arriving, which made the question of their treatment more and more important. As
contraband John Boston wrote in a letter to his wife, “This day I can address you thank God as a
free man… I am with a very nice Man and have all that heart can wish,” except that he had been
forced to leave his wife behind when he ran to Union lines.16 The federal government did not set
any guidelines on wages, rations, clothing, or shelter for the contrabands due to the
overwhelming task of ramping up the Union war effort after the catastrophic defeat at First Bull
Run, which left Butler to formulate policies on his own. Butler ordered missionary Edward
Pierce to “organize the contrabands into a labor force” to work in the “engineer, ordinance,
quartermaster, commissary, and medical departments.17 Pierce divided the contrabands into first
and second-class laborers based on ability to work, and designated wages of ten dollars a month
for first class hands and 5 dollars a month for second class, along with rations and clothing for
laborers and their families. The contrabands only received one or two dollars a month, due to
deductions for clothing and a fund to support contrabands who could not work in order to avoid
dependency on government funds.18 Any contraband who was sick for six days in a row or more
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than ten in a month lost half wages for the month, regardless of whether they had any family to
support.19 The low wages reflected the desire to reduce government expenditures and also the
belief that the contrabands did not require very high wages to support basic subsistence. Pierce
and Butler only wanted to pay enough to avoid dependency on the government, especially given
the uncertain status of the contrabands. The low wages did not allow the contrabands to
accumulate savings, which undermined Butler’s own policy of ensuring self-sufficiency.
Despite these wage deductions, Pierce, who Butler named superintendent of contrabands at the
Fort, stated, “They would be required to do only such labor as we ourselves had done… they
would be treated kindly, and no one should be obliged to work beyond his capacity… and that
they should be furnished… with full soldiers’ rations.”20 His promises would prove unfulfilled,
as commanders at Fort Monroe routinely failed to pay wages, impressed contrabands, and did
nothing to stop abuse by soldiers, and the lack of a coherent federal policy or oversight
mechanism enabled mistreatment and abuse.
As soon as the first contrabands arrived at Fort Monroe, the army required the ablebodied to work for the government, but then failed to pay the contrabands even the low wages
stipulated in Butler’s orders. General Wool, who succeeded Butler as commander of the fort in
late 1861, justified this exploitation by arguing that the money went to the fund for dependents,
but then still refused to pay the contrabands the wages due after deductions for the fund due to an
overwhelming focus on economy and avoiding dependency.21 Wool utilized arguments that
would become common not only among military officials, but also the federal government and
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later Bureau officials to justify mistreatment of contrabands. Firstly, he argued that contrabands
would refuse to work without government compulsion, and that a mandatory wage labor system
based on binding contracts would be necessary to compel them to support themselves.22
Secondly, he argued that charity or any form of government handouts would encourage
contrabands to become dependent on the government, so the contrabands should have to work
for all material aid, including clothing and rations.23 In fact, according to historian Ira Berlin,
many officers believed that contrabands-once freed, educated in the basics of reading and
writing, and converted to Christianity- would profit from freedom alone without the need for
wages or any other form of material support.24 These ideas led officers at Fort Monroe to strictly
enforce mandatory wage labor for the army, and they jailed or even whipped contrabands who
attempted to protest bad conditions and the lack of wage payments, which many saw as a mark
of slavery.25 These ideas would have devastating consequences not only for the contrabands at
Fort Monroe, but also across the South, as they set precedents for both contraband camp and
Bureau policy.
In addition to ideological justifications for the failure to pay wages, corruption also
emerged as a major factor, as it would across numerous contraband camps. Officers sold rations
and clothing meant for contrabands for their own profit, and even pocketed the money
designated for contraband wages.26 The fact that corruption remained unchecked throughout the
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war and Reconstruction indicates the failure of federal oversight of the camps, which persisted
even after the formation of the Bureau and would have terrible consequences for the
contrabands. For example, Suthey Parker worked for the quartermaster for two months and then
as a military cook for ten months during 1862, but only received fifteen dollars total for a year of
work and was still trying to gain his back wages in September 1865 when he petitioned the
federal government for redress.27 Lewis Lockwood, meanwhile, used his capacity as a minister
at Fort Monroe to petition the War Department to improve conditions for the contrabands. He
described numerous abuses, including contrabands who only received one dollar total and
“inadequate” clothing for themselves and none for their families after six months of work despite
the seven thousand dollars in the fund for dependents, and they hoped that Lockwood could
intervene on their behalf to the federal government.28 The federal government did not address
his complaints, which again reveals the lack of oversight of the camps and the fear of contraband
dependency that pervaded the federal bureaucracy. In another revealing letter, Orlando Brown,
the superintendent of contrabands in nearby Newport News, stated that one hundred contrabands
working in the hospital had never received any wages, and that only thirty out of more than one
hundred contrabands working for the quartermaster had received pay, despite the fact that some
had worked for almost a year and had families to support, and the fact that the fund for
dependents contained ample cash reserves.29 Major General Dix, the commander of the
southeastern Virginia region, wrote his superiors in Washington that payments did not begin
until the end of 1861 for contrabands, despite the fact that white workers at the fort always
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received full wages on time.30 In fact, regular wage payments at Fort Monroe did not begin until
late 1863, meaning that contrabands labored without pay for almost two years while military
commanders more concerned with economy and avoiding dependency failed to take action.31
While the lack of wages itself constitutes a glaring failure of federal oversight, other
policies at the fort made conditions for contrabands even worse and also remained unchecked by
federal policy or oversight. Late in 1862, C.B. Wilder, superintendent of contrabands, wrote,
“As the colored people increase in numbers, so [did] the hostility to them,” and this hostility
soon began to result in fatalities.32 In winter 1862, “thousands of blacks were left without food,
clothing, or the means to purchase firewood” during the unusually harsh weather, contributing to
a mortality rate of four to six a day, which was also worsened by the lack of adequate clothing,
rations, and shelter that directly resulted from the failure to pay wages.33 In addition, army
officers not only used corporal punishment, including whipping, on contrabands, but failed to
punish soldiers who beat, robbed, and raped contrabands with impunity, which clearly indicates
the racism that pervaded the Union army, even among officers charged with caring for
contrabands.34 In a final example of exploitation, Superintendent C.B. Wilder evicted one
hundred contrabands, many of them women and children, from their barracks home in Hampton
to house a brigade of soldiers, and gave them land, but also denied them any further government
support and ordered them to “take care of themselves” in the city, despite the fact that much of it
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still lay in ruins and they had no agricultural implements for farming.35 Conditions in Hampton
became so bad in 1861 and 1862, in fact, that some contrabands voluntarily returned to their
masters rather than remain in what they, in petitions to the federal government protesting
constant mistreatment, termed “government slavery.”36 The failure of the federal government to
lay out a clear contraband policy led to exploitation and mistreatment at Hampton that remained
unchecked by federal oversight, a pattern that would repeat itself across the South and Border
States, and also manifest itself during the Peninsula Campaign of 1862.
During the Peninsula Campaign, when General George McClellan and the Army of the
Potomac advanced up the Peninsula towards Richmond and came within miles of the capital
before being repulsed by Confederate forces under General Robert E. Lee, contrabands from Fort
Monroe quickly assumed vital roles for the Union Army as laborers, scouts, and guides for both
the Army and the Navy, which supported the campaign from the James River.37 As Berlin
writes, “The freedpeople quickly made themselves indispensable to the Northern war effort,” but
the Union army failed to properly compensate them, which led to “hardship for workers and their
dependents.”38 Since General McClellan, a Democrat, held decidedly proslavery views and
wanted the Union army to refrain from interference in slavery, he did little to stop abuse of
contrabands. As Superintendent of Contrabands Wilder reported, after the arrival of McClellan’s
army, “The abuses… are continued, and in many cases… with increased rigor, by Rebel
sympathizers, straggling Soldiers, and Governmental Officers,” and the offenders almost never
faced discipline for even the worst abuses of contrabands, indicating the consequences of the
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lack of federal policy or oversight of the contraband camps.39 As historian Glenn David Brasher
argues in his work on contrabands in the Peninsula Campaign, soldiers “stole from AfricanAmericans, physically abused slave children, and sometimes raped enslaved women” during
their march up the Peninsula, and officers did nothing to stop them due to racism and a focus on
avoiding dependency on the government.40 Even worse for the contrabands, despite the fact that
Congress recently passed an Article of War prohibiting the Union Army from returning fugitive
slaves to their owners, some officers accepted bribes from masters to return their slaves, even if
their loyalty the Union remained doubtful at best.41 The fact that officers could so flagrantly
violate federal law without any repercussions clearly indicates that the federal government failed
to maintain effective oversight of the camps during 1861 and 1862.
Even the contrabands who achieved safety behind Union lines and avoided slave
catching-officers still faced mistreatment during the Peninsula Campaign. Contrabands who
farmed abandoned land faced theft or destruction of their crops by Union soldiers, which forced
them to resort to government labor that often failed to pay wages. Edward Whitehurst, for
example, cultivated eighteen acres and stated that Union troops took his crops, livestock,
potatoes, and even flour, and did not give him any compensation, leaving him destitute with a
family to support.42 When not enough contrabands volunteered for government labor due to the
lack of wages and difficult manual labor in the Virginia heat, army authorities resorted to
impressment despite earlier promises not to separate families.43 These workers often did not
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receive any wages at all, which left their families back in Hampton destitute with no way to
support themselves. When local impressment did not secure enough workers, authorities in
Washington, DC impressed contrabands from the camps there, brought them to Hampton, and
also failed to pay them wages, which left their families destitute in the squalid and disease-ridden
camps of the capital.44 The Peninsula Campaign, according to historian Robert Engs, “proved
devastating for army-black relations,” in a pattern that would repeat itself across the South, as
contrabands often faced exploitation directly connected to military campaigns and the movement
of the Union Army.45
In November 1862, Major General John Dix, commander at Fort Monroe, ordered the
contrabands moved to Craney Island to make room for additional soldiers, and the move
continued the exploitation of contrabands by removing them from their farms and homes. He did
not give any consideration to the fact that many had steady government jobs at the Fort and,
according to missionary Lucy Chase, viewed the island as a “slave-pen” where they would face
even worse conditions than at the Fort.46 Army commanders made the move hastily and without
any planning, and the contrabands, according to Dix, were “forced to remain all night on the
wharf without shelter and… food” while waiting for a ferry to transport them to the island and
were “suffering with disease” due to exposure to the unusually harsh winter cold, and several
contrabands died from illness.47 In addition, Union soldiers robbed the contrabands of the very
few supplies they owned, including clothing desperately needed in the winter, and faced no
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discipline from superior officers.48 Some soldiers even physically beat the contrabands to force
them onto the ferries whether they resisted or not despite their weakened state from two days
waiting without shelter and little food on the docks. Soldiers and army authorities treated the
contrabands so badly during the move, according to Gerteis, that some contrabands ran away due
to fear of re-enslavement on Craney Island, especially since neither Dix nor the missionaries at
the Fort explained the reasons behind the relocation and that a contraband camp would be
established on the island.49 Dix reported the move and the resultant mistreatment of contrabands
to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, and neither he nor any other federal official even
censured Dix or ordered him to improve conditions, which further indicates the lack of federal
oversight or coherent policy during the early stages of the war.
The army continued the mistreatment of contrabands and corruption after the move as
well. By January 1863, more than two thousand contrabands lived on the desperately
overcrowded island, which contained almost no land suitable for farming.50 The army continued
to expect the contrabands to support themselves but failed to pay wages just as they had done at
Fort Monroe. In fact, the paymaster, Lieutenant Sykes, fled the island with the payroll records
but without paying any wages in September 1863, and neither Dix nor his subordinate
commanders made any effort to pay the contrabands their back wages, and again faced no
censure from the federal government.51 The army failed to issue enough clothing to the
contrabands, who had no way to pay for extra clothing because they had not received the wages
owed them. Missionary and aid worker Lucy Chase described children who had almost no
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clothing and a lack of shoes, which forced her to “send sick and shivering women home” without
adequate clothing or footwear despite the winter weather and prevented children from attending
her school on a regular basis, meaning they did not receive the education they needed to ensure
sustainable economic autonomy in freedom.52 The army also failed to issue adequate food
rations to the contrabands, despite the fact that they could not grow their own food on the barren
land of Craney Island. As Chase wrote, “The well on the Island were suffering for food, and we
had nothing with which to tempt the convalescing,” indicating the scale of the food shortages,
which persisted even in the hospitals where arguments of self-sufficiency could not hold up.53
Even when the army did issue rations, “the necessary exposure to which our half-clad people
were subjected, when going for rations… brings coughs and colds into every barrack,”
demonstrating that army authorities directly contributed to the high rates of disease that plagued
the island during its entire tenure as a contraband camp.54 According to Chase, two to three
contrabands died a day, and Berlin cites hundreds of deaths during Craney Island’s tenure as a
contraband camp.55
While many diseases, including tuberculosis, could not be cured even by the best doctors
during the Civil War era, the army still could have taken measures to improve the health of the
camp, including issuing adequate clothing for the harsh winter weather, wholesome and
nutritious rations, and issuing rations closer to the contraband barracks to prevent exposure to the
weather. A higher standard of cleanliness could have been maintained, as almost every barrack
contained rat infestations, which worsened the spread of diseases, especially given the lack of
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clean clothes and proper hygiene facilities for the contrabands.56 A focus on economy and
avoiding dependency meant that military officers made little to no effort to improve camp
conditions, even though disease outbreaks continued, and missionaries in the area also failed to
protest on behalf of the contrabands. The fact that the federal government did not intervene
despite receiving numerous letters and reports from the army command at Craney Island
indicates not only the lack of oversight, but also the consequences of the lack of a clear
contraband camp policy from 1861 to 1863.
The ad-hoc contraband policies established in Virginia created several models that would
emerge in camps across the country and later as the cornerstones of Freedmen’s Bureau policy.
These included including mandatory wage labor, acceptance of women and children into
contraband camps, and the provisions of rations, clothing, and shelter for contrabands. They also
failed to prevent several forms of exploitation, including the lack of wage payments,
impressment, violence and theft by soldiers, and even returning contrabands to their masters, and
military officials too concerned about economy, avoiding dependency on the government, and
the war effort itself failed to intervene. While the federal government provided the initial
acceptance of Butler’s contraband policy and passed an Article of War prohibiting the return of
contrabands to masters, they failed to provide adequate oversight of the camps or to respond to
abuses when clearly informed of conditions in the camps. This lack of attention to contrabands
characterized the early stages of the Civil War in camps across the South when commanders
were left to make their own decisions on almost all aspects of contraband policy.
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South Carolina: Abandoned Plantations on the Sea Islands
On the Sea Islands, the labor system was much different than that found in Virginia,
which led to a much larger contraband population due to large numbers of slaves on the islands.
The land was divided into large plantations, each home to hundreds of slaves, while Virginia
planters held much smaller numbers of slaves. Slaves in South Carolina worked based on the
task system, where they were assigned a particular task, such as a number of acres to hoe, and
were permitted to return to the quarters after completing that task. Slaves in Virginia, on the
other hand, worked from sunrise to sunset under the gang labor system. The most significant
difference between the two states is that almost all of the whites fled when the Union Army
conquered the Sea Islands, leaving thousands of slaves behind.57 This distinction alone would
lead to much different policies in South Carolina than Virginia, including the first significant
attempt at federal oversight of contraband camps.
In November 1861, a Union naval flotilla commanded by Admiral Samuel Francis Du
Pont arrived and occupied the islands without opposition, as no Confederate troops were
stationed in the islands to provide any kind of organized defense, and South Carolina had the
distinction of being the only camp to never face a major military threat during the war. The
entire white population of the islands fled as soon as the first United States Marines stepped
ashore. Du Pont believed that the whites fled due to fear of their slaves rather than the Union
military, and he refused to use his sailors to protect the slave property of rebels, which provides a
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stark contrast to officers in Virginia who accepted bribes to return slaves to rebel masters.58 Du
Pont foreshadowed the racism soon demonstrated by Union authorities and even Northern
missionaries by stating in a letter to his wife that the slaves “were filthy but friendly, with
scarcely any modification of the pure African feature.”59 He had sympathy for the contrabands,
but saw them as alien and inferior to whites.60 Such racism, along with federal bureaucratic
bickering, would hamper the ability of the army and the missionaries to properly provide for the
contrabands, which indicates that a constantly changing federal policy was little better than no
policy at all.
The military quickly had to come up with a plan for the contrabands with little input from
the federal government. DuPont quickly turned over control of the islands to the Army, and
General Thomas Sherman (no relation to the more famous General William Tecumseh Sherman)
assumed control of the islands. Sherman, in turn, placed General Rufus Saxton in command of
contraband camps at Beaufort and Hilton Head.61 Contrabands who voluntarily came to the
camps worked for the army for three to five dollars a month, but had to buy their own rations
with the meager wages even though prices remained inflated throughout the occupation. They
also never received adequate clothing for themselves and almost none for their families.62
According to B.K. Lee, the Superintendent of Contrabands at Hilton Head, the contrabands were
“very destitute” and had very little clothing during their time in the contraband camp.63 As
missionary Elizabeth Hyde Botume wrote, the lack of clothing undermined the ability of the
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contrabands to work, as their attire was not sufficient for heavy manual labor.64 Despite the
presence of superintendents and other subordinate officers at each camp, enlisted soldiers
engaged in “plundering the negro houses of everything of any value” and rarely faced military
discipline both due to racism and preoccupation with the war effort, which indicates the failure
of oversight at the local camp level.65 In early 1862, meanwhile, a smallpox epidemic hit the Sea
Islands, and the six army physicians failed to set up any type of quarantine system to isolate
infected patients from the crowded camps, and the disease rampaged through the camps.66 The
camps constituted a failed first step towards organizing the contrabands. They did not provide
adequate supplies due to a focus on economy and avoiding dependency on the government, and
wages were not sufficient for the contrabands to support themselves. The overcrowded
conditions contributed to the spread of disease. By 1862, financial motivations as well as a
newfound desire to set up a model contraband camp led the federal government to take charge in
the Sea Islands in the first example of direct federal oversight of a camp.
Sherman and Saxton also had to come up with a plan for abandoned cotton, and the plan
clearly demonstrates the consequences of inadequate federal oversight. When the whites fled the
islands, the 1861 cotton crop had just been harvested, but no cotton crop had been planted since
while the contrabands worked for the army in the camps. The army decided to have the
contrabands grow cotton, and to use the money from the harvest to obtain supplies and otherwise
support the contraband program. The federal government strongly supported this idea, since
they wanted to spend as little money as possible on contraband support due to the already

64

W.C.G. to Sir, 24 March 1862, in Letters from Port Royal, Written at the Time of the Civil War, ed. Elizabeth
Pearson Ware (Boston: V.B. Clarke Company, 1906), 12.
65
Aide-de-Camp to the Commander of the 2nd Brigade, SC Expeditionary Corps, 11 November 1861, in Freedom:
The Lower South, ed. Berlin, et al, 114-115.
66
Edward L. Pierce to Hon. S. P. Chase, 2 June 1862, in Freedom: The Lower South, ed. Berlin, et al, 193. Pierce
had worked in Virginia contraband camps before moving to South Carolina in early 1862.

51

massive expenditures of the war.67 The army and Treasury Department officials set up the
plantation superintendent system, where contrabands would be placed on plantations run by
government superintendents who would be civilians paid by northern aid societies, meaning that
the government had to spend almost nothing to establish and maintain the plantations.68 Neither
the army, the Treasury Department, nor the missionaries and aid societies consulted the
contrabands as to their wishes for a labor system, mainly due to racism and a belief that the
contrabands were only suited for wage labor. The contrabands strongly opposed cotton as the
crop of slavery and preferred to grow food crops to support themselves without relying on often
irregular government wages.69 The army ignored their arguments and officers soon began
sending them out of the camps and onto government plantations across Hilton Head, Beaufort,
and Port Royal.70 The Treasury plan seemed to be off to a good start, but the lack of continued
federal oversight of the superintendents proved to be its downfall.
The army’s plan for rations and wages further demonstrates the failure of federal
oversight. Sherman issued General Order Number Nine in February 1862, which established
regulations for contrabands working on government plantations. He formulated these regulations
without any input from the Treasury Department or the high command of the army, which
indicates that federal oversight failed before the program even began. The order required
superintendents to pay regular and adequate wages, provide rations and clothing for laborers and
families, and to ensure the “humane” treatment of contrabands, but did not provide a specific
definition of the term.71 Later in 1862, another order designated wages of six dollars a month for
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first class laborers and four dollars a month for second class laborers, with equal amounts of
rations provided for both groups.72 Sherman failed to enforce even these basic orders, and
superintendents exploited contrabands while neither the army nor the Treasury Department
intervened.73 One major problem for the superintendents was the lack of federal funds provided
for contraband wages, which clearly is the fault of the Treasury Department. According to
historian Louis Gerteis, the army had no money to give superintendents for contraband wages
until late April 1862, and even then, only had five thousand dollars for four thousand
contrabands. As a result, contrabands only made nine dollars a year from February 1862 until
January 1863 for difficult plantation labor in the extreme heat of the Sea Islands.74 In contrast,
contrabands in Virginia (when they received their full wages) made five dollars a month for
military labor, while wages in Washington reached twenty dollars a month, indicating the scale
of low wages in South Carolina and the priority of economy over contraband welfare. The
federal government and the army clearly had the resources for higher wages in other contraband
camps but kept wages in South Carolina so low that contrabands could not support themselves,
and neither the army nor the Treasury Department ensured that superintendents paid even these
low wages to the contrabands. As a missionary stated, “at present they are working upon faith,
without even a definite promise as to what that payment might be,” and the situation improved
little on the government plantations.75
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At Coffins Point Plantation, Nathaniel Philbrick, the superintendent, failed to pay the
contrabands from December 1862 through March 1863, and also failed to issue clothing or
provide adequate medical care even though the contrabands had received no wages and could not
buy clothing or pay for physicians or medicine. Despite Philbrick’s complaints, military
authorities failed to issue him the clothing or money he needed, resulting in conditions so horrid
that some contrabands stated that they had received better treatment from their old masters.76
The National Archives contains numerous letters that Philbrick wrote to the Treasury
Department about the lack of funds for the contrabands, but the government did nothing, which
indicates that federal oversight of the South Carolina contraband program did not extend beyond
a written policy during the first half of the war, and the same would be true for contraband camps
across the South.
On Phrogmore Plantation, meanwhile, the contrabands also failed to receive adequate
rations or wages and left for jobs with the army, clearly showing the degree of mistreatment of
plantation laborers since life in the squalid disease-ridden camps constituted an improvement
over the government plantations.77 In fact, according to Pierce, without the intervention of
northern aid societies, contrabands at Port Royal would have faced complete destitution.78 As J.
Miller McKim stated in July 1862, “Until this time their pay has been almost wholly in
promises,” and they lacked adequate food and clothes.79 Finally, the superintendents, according
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to McKim, did not know how to grow cotton, meaning that they were totally unqualified for their
postings, and could not be relied on to produce a crop sufficient to pay for supplies for the
contrabands, which indicates the clear failure of federal oversight of the superintendent
program.80 As a missionary wrote in a letter home, “Saxton and his staff understand little or
nothing of the real wants of the plantations,” which indicates that even the army officers charged
with supervising the contrabands had little to no knowledge of cotton cultivation, which clearly
hampered their ability to adequately administer free labor agriculture.81
Even worse for the contrabands, they faced theft of their meager supplies from the army
tasked with supporting and guarding them. Soldiers in Port Royal, for example, despite the fact
that authorities never enacted a policy for living off the land and provided soldiers with adequate
rations, stole not only the corn crop but also all of the livestock from the plantations, leaving the
contrabands “miserably bereft” without a way to support themselves by farming, since
agriculture on the Sea Islands required work animals.82 Soldiers often held racist views and saw
exploitation of the contrabands as relatively easy since they faced no consequences. Pierce
stated that every single plantation on the Sea Islands faced a shortage of supplies due to theft by
soldiers, but the military did nothing to stop it and very few soldiers faced discipline.83 As
McKim stated, the contrabands were “badly treated by some of our soldiers, officers, and
privates.”84 At Fuller Plantation on St. Helena Island, meanwhile, soldiers took five sheep and
two lambs from contraband Richard Sams, and also stole most of the corn on the plantation
without regard to the fact that it constituted the only sustenance for the contrabands since rations
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were irregular at best.85 Finally, Pearson states that “several plantations near Beaufort… had
been stripped of their corn by the army” and nothing was done to provide the contrabands with
additional rations.86 The fact that soldiers almost never faced discipline for outright theft from
the contrabands indicates the failure of the command at Port Royal to effectively administer the
contraband camps since it would not be a major expense to enforce strict discipline on soldiers at
the local level.
Despite the Union occupation of the Sea Islands, Confederates recaptured Edisto Island
in early 1863 and re-enslaved contrabands who could not escape to one of the other islands,
which led to a major crisis on Port Royal Island that demonstrates the inability of the army to
adequately support the contrabands. The survivors fled to Port Royal Island with only the
clothes on their backs, having lost all the crops planted on Edisto Island.87 As Brigadier General
Rufus Saxton, the military governor of the Sea Islands and Union-held territory in mainland
South Carolina, wrote, “Two thousand negroes have been thrown out of employment from the
lands they were cultivating… and are now destitute upon my hands.”88 There were no available
jobs on the plantations, so Saxton had to send the contrabands to the already overcrowded camps
to work for the army, and they unsurprisingly failed to receive regular wages, which only
increased their severe destitution. In October 1863, several months after the raid, Secretary of
War Stanton observed that “the freedmen were found to be in a destitute condition” and still did
not receive regular jobs and wages.89 The fact that Stanton himself knew of the lack of wages
and squalid conditions in the camps indicates that the highest levels of the federal bureaucracy
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knew of the failure of their contraband policy in South Carolina, but failed to come up with an
effective solution. The ad hoc measures introduced later in the war did little to improve the
situation on the ground in South Carolina, as the contrabands became a pawn in political battles
between Radical and moderate Republicans over land distribution and property rights. That is a
subject for Chapter 2, which covers the second half of the Civil War in the Eastern Theater.
While the federal government failed to provide adequate resources or oversight for the
contrabands, Gideon’s Band, or missionaries from the North, mainly Boston and New York,
arrived throughout 1861 and 1862 to provide material aid and religious education to the
contrabands. They intended to provide the contrabands with the resources they needed to gain
economic autonomy and support themselves in freedom as frugal, hardworking Christians.90
Conflicts with the army and plantation superintendents began almost immediately, as
missionaries argued for improved conditions and regular wages but faced constant pushback.
Colonel Nobles, for example, hated Edward Philbrick and his fellow missionaries, calling them
“damned abolitionists” who wanted to “breed discontent among the negroes,” and actively
worked to undermine his efforts.91 Many plantation superintendents evicted the missionaries
from their land and accused them of undermining the work schedule and making the contrabands
unwilling to abide by the plantation regulations.92 As Pearson wrote, the cotton agents hated
missionaries as threats to their authority who would undermine the cotton program.93 While the
federal government had given the missionaries permission to work at the islands, therefore, they
failed to ensure that military authorities and plantation superintendents cooperated with the
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missionaries for the good of the contrabands, which illustrates a further failure of federal
oversight in South Carolina.
The missionaries themselves, however, harbored racist beliefs and often enabled
mistreatment of the contrabands by the army and superintendents. McKim stated that some
missionaries from Philadelphia thought “the blacks were lazy and good for nothing; spoiled by
kind treatment and unmanageable without a master,” and they imposed just as harsh conditions
on their leased plantations as any government superintendent.94 Another missionary stated that “I
find them to be rather stupid” and not qualified to make their own decisions. Such thinking led
the missionaries to make decisions for them without any input from the contrabands.95 In
addition, missionaries ran stores on the government plantations that charged wildly inflated
prices for basic necessities, despite the low wages paid to contrabands.96 As Pearson stated, the
missionaries sold clothing even when the destitute contrabands could not afford it in order to
raise money, despite the fact that the children “cannot change their clothes, which are of the
raggedest.”97 The missionaries often deviated from their stated Christian benevolence and
mistreated the contrabands, and the failure of federal oversight meant that their actions went
unchecked.
The free-labor ideology prominent in antebellum America contributed to an emphasis on
contraband labor at the expense of humane treatment and remained a key aspect of both the
missionaries’ attitude towards contrabands and army contraband policy. According to Eric
Foner, the free labor ideology stated that any worker could become economically independent
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and gain dignity through hard work and wage labor.98 In reality, the idea of free labor failed to
eliminate major inequity in labor relations and employers had complete control.99 Such ideas
became part of federal contraband policy, as “Republicans viewed the transition from slavery to
freedom through the prism of free labor” and only saw the contrabands becoming wage laborers
on plantations rather than independent proprietors or land owners.100 Contrabands had to either
work for the government or work on farms run by lessees, and both parties failed to provide even
basics such as food and shelter or even the right to leave an abusive employer.101 The free labor
ideology drove contraband policy not only in South Carolina but in camps across the South and
in Bureau policy during the early years of Reconstruction.
While the federal government took a much more active role in the contraband camps in
South Carolina than in Virginia, it still failed to correct the most egregious abuses of
contrabands. The army forced contrabands into squalid, overcrowded camps and then failed to
pay wages or improve sanitation to mitigate the frequent outbreaks of disease. The Treasury
Department saw the plantation superintendent program as an improvement, but it also led to low
wages and did not take the wishes of the contrabands into account. As Pearson stated, “the
natural impulse to treat the negroes as objects of charity was thus early found to be a mistaken
one; by the end of November [1862] the government… had ceased to give them anything” even
when they faced destitution due to a lack of regular wage payments and theft of their crops.102 In
addition, another missionary stated that the “general inefficiency, ignorance and indecision of the
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authorities” greatly undermined the contraband program, especially due to high number of
“jealous and hostile” army officers that opposed any support for the contrabands.103 The lack of
a clear and strictly enforced contraband policy led to unchecked exploitation of the contrabands
in South Carolina, as is clearly demonstrated by letters detailing conditions received by Chase
and Stanton, who knew of the bad conditions but did little to mitigate them.
North Carolina: The Establishment of a Contraband Colony
Results were similar in North Carolina, but the events there deserve separate examination
for several reasons, even if it discusses similar topics to those addressed in other camps. This
separate examination provides crucial details for examining the consequences of a lack of federal
policy to govern the contraband camps and to connect the contraband camps to Bureau policy.
First, the camps in North Carolina contained an initial attempt at a self-supporting contraband
colony at Roanoke Island, which illustrates the military’s attempts to make the contrabands selfsupporting while providing minimal economic assistance to the destitute or those unable to work.
These attempts at freedmen’s colonies would mark the contraband camps of North Carolina and
set an example for the Bureau to follow after the war. Second, the camps provide one of the first
clear examples of direct federal intervention in the contraband camps. Lincoln nominated
Edward Stanly to be military governor of northeastern North Carolina and also to govern the
contraband camps, but he opposed the entire contraband project and instituted numerous policies
that directly contravened federal military policy in his attempt to close the camps, and he
continued to do so until he resigned. This example of direct intervention by the federal
government in the camps was rare during the Civil War and indicates how even federal nominees
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did not follow the government’s own contraband policies due to inadequate oversight. Third, the
contrabands in North Carolina faced by far the most significant guerrilla threat in the Eastern
Theater, and the military’s inability to protect the contrabands not only resulted in the closure of
numerous camps and the re-enslavement of thousands of contrabands, but also set precedents for
the army’s similar failure to protect the contrabands on leased plantations in the Western
Theater. The guerrilla threat also clearly indicates the low priority of the contrabands to Union
policy during the first half of the Civil War. Finally, the North Carolina camps witnessed the
growth of missionaries in the governance of the camps, as missionaries became superintendents
of the contraband camps there from the beginning of the Civil War, but faced resistance from the
military when they attempted to institute benevolent policies for the contrabands.
The Union Army had to provide for the contrabands almost immediately after arriving in
North Carolina. In late 1861, a Union army under General Ambrose Burnside landed on the
coast and conquered New Bern, Elizabeth City, and Edenton on the mainland and Roanoke
Island. Soon after, they also occupied Beaufort and Washington, also on the mainland.104 As
soon as the Union army arrived, whites ran away from New Bern and left their slaves behind,
which created a situation very similar to that at Port Royal.105 Slaves from the countryside took
advantage of the chaos of war and occupation to flee to New Bern, and 7,500 contrabands
arrived in the town by mid-1862, along with one thousand on Roanoke Island and another 1500
in Washington and Beaufort.106 As C.H. Tubbs, a Union soldier in Burnside’s army wrote, his
unit was “on the march again with a large train of slaves, bound for freedom at New Bern.”107 In

104

Janette Thomas Greenwood, First Fruits of Freedom: The Migration of Former Slaves and their Search for
Equality in Worcester, Massachusetts 1862-1900 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 32.
105
Ibid; Incidents of a Three Years Trip at Soldiering as Recollected by C.H. Tubbs, Written from Memory, North
Carolina State Archives, Raleigh, North Carolina, 5.
106
Ibid, 32-34.
107
C.H. Tubbs, Incidents of a Trip, 9.

61

addition, Tubbs states that contrabands led the Union army to Confederate sympathizers, who
had their property, including slaves, confiscated.108 As historian Janette Thomas Greenwood
writes, the “runaways’ unshakable faith that the Yankees had come to free them far outstripped
the official policy of the federal government in the spring of 1862.”109 The army quickly set up
camps to house the contrabands, and Burnside prohibited the army from returning any fugitive
slaves even before Congress passed the Article of War making it a national policy, illustrating
how policies formulated at particular contraband camps often remained far ahead of federal
policies.110
The military quickly outlined a plan for the contrabands that focused on avoiding
dependency. On March 12, 1862, the post commander at Roanoke Island, Rush Hawkins,
outlined the contraband policy for North Carolina as a whole. Contraband men working for the
government would receive twelve dollars a month and women would receive four, along with
clothing and rations, while children would receive rations and would not be required to work
until they reached twelve years of age. A portion of wages would be deducted to support
contrabands unable to work in order to make the camps self-sufficient.111 Contrabands would be
housed in camps not only to protect them from Confederate raiders but also to prevent disease
from spreading to the Union army camps. As has been demonstrated in Virginia and South
Carolina, a vast difference quickly emerged between written orders and the reality for the
contrabands of North Carolina.
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The contrabands not only faced low wages, but also abuse from the very soldiers
assigned to protect them. As Greenwood writes, “Union officers such as Burnside viewed the
contrabands as a burden, and some soldiers saw them as cheap labor or a diversion from the
monotony of camp life” and faced little discipline for depredations against contrabands, as
demonstrated earlier in Virginia and South Carolina.112 Some soldiers forced contrabands to
entertain them by dancing in an often demeaning and racist manner.113 As Union soldier Charles
H. Tubbs wrote in his memoirs, other Union soldiers stole food from the contrabands, despite the
fact that they received ample rations and had unlimited access to the coast for fishing.114
Contrabands who tried to increase their meager earnings by selling confiscated Confederate
cotton faced close confinement in the camps, while soldiers who committed the same offense
received no punishment at all, which clearly demonstrates the racism of Union officers.115 The
army authorities at New Bern, particularly General Burnside and his subordinate officers, failed
to protect the contrabands from the depredations of the army, despite the fact that separate
contraband camps were supposed to protect the contrabands from crimes committed by soldiers.
Missionaries also played a vital role in the administration of North Carolina camps,
especially to make up for the shortcomings of army policy. On March 30, 1862, Burnside named
Vincent Colyer, a Quaker minister and missionary, Superintendent of the Poor for North
Carolina, meaning that he would care for both contrabands and white refugees.116 Under his
leadership, missionaries arrived in ever-increasing numbers to educate and assist the
contrabands, but, according to historian Patricia Click, faced an “uneasy” relationship with the
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army.117 Burnside and his officers wanted the contrabands to work and support themselves, and
opposed anything that resembled charity.118 A shortage of jobs undermined their free labor
program. Both New Bern and Roanoke Island became extremely crowded, and not enough jobs
could be created for the contrabands, especially for women and children.119 As Colyer wrote,
“women and children supported themselves with but little aid from the government, by washing
and ironing, cooking…to the troops,” indicating that contrabands could support themselves
despite the lack of government employment.120 A supply of captured Confederate uniforms
allowed the army to fully clothe the contrabands, and North Carolina did not suffer the shortages
of clothing that plagued Virginia and South Carolina.121 The contrabands in North Carolina
found ways to support themselves in the early stages of the Civil War by working for the
government, for individual soldiers, or private employers. They received much more regular
wages than contrabands in Virginia or South Carolina, which indicates not only more effective
administration of contraband labor programs, but also the importance of a clear contraband labor
policy established at the outset of Union control of coastal North Carolina.
While contrabands in North Carolina received much better pay than in Virginia or South
Carolina, they did not escape the ravages of disease. As Tubbs wrote in his memoir,
overcrowding and possibly contaminated water in New Bern rapidly spread disease among the
contrabands.122 In addition, heat that reached one hundred fourteen degrees in summer 1862
caused contrabands to die from exposure, and the army did not reduce the workload despite the
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intense and dangerous heat.123 In addition, the fact that the army located the New Bern
contraband camp right next to a swamp directly led to the spread of mosquito-borne diseases
such as malaria and yellow fever, but the army did not move the camp even as disease rates
rapidly rose in summer 1862.124 In addition, by winter 1863, Tubbs and his unit had moved to
Washington, North Carolina, which also faced severe overcrowding in the contraband camps and
corresponding high rates of the respiratory diseases common to the winter season.125 While
medical authorities had no way to cure most of these diseases, they did little to alleviate the
overcrowding and environmental factors that led to high disease rates, particularly in the swamps
of coastal North Carolina. Moving the camp away from the swamp or even utilizing contraband
labor to drain the swamp nearest the camp would have drastically reduced disease rates.
Contrabands faced particularly high rates of disease in North Carolina due to the failure of the
army to take proper corrective measures due to a focus on economy and reducing expenditures.
In early 1863, the situation for the contrabands would get much worse, as a new military
governor did everything he could to undermine the contraband program, until the very freedom
of the contrabands became an uncertainty two years after they fled their owners to reach Union
lines and what they believed to be certain freedom.
The administration of Edward Stanly clearly demonstrates the consequences of
inadequate federal oversight of the camps. In May 1862, President Lincoln named Edward
Stanly the military governor of Union-occupied North Carolina. Lincoln wanted to reestablish
Union authority since he believed that large numbers of Unionists lived in the region. He failed
to account for the fact that Stanly held strident proslavery beliefs and strongly opposed the
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army’s programs to assist contrabands.126 Lincoln also believed that, as part of the
reconstruction and reconciliation process, that he should enforce as many current state laws as
possible, including those related to slavery. Citing the law that prohibited slaves from learning
how to read or write, Stanly closed all contraband schools and ordered northern teachers to leave
the state.127 As Colyer stated, it was a “criminal offense, under the laws of North Carolina, to
teach the blacks to read, which laws he has come from Washington, DC, with instructions to
enforce.”128 The schools remained closed despite strong opposition from the North, and
contrabands were denied the education that they sorely needed to succeed in freedom for most of
1862.129 As bad as the school closings were for the contrabands, however, Stanly also began to
attack their very freedom.
Stanly also cited the existence of slavery in North Carolina and the Fugitive Slave Act to
argue that contrabands should be returned to their owners and ordered the army to begin reenslaving contrabands despite the Article of War that specifically prohibited the army from
returning contrabands to their owners. The fact that Stanly could so blatantly violate federal law
for several months without censure or corrective action starkly demonstrates the failure of
federal oversight of the contraband camps in North Carolina during 1862. According to Colyer,
“Stanly had returned several fugitive slaves to their owners” by fall 1862, often with the
compliance of the army.130 In June 1862, in fact, Captain William Hammill of the Ninth New
York Infantry returned two contrabands to a Plymouth owner of questionable loyalty, and
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punished soldiers who tried to intervene to help the contrabands.131 Planters could also petition
Stanly for the return of their property, and he almost always granted their wishes. Nicholas Bray
found one of his slaves at New Bern and “dragged her forth and drove away with her to the
plantation” while the army did nothing despite the fact that he was, according to Colyer, a “wellknown rebel.”132 Numerous other planters also gained admission to the contraband camps to
recapture their slaves, and contrabands began fleeing the camps to hide in the impenetrable
swamps of coastal North Carolina. As Colyer stated, they “would rather die” than face reenslavement, especially since harsh punishment often awaited them due to their previous
escape.133 The re-enslavement of contrabands, in fact, did not end until Stanly resigned in
disgust in early 1863 in response to the Emancipation Proclamation, which he vehemently
opposed.134 The contrabands could return to the camps, but overcrowding and disease continued,
and their freedom remained in jeopardy due to continued Confederate raids.
The brief administration of Edward Stanly demonstrates numerous shortcomings in
federal contraband policy during the first half of the Civil War. First, he did not face dismissal
or even censure despite blatantly violating an Article of War passed by Congress, and for using
the army to violate federal law. Newspaper reports of his actions reached the North, which
indicates that the federal government knew of his actions, but still did not dismiss or even
censure him. Colyer argues that Lincoln did not instruct Stanly to enforce local laws, especially
those that would maintain slavery, which indicates that Stanly violated his presidential
instructions but still did not face consequences from the administration.135 In fact, Lincoln had
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stated in early 1862 that “no fugitive who once comes within our lines a fugitive from a rebel,
shall ever be returned to his master,” but Stanly did just that repeatedly without consequence.136
The lack of a coherent federal contraband policy allowed Stanly to violate federal law and return
contrabands to disloyal masters and close contraband schools without any action taken by the
authorities in Washington. While conditions would improve in North Carolina, this inaction set
a precedent for inadequate federal response to the clear exploitation of contrabands in other
camps across the South.
North Carolina contrabands also began to face a major guerrilla threat late in the war,
which the Union Army could not prevent due to major reductions in manpower. By late 1862,
only nine thousand Union soldiers remained in North Carolina, as thousands had departed to
reinforce Union armies in Virginia.137 As a result, the contraband camps remained subjected to
Confederate raids throughout 1863 and 1864. According to Tubbs, guerrillas captured four
hundred contrabands outside of New Bern in July 1863, and also an unspecified number in
Tarboro soon after.138 In February 1864, thirteen thousand Confederates attacked New Bern and
captured camps housing 1,800 contrabands. According to historian David Silkenat, “untold
numbers were killed and captured” by the Confederates and re-enslaved, but the lack of records
means that a precise number will never be known.139 In summer 1864, the Confederates
besieged Plymouth and conquered the city before the Union army could safely evacuate all of the
contrabands, and several hundred remained trapped in the city before a Confederate army that
offered “no quarter” to African Americans, and perhaps hundreds lost their lives in a city that
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they thought promised freedom.140 In addition to the contrabands who faced re-enslavement, the
Confederate raids led to severe overcrowding in the better-protected camps, as contrabands fled
to Beaufort and the central New Bern camp in overwhelming numbers, which led to high
mortality rates from disease and exposure. In Beaufort, seventy contrabands died in two weeks
in 1864 from exposure due to the lack of shelter after hundreds of contrabands fled from
Confederate raids of smaller camps.141 Despite the continued raids, the Army high command
never sent adequate reinforcements to North Carolina due to the ongoing campaigns in Virginia,
meaning that the contrabands did not have adequate protection during the entirety of the Civil
War. The guerilla raids hampered their ability to obtain secure jobs that would provide
economic autonomy.
The army shifted to the creation of a contraband colony to try and concentrate them in a
central area that could be better protected, and also created the first contraband bureau. In
November 1862, Colyer resigned and Horace James became Superintendent of Blacks for North
Carolina.142 In early 1863, he authorized General Augustus Wild to begin recruiting for the
United States Colored Troops, and soon only women, children, and elderly or infirm men
remained in the camps.143 To relieve overcrowding at New Bern, the army established a colony
at Roanoke Island, which it hoped would help the contrabands become self-sufficient.144 The
contrabands on the island quickly built homes, and received plots of land for farming and
unlimited fishing rights, which meant that the army no longer had to issue rations since the
contrabands had ready access to ample supplies of food.145 After all able-bodied men were
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required to enlist, the army issued rations to their families to ensure that they never faced
starvation if the crops failed or they became too ill to farm.146 To administer the colony, the
army set up a “bureaucratic model that was later emulated in the [Freedmen’s] Bureau” by
establishing the Department of Negro Affairs for North Carolina.147 Led by Colonel Joseph
Burnham Kinsman, the Department worked with aid societies to ensure adequate supplies for the
contrabands, helped them to find jobs and housing, and also set up schools and churches with the
help of northern missionaries.148 Like the Bureau later in the war, it faced shortages of staff and
resources that greatly undermined its ability to administer the camp, and Roanoke Island faced
shortages of supplies, horrific sanitary conditions, and a lack of adequate schools for the
remainder of the war, but that is also a subject for Chapter 3.
The contraband program in North Carolina during the first half of the Civil War
demonstrated the failure of federal policy and oversight of the camps, but also the first attempt to
create a centralized bureaucracy for administering the contraband camps. The program began in
the same ad-hoc manner as Virginia and South Carolina, as commanders acted with little to no
federal guidance, and quickly became overwhelmed by the large numbers of contrabands.
Neither the army or the federal government intervened to stop Stanly’s exploitation of
contrabands and blatant violations of federal law, which demonstrates more clearly than any
other event of the Civil War the consequences of the lack of a federal contraband policy or
bureaucracy from 1861 to 1865. While the federal government failed to take appropriate actions,
the army acted on its own initiative to establish the Department of Negro Affairs to administer
the contraband camps spread across coastal North Carolina. The Department demonstrates how
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the precedents for the Freedmen’s Bureau itself emerged from the contraband camps rather than
from Congress, the administration, or bureaucrats in Washington, DC. Similar bureaus would
emerge in other contraband camps, particularly in Mississippi, which further strengthens the
argument of this dissertation that the Freedmen’s Bureau and its policies emerged from
precedents formulated in the contraband camps, and North Carolina created the first model. The
fact that North Carolina constituted the first centralized contraband bureau is even more
surprising considering that contraband camps emerged in the very heart of the federal
bureaucracy from the first day of the war, and contrabands in the camps in Washington, DC
struggled in the face of disorganized leadership and a lack of federal oversight despite their
location in the nation’s capital.
Washington, DC: Inadequate Federal Oversight in the Nation’s Capital
In Washington, before the army and government officials could formulate a policy for
how to treat contrabands in the capital, they had to decide whether to accept fugitive slaves into
Union lines to begin with. While slaves arriving from Virginia clearly constituted enemy
property subject to confiscation, fugitives from the border state of Maryland raised the issue of
determining whether a master was loyal or disloyal in order to assign the slave the status of
contraband.149 In 1862, Congress passed a law banning the military from enforcing the Fugitive
Slave Act and returning even the slaves of loyal masters to relieve officials from having to
determine the loyalty of a master, which was often an impossible task in the field.150 Since
Washington, unlike Virginia, South Carolina, and North Carolina, remained under the direct
control of Congress for the duration of the conflict, federal authorities had much more say in
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policy than in the other two regions, and the federal judiciary stepped in to influence fugitive
slave policy.
Despite the passage of the First Confiscation Act that freed slaves held by disloyal
owners or who had been forced to work for the Confederate military, Maryland slaveowners
continually entered the District to reclaim their slaves, helped by the local police who captured
fugitives at the Navy Yard Bridge separating Maryland from Washington.151 Even though the
army could not return fugitives, the federal government still could enforce the Fugitive Slave
Law, especially when Lincoln, concerned about the loyalty of the Border States and Maryland in
particular due to its proximity to the capital, called for the return of fugitives from Maryland.152
In 1862, the federal circuit court for Washington DC appointed fugitive slave commissioners and
began to hear rendition cases despite the furious protests of local black leaders, including
Frederick Douglass, and even local military commander James S. Wadsworth, who tried to help
the fugitives but often failed.153 In addition, enlisted soldiers did not care where fugitives were
from, saw their value as laborers who would be willing to perform the hardest and dirtiest jobs,
and accepted them into the lines, while the federal government continued to return Maryland
fugitives to slavery.154 The commissioners received ten dollars for remanding a fugitive to
slavery but only five dollars for emancipating them, which meant that most cases ended with the
fugitive returned to slavery. According to historian Kenneth Winkle, “All fugitive slaves who
could not prove their state of origin or the disloyalty of their owners were treated as… subject to
return under the Fugitive Slave Law,” and federal authorities actively returned fugitives to
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Maryland throughout the early stages of the war.155 Even though the army tried to help fugitives,
the federal government, focused on the loyalty of the Border States, returned them to slavery
unless they could prove their owner was disloyal. The government placed the war effort and
worries about the Border States ahead of the welfare of fugitive slaves and contrabands. For the
contrabands in Maryland and Washington, the consequences of a clear federal policy were worse
than the lack of policies early in the war in the southern contraband camps. In fact, the
commanders in Virginia, South Carolina, and North Carolina formulated more liberal contraband
policies than the federal government in Washington, which indicates the vital role of local camp
commanders in formulating federal policy.
Fugitives arrested faced horrid conditions in the local jail, and the federal government
took little action, which further indicates poor oversight even in the capital. When the army
arrested fugitive slaves from Maryland, they turned them over to the District police and city
marshal Ward S. Lamon, who ran the Washington City Jail.156 As historian Margaret Leech
writes, the jail was “a disgrace to the community” and the cells were “dark, unsanitary, and illventilated.”157 In winter 1861, the jail, designed to hold a maximum of one hundred prisoners,
held two hundred, including sixty fugitive slaves, and ten prisoners were held in an eight by ten
foot cell. Guards locked up contrabands with violent, often racist, criminals despite the fact that
they were not accused of a crime themselves.158 According to William S. Wood, the
commissioner of public buildings, “The old jail is now crowded with more than double the
number of persons… than can be kept there with any regard to cleanliness or health. … It is unfit
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for the purposes of a jail.”159 Lamon often falsely accused runaway slaves of crimes in order to
justify their imprisonment even when no master came to reclaim them. District police even
arrested contrabands who worked for the Union army and falsely claimed that they were
fugitives from Maryland in order to justify returning them to slavery. The army failed to
intervene to protect them and allowed the District police into their camps to recapture
contrabands, which means that officers violated the Article of War prohibiting the army from
returning contrabands and still did not face any punishment. The federal government did not
enforce its own laws even in the national capital, which clearly demonstrates the inadequate
enforcement of contraband policy early in the Civil War.160
After an investigation by private detective Allan Pinkerton, who saw the value of the
contrabands to the Union army as laborers and spies, abolitionists began to criticize the jail,
which led to overwhelming negative publicity. The Washington Evening Star newspaper wrote
that the “jail of Washington… is miserably constructed, badly lighted, and poorly ventilated,
and… it is inhuman to confine even the vilest criminals in its reeking cells.”161 Congress finally
acted in late 1862 and released all fugitive slaves from the jail and ordered Lamon to only hold
fugitives one month, and, if no master came to claim them, to free them no matter the loyalty of
their master or where they originally fled from. A Senate report stated that “a barbarous system
of punishment had been practiced upon colored persons in the jail” including “torture” and that it
had to stop immediately.162 The federal government finally acted to end the abusive practices of
the District police, but only after untold numbers of fugitives had been arrested and held in
deplorable conditions even when no master came to claim them, indicating the low priority given
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to the rights of contrabands and fugitive slaves early in the war. While federal action does
indicate closer oversight than Virginia, South Carolina, or North Carolina where local
commanders acted almost entirely on their own, it still indicates a preventable lack of initiative
since the government only acted after hundreds of contrabands had been held as runaways and
criminals in horrific conditions. It also indicates the important role of private citizens in
exposing the inadequacies of federal contraband policy and the lack of enforcement, which
foreshadowed a pattern that would be repeated across the South as aid societies and missionaries
constantly appealed to the federal government to improve conditions for contrabands.
The behavior of the police and Maryland slave catchers did sharply reduce public support
for the Fugitive Slave Law in the District and made army officers even more willing to protect
fugitives. Officers of the Seventy-Ninth New York protected ten fugitives from the police, but
the police captured them anyway and sent them back to slavery in Maryland, indicating that even
the army could not protect fugitives from the local authorities.163 By this point, violent protests,
along with the Second Confiscation Act, which mandated a loyalty oath to the Union for
reclaiming a slave and freed all slaves of disloyal masters whether they worked for the
Confederacy or not, and took effect in summer 1862, made the Fugitive Slave Act, according to
historian Kate Masur, “unenforceable” in the District.164 While contrabands who made it to the
army no longer had to worry about rendition, they still faced overcrowded, squalid camps
plagued with disease, hunger, and crushing poverty, while army authorities that had been so
eager to protect them from the police did little to improve the appalling conditions, indicating the
lack of effective federal oversight even in the nation’s capital.
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Even contrabands who escaped arrest as fugitives faced exploitative labor arrangements.
While multiple forms of work, including government farms and leased plantations, provided jobs
for contrabands in Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, the federal government
remained “the largest employer” throughout the war for contrabands in Washington. Private
employers ‘had to match or better the terms offered by military employers if they hoped to attract
and retain black workers.”165 In addition, the federal government assumed the responsibility of
providing for the families of workers, including housing, clothing, rations, and medical care.166
In late 1862, Military Governor Wadsworth ordered wages of twenty dollars a month for laborers
and twenty five dollars a month for skilled teamsters in addition to rations for workers and their
families, which he claimed to be double the wages given to farmhands in the North.167 In
addition, these wages were more than double those paid to contrabands in any of the southern
camps, which reflects the high demand for labor in Washington, as the government had to
compete with private employers to hire contrabands. Just like in Virginia and North and South
Carolina, the contrabands never received full wages, as paymasters deducted five dollars
monthly for the support of the hospital as well as destitute women and children.168 The wage
deductions aimed to reduce expenditures and to avoid dependency on the government by making
the contrabands totally self-sufficient, which included requiring them to pay for their own
medical care. Even these reduced wages failed to come regularly, especially early in the war, as
military authorities more afraid of “the specter of poverty and dependency” on government
charity failed to provide even minimal compensation to military laborers.169 The federal
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government did not intervene to ensure that paymasters properly paid contrabands, even when
the camps were blocks from federal offices, indicating that the lack of a federal policy or
oversight program even undermined contraband programs in the national capital.
The army often failed to pay contrabands even their low wages. According to historian
Ira Berlin, contrabands “were eager to work and willing to perform more grueling tasks, at lower
pay, and under stricter supervision, than even the most desperate white workers would tolerate,”
but did not receive decent treatment or compensation for their difficult labor.170 Many
contrabands only received pay once every three months if that, as military authorities believed
that food and freedom constituted adequate compensation. The lack of wages combined with the
lack of promised distribution of clothing and regular rations, forced contrabands to buy basic
supplies on credit at “exorbitant prices,” placing them in crippling debt, which army authorities
ensured they paid back by further deducting their wages.171 In addition, the five-dollar tax,
combined with the failure to pay adequate wages, left the contrabands with “barely enough to
make ends meet” and support their family members who could not work.172 The tax ended up
further impoverishing the contrabands while failing to ensure that those unable to work received
adequate support, as supplies of rations and clothing failed to come regularly, and sometimes not
at all, which indicates a further failure of contraband policy during the early stages of the war in
Washington DC.
A few examples of nonpayment demonstrate the consequences of inadequate federal
oversight. G. W. Simms, for example, worked as a military blacksmith for eleven months at a
supposed wage of thirty dollars a month, but could not support his family due to the tax and
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irregular payments, as he rarely received even close to his promised wage every month and often
received no pay at all.173 Contrabands working for the quartermaster failed to receive any wages
for an entire year, leaving them “in great need,” but Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs
refused to grant them any back pay. He stated that their rations constituted the only
compensation necessary, without regard to the needs of their families, who did not receive any
rations or clothing despite the tax to support dependents.174 According to a missionary teacher,
military authorities also cut off wages and rations to contrabands who became ill and could no
longer work, leaving their families unable to purchase food, and only the intervention of aid
societies prevented them from starving.175 The worst example of exploitation is the fact that
officers pocketed the five dollar tax rather than using it to support the destitute, indicating the
low priority that they gave to contraband welfare and the lengths they would go to exploit the
contraband laborers.176
The failure to provide regular wages and rations demonstrates the fear of dependency on
government charity and the desire to make the contrabands support themselves, without regard to
the high prices at stores or the needs of their family members unable to perform difficult military
labor. In addition, the fact that officers could appropriate the tax for themselves clearly indicates
a lack of oversight, despite the clear role of the federal government in enforcing tax policy, and
the fact that paymasters in contraband camps sent regular reports of wages to the War
Department. Contrabands in Washington faced the same exploitation as those in Virginia and
the Carolinas, as they performed difficult manual labor without any pay, despite the fact that they
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had families to support. The fact that the same failures of contraband policy existed in these
disparate camps indicates the consequences of the lack of a federal contraband policy or
centralized contraband bureaucracy, as clear violations of federal law to abuse and exploit
contrabands went unaddressed, which foreshadowed problems that continued throughout the
Civil War and even into Reconstruction due to disorganization and a lack of staff at the
Freedmen’s Bureau. These families, along with the workers themselves, also had to live in a
series of squalid camps, as unprepared army authorities repeatedly failed to provide even
minimally adequate shelter.
The lack of military preparedness for the contrabands is clearly demonstrated by the adhoc housing arrangements in the District. At the beginning of the war, lacking a clear plan on
where to house the contrabands and without any assistance in the matter from the federal
government, Wadsworth sent them to the dilapidated and vermin-infested Old Capitol Prison,
both as a shelter and as protection from the District police.177 At the prison, the army housed the
contrabands near white prisoners who had been accused of supporting the Confederacy and held
racist and proslavery beliefs, causing opposition from many officers in the area who wanted
them housed in segregated camps for their own protection.178 The prison was so overcrowded
that “the negroes by scores, can hardly be provided for with any comfort to themselves or to the
whites,” and smallpox broke out in the squalid prison.179 Seeking to stem the epidemic and
prevent it from spreading to white prisoners, Wadsworth ordered the contrabands moved to Duff
Green’s Row, a “cluster of tenements” that was little better than the prison and in fact even
worse, as disease and poverty plagued the camp during its entire tenure as a contraband
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settlement.180 The move indicates that military officers in Washington assigned contrabands
shelters and forced them to move to new quarters to protect nearby whites from disease rather
than out of concern for the welfare of the contrabands, and the federal bureaucracy failed to
intervene to address the horrific conditions in government contraband camps.
Duff Green’s Row quickly became overcrowded, but fears of dependency undermined
efforts to mitigate the situation. In June 1862, the same time that the contrabands moved to Duff
Green’s Row, command of the camp passed to Danforth B. Nichols, a missionary who worked
closely with the army to set up and maintain camps find work for the contrabands. The Union
army’s military campaigns, particularly the Peninsula Campaign, brought in more contrabands
than the army or Nichols had prepared for, and Duff Green’s Row quickly proved inadequate for
housing the rapidly increasing numbers of contrabands. By summer, twenty contrabands arrived
each day, mostly destitute and in desperate need of food, clothing, and shelter that the army
simply did not have, despite the fact that the capital constituted a major distribution point for
military supplies.181 The contrabands were given passes and documents verifying their freedom
but little else, and Nichols hired them to private employers in order to prevent their dependency
on the government.182 As Johnston writes, the army remained determined to avoid a “welfare
mentality” among the contrabands and also to spend as little as possible on supplying them, and
only issued rations to contrabands during their brief stay in the camp before being hired out.183
Ideas of economy and free labor contributed to the hiring out of contrabands, and employers only
had to promise decent treatment to hire contrabands from Duff Green’s Row.184 The employers
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quickly violated such promises. According to Nichols, “from the moment the contraband… gets
any money he is the victim of fraud and robbery” by private employers who cheated contrabands
out of wages and then charged excessive prices at stores, leaving the contrabands in hopeless
debt.185
Along with the irregular wage payments for government workers, such mistreatment by
private employers clearly demonstrates the priority of free labor ideology and avoiding
dependency rather than ensuring the welfare of the contrabands. In addition, the fact that the
army forced contrabands to find housing despite skyrocketing rents that they could not afford on
their meager wages indicates both a lack of preparedness for the contrabands and the inability of
both the army and the federal government to come up with a new policy for housing the
contrabands. The abuses by private employers provide even more evidence of inadequate federal
oversight of contraband programs, as the government took little to no action against employers
who failed to pay contrabands their wages, which left them desititute and unable to support their
families. The contraband program in Washington failed to escape the precedents of
mismanagement and lack of oversight that plagued southern camps early in the Civil War.
The overcrowding at Duff Green’s Row quickly contributed to widespread disease, and
the army failed to provide adequate shelter or medical care to stem the repeated outbreaks. As
Berlin writes, “In the close quarters of Duff Green’s Row, sanitary conditions deteriorated and
disease spread rapidly,” as three hundred sixty contrabands crowded into a camp meant to hold a
maximum of fifty, as the new arrivals overwhelmed the hiring out program and contrabands
began to stay in the camp for extended periods.186 According to Harriet Jacobs, an escaped slave
working as a nurse in the camp, diphtheria, scarlet fever, and typhoid raged through the camps,
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and the contrabands were “in the most pitiable condition.”187 Nichols and the army, meanwhile,
remained occupied with hiring out contrabands and did little to address the worsening conditions
at the camp, even though contrabands needed to be healthy to be hired out to private
employers.188 By June 1862, ten contrabands died a day, and nurses had “nothing at hand to
administer to the comfort of the sick and dying.”189 In addition, the contrabands, even the
desperately ill, only had “filthy rags” for beds, and some had no bedding at all.190 According to
Jacobs, it was “almost impossible to keep the buildings in a healthy condition” due to the
shortages and overcrowding, leading to horrific consequences when smallpox began to spread
through the camp in the summer of 1862, as army authorities continued to neglect the basic
medical needs of the contrabands even during an epidemic.191
As mentioned earlier, physicians could do little to treat infectious diseases during the
Civil War, but camp administrators made matters worse in a variety of ways. First they failed to
construct more shelters to relieve overcrowding, to ensure that all contrabands had adequate
clothing and bedding, and to make sure the camp maintained adequate sanitation and waste
removal. The fact that Nichols and the army allowed the camp to deteriorate to the point that
epidemics became almost constant indicates a failure of both the army and the federal
bureaucracy to formulate and enforce sufficient policies for contraband camps, and the inability
of commanders in Washington to improvise their own solutions.
Second, Nichols and the army medical staff failed to take any preventative action.192
Most of the contrabands came from rural areas in Virginia and Maryland and had never been
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exposed to smallpox, meaning that they would be susceptible to the disease if an epidemic
occurred. The medical staff only ordered vaccinations for white soldiers and aid workers at the
camp and refused to vaccinate the contrabands, causing completely preventable and devastating
mortality rates when the disease arrived in summer 1862.193 The failure to vaccinate provides
clear evidence of army mistreatment of contrabands in Washington, as they failed to use a simple
procedure that could have prevented the epidemic, but chose to only vaccinate white workers,
indicating both a focus on economy and sheer medical neglect of the contrabands. Since the
army surgeons had to order vaccination supplies from Medical Department headquarters, the
failure to vaccinate contrabands clearly received approval from the highest levels of the military
medical establishment, which further indicates the failure of the federal administration to correct
abuses of contrabands at the camp level.
Third, doctors failed to quarantine contrabands afflicted with smallpox, allowing the
disease to spread rapidly through the camp, further indicating the neglect of even basic medical
care for the contrabands.194 According to historian James Oakes, twenty contrabands died every
day from smallpox, and shortages of medicine, shelter, and clothing only worsened during the
epidemic.195 Winkle cites one seventy year old contraband dying of smallpox “found lying in a
pile of manure” and left to die by army doctors without even minimally decent shelter or medical
care.196 The epidemic became so horrific that even white Washingtonians, often indifferent to
the contrabands at best, were “aghast” at the death toll and appalling neglect in the camp,
indicating the scale of mistreatment and abuse at Duff Green’s Row.197 As Jacobs wrote, “Those
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fearful eyes often looked up to me with the language, ‘Is this freedom?’.”198 For the contrabands
at Duff Green’s Row, freedom was plagued by poverty, overcrowding, epidemic disease, and the
failure of Nichols, the federal government, and military authorities to do anything to stem the
rising mortality rates. The situation would not improve when the contrabands moved to a new
camp, as poverty, neglect, and the failure of federal oversight would only worsen when the
contrabands moved to Camp Barker.
Fourth, by August 1862, the smallpox epidemic had become so widespread that military
authorities decided to move the camp to a healthier location.199 Nichols and the army doctors
left the smallpox patients at Duff Green’s Row, which became a smallpox hospital that suffered
from a lack of staff and supplies throughout the war, and moved the healthy contrabands to
Camp Barker, a set of military-style barracks designed to alleviate overcrowding.200 The new
camp did not prove to be an effective solution, as disease, poverty, and overcrowding continued,
while Nichols and the army officers who staffed the camp focused on helping the contrabands as
little as possible to avoid dependency on the government, despite the clear evidence of need.
While the federal government eventually gave the army permission to move the camp, they
failed to provide any clear policy for administering the camp and also failed to take any action to
address the rapidly worsening conditions at the camp for almost a year.
As a result of these failures, the epidemic continued to ravage contrabands at Camp
Barker, and overcrowding continued despite the large new barracks. According to Berlin, two to
three families lived in every ten by twelve-foot barracks room, and twenty six people lived in
one small cabin, all with minimal furnishings.201 In addition, inadequate sanitary facilities
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contributed to the spread of disease, while army doctors again failed to provide proper medical
care or take action to improve sanitary conditions in the camp, which would have prevented a
significant portion of the disease and cost little for either the army or the federal government.202
When smallpox again ravaged the contrabands despite the move from Duff Green’s Row, army
doctors initially refused to begin vaccination, and then, as the epidemic spread, attempted it
without success due to a bad batch of vaccine matter that actually spread rather than prevented
smallpox, and the disease ravaged the severely overcrowded camp.203 By November 1862,
twelve to fifteen contrabands died daily of smallpox and other contagious diseases, and the
hospital, according to a Quaker missionary, was “ill-ventilated and disgusting in the extreme,”
which only raised the death rate.204 Still, the army did nothing to address the severe
overcrowding and wretched sanitation of the camp, and the federal government failed to
intervene despite the camp’s location in downtown Washington. The outbreak worsened in
summer 1863, as twenty five contrabands perished every week from disease, and reached its
nadir in January 1864, when one hundred fifty died in one month.205 Even worse, army doctors
delayed the treatment of smallpox victims until they could decide whether to admit them to the
local hospital for paupers or the army-run hospital for contrabands, causing many to die without
receiving any treatment, and they received no guidance from any federal agency on the matter,
which further reflects the consequences of poor federal oversight.206 By April 1863, according to
historian Allan Johnston, seven hundred contrabands had died of disease, revealing the horrific
consequences of overcrowding and medical neglect of the contrabands that went uncorrected by

202

Testimony of D.B. Nichols before the American Freedmen’s Inquiry Commission, April 1863, in Freedom: The
Upper South, ed., Berlin, et al, 290.
203
Testimony of James I. Ferree, January 1864, in Freedom: The Upper South, ed. Berlin, et al, 326-327.
204
Winkle, Lincoln’s Citadel, 314.
205
Ibid, 314-315.
206
Ibid.

85

the army and by a lack of federal policy or oversight of the contraband camps, which failed to
correct much more ineffective camp leadership than existed in Virginia or the Carolinas.207 Even
for contrabands who managed to survive the outbreak, however, another danger loomed that
threatened their freedom: re-enslavement.
Despite the fact that District police could no longer detain fugitive slaves and the army
could not return them even to loyal masters according to both Article of War and the Second
Confiscation Act, contrabands at Camp Barker still were not safe from the threat of reenslavement. The military banned Fugitives from Maryland from the camp due to continued
fears over the loyalty of the Border States and forced them to find housing in the District, where
they had to live in the “worst areas of Washington,” which were plagued by “disease, crime, and
destitution.”208 Citizens of the District, according to Johnston, held largely racist tendencies
even if they opposed slavery and were “unwilling to accept their presence and foster their wellbeing,” leaving them to settle in the most dangerous parts of town with often inadequate shelter
and barely enough to live on, especially if they could not find a steady job due to rampant
employment discrimination.209 Maryland masters unaware of the exclusion policy continuously
raided Camp Barker, exposing the contrabands to the threat of re-enslavement.210 The raids
demonstrate the inability of the army to protect contrabands from small raiding parties even in
the military headquarters of the Union, clearly demonstrating a lack of concern for the basic
rights of the contrabands. In addition, it provides a stark demonstration of the failures of federal
oversight, as the army allowed slaveowners to blatantly violate federal laws and did nothing to
address it or protect the contrabands from re-enslavement. The Article of War prohibited the
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army from returning fugitives no matter the loyalty of the master, so the fact that they continued
to allow Maryland masters into the camp constituted a blatant violation of federal law. Neither
Nichols nor the commanders at Camp Barker faced discipline for returning fugitives to their
owners or excluding contrabands from the camp entirely, which provides further evidence of the
consequences of the lack of a federal contraband policy early in the Civil War.
In addition to failing to protect contrabands from re-enslavement, the army failed to
provide adequate wages at Camp Barker. The army set up the camp, according to Berlin, as a
temporary employment depot, and contrabands working at the camp only received six dollars a
month along with rations in order to entice them to find work elsewhere.211 According to
historian Kenneth Winkle, half of the contrabands found government jobs, either for the army or
for various government agencies in the Washington area, and they at least received regular
wages and adequate rations for themselves and their families.212 For the rest, they faced much
more tenuous work assignments that did not always permit them to support themselves, much
less their families. Nichols, the superintendent of the camp, wanted the facility to be selfsufficient and ordered all contrabands, even children, to work for the camp or find a job
elsewhere.213 He maintained the practice of hiring contrabands out to private employers, who
continued to exploit the contrabands with low wages, high prices, and failure to provide
essentials such as food and clothing, and the contrabands had no recourse since the army failed
to enforce its own regulations on contraband welfare. Some employers even laid off the
contrabands without paying any wages, and neither Nichols nor the army authorities did anything
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to prevent such base exploitation, which further indicates the consequences of ad-hoc contraband
programs and inadequate federal oversight.214
Even worse, Nichols sent many contrabands, mostly children forcibly separated from
their families, to work in Maryland, where slavery remained legal until late 1864. The
contrabands protested vociferously, stating their fears of returning to a slave state and the fact
that separating families without consent closely resembled slavery, but Nichols continued to
allow Marylanders to hire contrabands, including those who clearly had Confederate
sympathies.215 Nichols himself admitted that “some” contrabands were indeed re-enslaved upon
arrival in Maryland, but continued the practice anyway, and the army officers who ostensibly ran
the camp did nothing to intervene.216 These labor practices, especially sending contrabands to a
slave state, indicate the degree of emphasis on free labor and self-sufficiency, even risking the
freedom of the contrabands to compel them to work. The desire to reduce expenditures and
avoid dependency on the government at all costs led to the requirement that all contrabands
work, even if that meant bringing in exploitative private employers from a slave state. Finally,
the raids at Camp Barker had clearly demonstrated the real motives of Marylanders, but rather
than driving them away, Nichols and the army allowed them to hire contrabands, bringing to
light the true consequences of free labor and self-reliance for the contrabands who thought that
Camp Barker would ensure their freedom. The federal government failed to intervene to prevent
the clear re-enslavement of contrabands and the separation of families, which lucidly reveals the
failure of federal oversight of the camps even in the national capital, and the dire need for an
overarching federal contraband policy by 1862.
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The contrabands who remained in the camp faced another form of mistreatment: abuse by
Nichols and the military administrators. Nichols himself admitted that a Captain Mackey used
“corporal punishment,” including whipping, on the contrabands for relatively minor offenses,
and does not describe any attempts to discipline Mackey for such blatant abuse, and the military
records for Washington do not show any discipline by the army.217 Lewis Johnson, meanwhile,
testified that Nichols “was not very kind” and stated that Johnson “may as well be dead” when
he tried to get the wages he was justly owed by his military employer, especially since Nichols
required cash for all purchases of even basic supplies, including food and clothing.218 Kesiah
Briggs, meanwhile, testified that Nichols viciously whipped a woman for refusing to go to the
smallpox hospital, which would expose her young and unvaccinated child to the disease and
almost certainly lead to its death.219 When Patsy Scott approached Nichols for her housing
ticket, Nichols refused to give her housing even though contrabands without employment could
live in Camp Barker on a temporary basis until they acquired a job, and not only berated her but
also beat her despite her pregnancy, and she had a miscarriage soon after. According to Scott,
Nichols treated her worse “than my old master would do.”220 These cases not only indicate
abuse by Nichols, but also the failure of military authorities both at the camp and around
Washington to stop it and the obvious failures of federal oversight. These contrabands testified to
a military court inquiry, but the abuse only continued, demonstrating the clear neglect of
contraband welfare by the army and the federal bureaucracy in Washington.
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Two cases, more than any others, exemplify the direct participation of Nichols and
soldiers in the mistreatment of contrabands. Betsey Brown, a washerwoman for the commissary,
became ill and needed blankets and warm clothing. She lived in a tent that was “full of holes”
since Nichols refused to replace worn-out tents even though they directly contributed to disease
during harsh weather.221 When she went to Nichols to get the basic supplies she desperately
needed, Nichols claimed that she did not work hard enough despite her government job and longterm illness and did not deserve any assistance, even though her son, a soldier in the United
States Colored Troops, was killed in combat.222 He beat her and threatened to have the military
arrest her if she complained again, indicating the degree of emphasis on self-sufficiency and
fears of dependence on the government, which caused Nichols and the army to deny assistance to
contrabands who clearly qualified for charity.223 Most aid societies concentrated their efforts in
camps farther south, meaning that contrabands in Washington did not receive as much aid from
northerners, which only made the refusal of assistance by Nichols and the army more dire.
Lucy Ellen Johnson fared similarly. When she arrived at camp, Nichols refused to give
her rations even though her husband worked for the government and was supposed to receive
rations for his family in addition to wages, ordering her to work as well. When she protested,
Nichols ordered the guards, soldiers from the Eleventh New York Volunteers, to arrest her and
take her to the guardhouse even though she had not committed any actual crime and had only
protested her mistreatment by Nichols.224 The guards kicked and hit her repeatedly, before
whipping her and tying her up by the thumbs for half an hour before officers finally intervened to

221

Testimony of Dr. Garland, in RG 393, Washington, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington,
DC.
222
Ibid.
223
Ibid.
224
Testimony of Fielding Lewis, in RG 393, Washington, National Archives and Records Administration,
Washington, DC.

90

end the sadistic punishment.225 Even worse, Captain W. L. Frisbie had not only failed to stop the
torture but actually ordered his soldiers to use the increasingly harsh measures, and continued in
this manner until stopped by superiors.226 Such behavior by soldiers, and especially officers,
clearly illuminates the degree of exploitation and abuse of contrabands at Camp Barker, and the
failure of the federal government to effectively intervene to prevent such abuse, as the camp was
located within blocks of federal offices. Johnson’s case led to a lengthy inquiry by the high
command of the army but did not lead to any charges or dismissals from the service, which
indicates that even the highest levels of military command did nothing to stop abuse by soldiers
and officers.227 The abuse also demonstrates the preference of economy and self-reliance over
contraband rights, as army quartermasters and Nichols refused to provide even basic supplies,
leading to preventable deaths from exposure, even though ample supply stores existed across the
District. By late 1862, the contraband program in Washington could only be considered a dismal
failure.
Contrabands in Washington during the first two years of the Civil War faced the threat of
re-enslavement by Maryland masters, incarceration in the city jail, overcrowded, squalid camps,
the separation of their families, and mistreatment and abuse by the army and Superintendent
Nichols. The federal government failed to intervene to address conditions, despite the fact that
many of the problems, including the conditions in the camps, the re-enslavement of contrabands,
and the conditions in the jail were well-reported. Conditions in the Washington contraband
camps did not lead to a federal contraband policy, which led to dire consequences not only in the
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District but across the South, and the failure of federal contraband policy and oversight
continued during the second half of the Civil War across both the eastern and western theaters.
Overall, the contraband camps in Virginia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and
Washington, DC suffered from the lack of a clear contraband policy and inadequate federal
oversight. Local commanders, left to improvise their own policies, created well-intentioned free
labor programs, but failed to provide effective oversight or correct exploitation and abuses, either
due to a lack of federal guidance, the low prioritization of contraband welfare, or a lack of
adequate resources to provide for the contrabands. The ongoing military campaigns led to the
depletion of troops from the contraband camps, causing them to be more vulnerable to
Confederate raids. Some policies reflected the fact that local contraband camp commanders
remained ahead of the federal government in terms of policy creation, especially the Department
of Negro Affairs in North Carolina, the free labor program in South Carolina, and the acceptance
of contrabands into Fort Monroe in the first place. Numerous policies instituted in these camps,
including the payment of wages for government labor, the use of abandoned land for farming by
contrabands, the impressment of contrabands for military labor, the institution of mandated labor
for the government, and the attempts to determine whether contrabands had disloyal or loyal
masters, created models for Bureau policy after the war, further demonstrating the fact that
policies created in the camps created examples for Bureau policy and programs during
Reconstruction. In addition, the problems that plagued these camps, including nonpayment of
wages, the separation of families by impressment, the failure to address poor sanitation and
disease, and the failure to acknowledge the interests and goals of the contrabands, also
undermined Bureau efforts during the early years of Reconstruction. During the second half of
the Civil War, the federal government continually failed to provide effective contraband policy
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or oversight, which led to worsening conditions in camps across the South as the sheer numbers
of contrabands overwhelmed local commanders. They still created numerous policies and
programs for contrabands that clearly demonstrated the importance of local contraband policies
in setting precedents for the Freedmen’s Bureau during early Reconstruction.
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CHAPTER 2
POLICY FAILURES IN THE EASTERN THEATER CAMPS, 1863-1865

During the second half of the Civil War, contrabands in the Eastern Theater faced the
consequences of continued failures of federal oversight, as the lack of a uniform contraband
policy compelled local commanders and camp superintendents to make decisions on how to
support the contrabands, how to institute a free labor program, and how to handle enlistments
into the United States Colored Troops. In Virginia, commanders turned to government-run
farms due to the ample abandoned land near Fortress Monroe but a failed move to Craney Island
set precedents for later relocations of contraband camps in the Western Theater, and the attempts
of the Bureau to move freedmen to locations with better job prospects without regard to the
freedmen’s desires to remain where they were. In South Carolina the federal government
attempted to assist the contrabands by selling land at auction, but failed for several reasons,
including racism, greed, a focus on self-sufficiency and wage labor as the only acceptable
occupation for contrabands, speculation, and bureaucratic infighting among several Cabinet-level
departments. The failed land sales in South Carolina clearly foreshadowed the failure of the
Bureau to distribute land to the freedmen in South Carolina despite Sherman’s designation of
land as reserved for the freedmen. Camps in both states faced continued problems that would
foreshadow the weaknesses of the Bureau after the war, including a lack of wages, poor
sanitation and disease, a failure to take the wishes of contrabands into account when making
decisions, and the impressment of men for either labor or enlistment in the military. The second
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half of the Civil War provides compelling evidence of the consequences of failed federal
oversight, and the importance of policies and programs formulated in the contraband camps to
the policies later established by the Freedmen’s Bureau.
The discussion of the eastern camps is split into two chapters for several reasons. First, it
allows for extensive analysis of the different policies enacted in each camp to highlight both the
failure of federal oversight and the impact of different local circumstances on contraband camp
policy. Second, it demonstrates how different aspects of each camp, from wage labor in Virginia
to attempted land sales in South Carolina to contraband colonies in North Carolina to a model
village in Washington all shaped Bureau policy during Reconstruction. Finally, it more clearly
demonstrates that the Bureau had examples of obvious policy failures in the contraband camps,
but failed to learn from them and instituted the same failed policies for the Bureau.
The reasons that the contraband camps examined in this chapter became such a low
priority for the army are numerous. First, the needs of military campaigning always came first,
no matter the location of the camp or the condition of the contrabands. Second, as was discussed
in the introduction and will also be discussed in more detail in chapter four, many of the Union
officers held racist views and disliked assignments in contraband camps, and many low-quality
officers became superintendents, leading to incompetent leadership, negligence in addressing
exploitation, and even corruption and outright mistreatment of the contrabands. Third, the army
and the federal bureaucracy wanted to keep expenditures as low as possible, and contraband
camps came low on the budgetary priority list, meaning both that camps constantly faced supply
and personnel shortages, and that the army focused on making contrabands self-sufficient above
all else, even if it was detrimental to their welfare, and often overlooked failures to pay wages
due to the overwhelming focus on reducing expenditures. Finally, the growing presence of
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missionaries and aid societies in the camps led the army to rely on them more and more to
support the contrabands and even run the camps, which made contraband welfare an even lower
priority. The military believed that the missionaries could take care of contrabands with little
assistance from the army. All four of these reasons would combine to undermine contraband
camp administration in the eastern theater during the second half of the war.
Virginia: Farming as a Model for the Bureau
An analysis of the contraband camps in Virginia during the second half of the Civil War
provides several insights into the connections between contraband camp and Freedmen’s Bureau
policies. First, the attempt to move the contrabands onto abandoned farms created a model for
the Bureau’s policy of emptying the contraband camps and mandating that contrabands instead
sign labor contracts on plantations. The failures of the Virginia farming program foreshadowed
the numerous difficulties faced by the Bureau in assigning contrabands to employers and then
protecting them from abuse and exploitation. Secondly, the neglect of the camps and the failure
to address obvious abuse by military personnel indicated the low priority of the contraband
camps in the Union war effort, and the lack of resources given to the Bureau after the war that
greatly undermined their ability to support the freedmen. Finally, the guerrilla problem that
plagued the Virginia contraband camps both foreshadowed later guerrilla problems in the
Western Theater, and illustrates the army’s inability to protect contrabands from violence that
would continue after the war under the Bureau. An analysis of the Virginia contraband camps
from 1863-1865 is vital to understanding how contraband camp policy contributed to the policies
and programs of the Bureau after the war.
Before the contrabands could settle on government farms, they had to be moved off of
Craney Island, and the army mistreated them just as much on this move as when they arrived on

96

the island. Army officers in command of the move banned them from taking any crops and
refused to issue rations, meaning that the contrabands went without food for the duration of the
move and received no compensation for their farm labor.1 The army only issued the contrabands
half rations for the period prior to the move despite hard labor demolishing the barracks and
preparing for the move.2 The contrabands’ tenure on Craney Island was marked by exploitation,
abuse, disease, and death from arrival to departure, and federal authorities did nothing to
intervene, which indicates the consequences of the lack of federal oversight. Army authorities
claimed that government farms would be a significant improvement, but the exploitation and
mistreatment only continued.
In making the decision to set up the farms, General Dix focused on removing the
contrabands from dependency on the government and placing them far away from Fort Monroe,
in order to have farm superintendents supervise their labor and thus free army officers of the
burdensome task.3 Large amounts of abandoned land remained available since most of the
whites in the area had fled in 1861 and no attempt had been made to lease land to private
superintendents or lessees.4 Major General Butler approved this program in early 1864, and
began assigning contrabands to farms to begin planting that spring.5 Rather than helping the
contrabands, the army focused on free labor and “self-sufficiency” on the farms due to
overwhelming fears of dependency on the government. Military officials thought they were
teaching contrabands to be self-reliant and independent, but failed to account for the desperate
poverty amongst them and the very clear need for assistance, especially for rations while the
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crops grew prior to harvest.6 As Captain Orlando Brown, the superintendent of contrabands in
Norfolk, wrote, the goal of the farm program was “to leave them as far as possible to their own
resources [and] to teach them that freedom from slavery is not freedom from labor.”7 In fact,
Butler, Dix, and the officers in charge of supervising the farms took the doctrine of self-reliance
and free labor so far that they forced contrabands, even the families of soldiers in the United
States Colored Troops, to move to government farms by cutting off their rations until they
complied, with no regard to the desires of the contrabands or their ability to perform difficult
agricultural labor.8 In addition, authorities in Yorktown evicted oystermen, peddlers, and
squatters out of their houses to make room for farm workers, even though many of these
contrabands had legitimate jobs and did not wish to move onto a farm.9 Once the army settled
contrabands on the farms, either voluntarily or by force if necessary, the exploitation continued,
as military authorities continued to focus on free labor at the expense of supporting the
contrabands. In addition, they wanted to maintain a “traditional” economy with as little
disruption to the area’s infrastructure and economy as possible, and believed that only
contrabands who worked on government farms could become self-sufficient, despite clear
evidence to the contrary.10
Despite the fact that the army controlled Fort Monroe and most of the surrounding area,
and claims by army officials that farms would only be set up in “secure areas,” the government
farms still faced attacks from guerrillas and rebel sympathizers, leaving the contrabands
vulnerable to re-enslavement or worse despite the large military presence at Fort Monroe.11 The
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area, according to Berlin, remained plagued with “die-hard rebels determined to prevent former
slaves from engaging in any form of free labor” and army authorities failed to provide sufficient
protection to the contrabands, with horrific results.12 According to Engs, Confederate guerrillas
did capture several contrabands from government farms and sold them back into slavery, clearly
showing the scale of army neglect of contraband rights, as military authorities failed to protect
even their freedom from slavery.13 The problem became so bad in nearby Norfolk that the
commander of the army detachment there had to form a company of contrabands for defense
when the army refused to spare any soldiers to protect contraband farms.14 When the army
leased plantations to private businessmen late in the war, the problem only became worse, as
superintendents placed contrabands onto plantations but failed to provide any level of protection,
despite clear evidence of the guerrilla threat and the high numbers of known rebels in the area.
One Confederate sympathizer who had abandoned his land early in the war returned to find it
leased by the federal government. He retaliated by viciously assaulting lessees and contrabands
while the army, despite the presence of thousands of troops, did little to stop him and other
guerrillas that plagued the farms throughout the war, clearly indicating the devastating
consequences of the army’s focus on free labor at the expense of the welfare of the
contrabands.15 The higher levels of military command failed to intervene and send more troops
to protect the contrabands, which further indicates the lack of federal oversight of the contraband
camps. For the contrabands who escaped guerrilla attacks, conditions were little better, as
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military officials repeatedly cut rations and wages in order to ensure contrabands did not become
dependent on the government, but with little regard to the continuing poverty and destitution.
The army clearly set up the system of contraband farms to ensure that the contrabands
worked rather than to ensure their welfare. Each family worked a ten acre farm for half the crop,
but the army also created a gang labor system and even “put a lien on the crops to ensure the
payment of debts,” including rent, clothing, housing, and agricultural supplies, clearly revealing
the importance of ideas of self-sufficiency and free labor.16 Since the first food crop would not
be harvested until the fall, the army stated that it would issue rations to the contrabands until the
crop became available.17 A very strong aversion to contraband dependence within the army
caused numerous instances of army officials reducing or even cutting rations entirely on the
farms, even for women, children, and the elderly and infirm who could not work.
Superintendent Brown, for example, decided that the legal ration for contraband farm workers
“was considerably greater than… necessary for their actual support” and cut rations in order to
reduce expenditures.18 Even worse, when a drought devastated the 1863 crop, Brown refused to
increase rations in order to “leave them as far as possible to their own resources” and avoid
supposed dependence on government charity, even though unforeseen events, not a failure to
work hard, had devastated the crop and left the contrabands without sufficient subsistence and
with no way to obtain additional food since the army no longer permitted them to fish in the
area’s bountiful waters.19 While the situation dramatically improved in 1864, as good weather
produced a plentiful harvest that easily provided enough subsistence, the army still enforced rent
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charges and even charged for livestock fodder, clearly demonstrating the importance of selfreliance.20 In perhaps the most telling indication of the true motivations behind government
farms, the army made twenty thousand dollars in profits from the farms in 1864 alone, while
cutting rations and charging contrabands for rent and fodder.21
While the contrabands eventually provided their own subsistence, army officials still
mistreated and exploited them, and the federal bureaucracy failed to provide any oversight, even
when the scale of mistreatment became obvious from the high profits and continued charges for
rent and essential supplies. The army also failed to protect the farms and left the contrabands
without protection from potential re-enslavement while the higher levels of military bureaucracy
failed to send any more soldiers or take any action to protect their freedom. The army officials,
on the other hand, took the initiative and established a system of sharecropping that would later
become the model for almost identical programs set up by the Freedmen’s Bureau during
Reconstruction. Bureau agents permitted sharecropping contracts that deducted shares for rent,
fodder, rations, supplies, and clothing, and which often left the contrabands with little to no
profit at the end of a year’s labor.22 The failure to protect contrabands from guerrillas and white
violence also set an unfortunate precedent for Bureau policies. The contraband camps in
Virginia set multiple examples for the Bureau to follow, which demonstrates the importance of
contraband camps and contraband superintendents in instituting policies later adopted by the
Freedmen’s Bureau during the early stages of Reconstruction from 1865 to 1868.
For contrabands both on and off the government farms, financial exploitation by the army
did not constitute the only worry- Union soldiers and officers routinely abused contrabands and
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suffered almost no punishment from superiors. According to Gerteis, “northern soldiers
generally found a crude amusement in the harassment of contrabands,” and such abuse continued
throughout the war, long after McClellan’s army departed the Peninsula in the summer of 1862.23
Soldiers even attacked contrabands working on farms, stole crops and livestock, and generally
hampered the ability of the contrabands to support themselves, especially as ration cuts
continued throughout 1863 and 1864.24 In Newport News, soldiers desecrated the only black
church in the area, which also served as a school for one hundred children, ripping out
floorboards, siding windows, pews, and sacred objects, which could not easily be replaced due to
the poverty of the contrabands. No record exists of these soldiers being disciplined, which
became a common theme in cases of even the worst examples of contraband abuse.25 The
soldiers at Fort Monroe did not behave any better, as the contrabands there were “abused and
maimed, by the brutality of those under whom they work” and “were treated very roughly.”26
Such abuse, combined with a continued lack of wages and repeated reductions in rations, meant,
according to New York missionaries stationed in Hampton Roads, that the contrabands were
“worse off than they were in slavery,” and some even wanted to return to their owners despite
the horrors of slavery.27 These ideas came from the fact that contrabands and white officials,
both in the army and the higher levels of the federal government, had vastly different ideas of the
meaning of freedom. While military and bureaucratic officials, according to Engs, wanted to
“control” rather than help contrabands, and therefore focused on self-sufficiency, avoiding
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dependence, and the war effort, contrabands had other ideas.28 They believed that freedom
would mean decent treatment, wages for their work, and the end of impressment and separation
of families, which they saw as a relic of slavery. To the contrabands, unpaid labor, insufficient
rations, and impressment seemed too similar to the slavery they thought they had escaped, and so
did corporal punishment and abuse by Union troops.29 The fact that the federal government
failed to provide any effective oversight or make even minimal attempts to improve the situation
of the contrabands in Hampton Roads only further convinced many contrabands that exploitation
and mistreatment would only continue, and they would be proven correct by the events of the
late Civil War and early Reconstruction period.
Contraband women suffered even more, as the threat of rape by Union soldiers never
went away, especially since perpetrators faced minimal to no discipline. In Yorktown, several
soldiers raped a young girl, prompting male contrabands to kill the soldiers. The incident
established both the sheer depravity soldiers were capable of and the ability of contrabands to
fight for their rights and their basic dignity as human beings, even in the face of harsh
punishment by the military for the murder of a soldier.30 According to historian Leon Litwack,
such sexual violence against contrabands remained commonplace throughout the war across
almost all contraband camps, and he cites two disturbing cases of violent sexual assaults in
Hampton.31 These assaults clearly indicate the scale of army mistreatment and abuse of
contrabands and the lack of initiative by the federal government to order court martials or other
disciplinary measures against soldiers committing such abuses, as racist soldiers beat and

28

Engs, Freedom’s First Generation, 17.
Ibid, 17-18, 21, 25.
30
Ibid, 60.
31
Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long, 130.
29

103

exploited contrabands with little fear of repercussions.32 As Litwack states, contrabands were
“apt to encounter the same prejudices, the same exploitation… and the same capacity for sadistic
cruelty” as they had in slavery.33 Most soldiers remained “reluctant liberators” at best and did
not see contraband rights as a significant army objective, and many actively resented being
stationed at contraband camps rather than at the front, and took their frustrations out on the
contrabands.34 Common soldiers exploited and abused contrabands, and officers, who often
shared the same racist views, did little to stop it, while the federal government remained
impotent as it had throughout the Civil War , despite clear evidence of the continued abuse of
contrabands. Even for contrabands who escaped physical abuse, another threat loomed, as army
officers desperate for labor began to impress contrabands into labor gangs by force.
The army made a more purposeful attempt to stem impressment, but poor enforcement
undermined the order. In December 1863, Butler issued an order regulating the labor of
contrabands, and, in particular, the practice of impressment, or forcing contrabands to perform
certain labor tasks. He stated that men aged eighteen to forty five had to enlist in the United
States Colored Troops if fit for service, and that government laborers would not be provided
rations for themselves or their families and had to become self-reliant, even if some of their
family members could not work, which drastically reduced their ability to obtain sufficient
food.35 He also attempted to stop the pervasive practice of impressment, stating that “no officer
or soldier shall impress or force to labor for any private purpose whatever, any negro” and
ordered that any impressed laborers had to be given rations.36 The order did not specify any
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requirements for rations to be issued to the worker’s family, even though they did not receive his
income and often had no other way to support themselves. The government had to ensure that
impressment only occurred due to “military necessity” and that impressed workers received
humane treatment and proper wages and rations.37 The order failed to stem the abusive practices
of impressment in the region, as labor recruiters continued to force contrabands to perform hard
labor without regard to the consequences for both their rights and the welfare of their families
who depended on their wages, which often failed to come, leaving them destitute, especially
since women and children could rarely find jobs working for the army.38
Numerous instances exist of contrabands being impressed for military labor in the
Hampton Roads area, which demonstrates both poor local enforcement and inadequate federal
oversight of the camp. During the latter stages of the contrabands’ tenure on Craney Island,
labor recruiters promised contrabands their “long overdue wages” if they boarded a ship to see
the paymaster, but the ship took them to Washington for unpaid labor on the fortifications
instead without giving the contrabands any chance to contact their families, clearly indicating the
base exploitation of contrabands by military authorities and the lack of federal oversight of the
camps, especially since the contrabands would be performing labor in Washington, DC.39
Around the same time in Norfolk, soldiers removed contrabands from their homes and even from
church and forced them to board a ship for Washington, even though they still had not received
any pay for several months of work at Norfolk and their families faced starvation due to the
elimination of rations for families of government workers.40 John Jordan, for example, received
only a total of eighty six cents for a year’s labor, while William P. Johnson had not been paid at
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all in two years. Soldiers impressed contrabands such as Nelson Sprewell who were clearly unfit
for hard labor due to illness, advanced age, or disability.41 While these incidents occurred prior
to the issuance of the order, it did little to improve the situation for contrabands, as the practice
of impressment continued unabated. The lack of federal oversight meant that such abuses of
contrabands could continue with little to no consequence, as military commanders in Virginia
never faced discipline from the military or federal bureaucracy for even the basest exploitation of
contrabands, including wage fraud, impressment, abuse by soldiers, and failure to address the
constant guerrilla threat.
The problem of impressment actually worsened as the war went on, which demonstrates
the inability of the camp administration to stop abuses even at the local level. In May 1864,
despite the order prohibiting impressment except for urgent military necessity or a significant
Confederate threat to the area, Brigadier General Shepley ordered the impressment of
contrabands for the fortifications at Norfolk, and captured forty-five contrabands along with over
one hundred women and children, who he moved to Norfolk with their husbands. While he
promised twenty dollars a month and rations for the laborers, he failed to provide rations for
families, and no record exists of whether he actually paid the wages promised, meaning that
families almost certainly faced starvation unless the women could find ad-hoc ways to support
themselves.42 One officer, Lieutenant Colonel Frank J. White, even impressed free blacks in
addition to contrabands and placed workers in “a worst Bondage than the slaves ever was,”
according to a Virginia Unionist observer, and he never faced discipline for such flagrant abuses
and violations of regulations.43 As Captain Wilder, the Superintendent of Contrabands, wrote in
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an observation of the practice in general, “How unjust that they must stay here, after a long
absence from home, and be impressed… often without a cent for expenses, or but barely enough
to get them home, without being paid off.”44 His assessment accurately describes impressment
for military labor, as army authorities focused on the war effort and claiming military necessity
forced contrabands to perform hard labor while failing to provide rations or the wages needed to
support their families, resulting in destitution and poverty for the women and children left
behind.45 The fact that the practice continued unchecked throughout the Civil War clearly
indicates the lack of federal oversight of the camps and the consequences of the lack of a
uniform federal contraband policy. It also demonstrates the initiative of local camp
administrators in creating their own policies, especially since the impressment of contrabands
and freedmen continued under the Freedmen’s Bureau during Reconstruction, and models for
these policies emerged in the Virginia contraband camps. While labor recruiters mistreated
contrabands, however, recruiters for the United States Colored Troops practiced the most brutal
form of impressment.
Recruiters also used impressment to fill their regiments when contrabands did not
volunteer, and the recruits had to leave their families behind with no support. Beginning in late
1863, military impressment “separated hundreds of black men from their families and sent them
to the battle front,” where difficult labor and hard fighting took a terrible toll.46 As Engs writes,
“men were dragged away to army encampments and ordered to enlist” and faced brutal
punishments if they resisted, even if they were unfit for military service.47 Numerous
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contrabands testified to an army court of inquiry describing the harsh tactics used by recruiters.
James Holsten, for example, stated that recruiters confined him to the guardhouse, or military
jail, when he refused to enlist, despite disabilities that clearly rendered him unfit for service.48
Mills Burton and James Colden, meanwhile, despite having families that depended on their
wages from their government jobs, also faced confinement in the guardhouse until they gave in
and enlisted.49 Recruiters even forced fourteen-year-old Benjamin Crumpler and forty-threeyear-old John Bond to enlist despite the fact that neither was of military age, clearly indicating
the lack of supervision of the recruiters and the inability of the army court of inquiry to mitigate
their abusive tactics.50 Recruiters also took advantage of the illiteracy of the contrabands by
forcing them to leave their mark on enlistment documents they clearly did not understand,
indicating clear exploitation of contrabands even by members of black regiments who should
have been more sympathetic to their plight.51 The worst cases of military impressment involved
punishments sadistic enough to be seen as torture used to force contrabands to give in and enlist,
despite regulations that banned all forms of corporal punishment in the Virginia contraband
camps. According to Engs, many recruiters placed contrabands in jail with a ball and chain until
they enlisted.52 William Carney, for example, refused to enlist and recruiters locked him in the
guardhouse, denied him food and water, and forced him to carry heavy, fifty-pound balls
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continuously until he enlisted, and then punished him again for failure to “properly” take the
enlistment oath.53
Such practices clearly demonstrate how military recruiters exploited and abused
contrabands to fill the ranks, without regard to the fact that contrabands often had families
dependent on their wages or disabilities that prevented them from serving in the first place. As
Engs writes, “Impressment was final proof that not even emancipation and black participation in
the war effort could change army attitudes” and demonstrated the “army’s unwillingness to care
for the freedmen or do the job with any degree of goodwill.”54
Impressment, whether for military labor or army service, exemplifies military
mistreatment of contrabands and federal inability to prevent it. No one in Washington stepped in
to stop the brutal practice in Virginia, despite the voluminous testimony gathered by an army
court of inquiry, which failed to take any action to end the clear abuse and exploitation of
contrabands. The military, in addition to the civilian federal bureaucracy, also failed to correct
the abuses of contrabands. The impressment policy in Virginia would be echoed in contraband
camps across the South, as labor and army recruiters used increasingly heavy-handed tactics to
force contrabands into labor gangs or army regiments, while the federal government continued to
ignore the almost constant abuse and exploitation. While contrabands caught in the net of
impressment suffered greatly during this period, their families in the camps fared little better, as
they faced disease, poverty, and high mortality, and army authorities focused on avoiding
dependence on the government, despite clear evidence of need.
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Contrabands who escaped impressment still faced harsh conditions in the camps. By late
1864, no more abandoned land remained available for farming, meaning that contrabands,
mostly the dependents of government laborers and soldiers in the United States Colored Troops,
had to live in squalid, overcrowded, disease-ridden camps in desperate poverty.55 In one camp,
twelve contrabands lived in a very small one room house, and several homes at a camp near
Downey Plantation outside of Hampton were “unfit for human habitation,” but the army refused
to replace them with new buildings or even surplus tents, even though this simple measure would
have gone a long way towards preventing disease outbreaks.56 The contrabands, according to
unnamed New York missionaries who wrote a detailed report of conditions in the Virginia
contraband camps, “presented a miserable appearance” due to a lack of clothing and rations, and
the fact that their low wages did not allow them to purchase their own supplies for themselves
and their families.57 As Engs wrote, in 1864 and 1865, “much destitution and hunger” occurred
in the contraband camps, and also led to disease and higher mortality rates, much of which could
have been prevented by improving sanitation and constructing additional barracks or providing
tents, neither of which would have resulted in high expenditures.58 Smallpox and yellow fever,
along with numerous other diseases, took a “frightful toll” and medical authorities did little to
improve conditions, especially since overcrowding clearly spread diseases.59 Even in the
contraband orphanage in Hampton, a shortage of vegetables caused fifty-one preventable cases
of scurvy, indicating the degree of medical neglect of the contrabands, especially since the cause
of scurvy, a deficiency of vitamin C, was well-known in the medical profession by the Civil
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War.60 A school superintendent working for the American Missionary Association, a national
organization of missionaries that worked in almost all of the contraband camps, referenced
mortality rates of four to five a day in winter 1864 and stated, “With a virulent disease raging in
our midst, we find these means insufficient to save them from absolute suffering.”61 Despite the
clear evidence of horrendous conditions in the camps, military authorities focused more on
ensuring that the contrabands all had jobs and remained self-sufficient and did little to address
the overcrowding, disease, and poverty in the camps, even as contrabands determined to escape
slavery and achieve freedom no matter what the obstacles continued arriving at Union lines in
ever-increasing numbers. The federal government did little to create a uniform contraband
policy or create effective oversight of the camps.62
The fear of dependency that pervaded camp policy across the South undermined efforts
to improve conditions in the camps. According to Berlin, “attempts to alleviate destitution ran
afoul of efforts to conserve scarce resources and reduce expenditures,” indicating that the army
emphasized the need to save money, with devastating consequences for the contrabands, This
policy also created a model for policies in contraband camps across the South.63 Authorities
focused on avoiding dependence and making the contrabands self-sufficient, leading to wage and
ration cuts that resulted in widespread destitution in the camps. Only families of soldiers and
those clearly unable to work, even in light-duty jobs, could get government rations. The
commissary officer spent over eighty thousand dollars less than permitted on contraband rations,
clearly demonstrating the importance of economy rather than contraband welfare, especially
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given the ample evidence of destitution and starvation in the camps.64 In Norfolk, Orlando
Brown, the Superintendent of Contrabands, decided that the contraband ration allowed by army
regulations was too expensive and cut it almost in half in order to save money, but made no
mention of the impact on the already impoverished contrabands, who already faced starvation
due to the small size of the contraband rations.65 Even worse, commissary officers began
charging contrabands five cents per ration, even for the dependents of soldiers who had been
promised government sustenance, and refused to issue rations to those who could not pay unless
they were truly “helpless,” revealing the degree of exploitation of contrabands in the name of
self-reliance.66 The federal government failed to intervene despite promises to the soldiers that
their families in the contraband camps would receive sustenance without charge, and army
policies stating that the families of soldiers were entitled to rations at no charge, which
demonstrates the lack of federal oversight of the camps during the Civil War.
In addition to cutting rations, army authorities also failed to pay contrabands their wages
for government labor, continuing an exploitative practice that persisted throughout the war, while
the federal bureaucracy failed to take any action despite continual violations of contraband
regulations and the policies established earlier in the war for the Virginia camps. One
quartermaster failed to properly audit the payroll records for contrabands working in his
department, which resulted in their wages being denied, even though the army owed them four
months of back pay, and the quartermaster never faced discipline for his negligence.67
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According to Engs, contrabands “rarely” received the “just wages” due them for government
labor, and the army often owed them several months of back pay, which they rarely if ever
received by the end of the war.68 Abraham Cannaday, for example, worked at a government
sawmill for over a year and failed to receive any wages. He stated, “I have not recevd a cent of
money and my famley is aseffring for the sorport of my labor,” indicating both the degree of
army exploitation of contraband labor and the efforts by contrabands to protest for their basic
rights by petitioning the federal government, which clearly indicates that the federal bureaucracy
knew of the abuses of contrabands but still failed to take any action.69 No record exists of army
authorities granting him the wages clearly owed him, even as the war came to an end. In
addition, “many of the black workers employed at Fortress Monroe in the first months of the war
were still trying to collect their pay at its end,” demonstrating that army authorities failed to stem
the clear exploitation of contraband labor despite repeated orders and regulations calling for fair
wages.70 While government laborers suffered exploitation at the hands of their employers,
women and children forced to sign labor contracts fared little better, as private employers also
exploited and abused them, while government authorities did little to enforce the regulations of
the contracts even when they resulted in clear mistreatment.
In late 1864, Frank T. White, the provost marshal for southeastern Virginia, issued an
order requiring all contrabands to work either for the government or for a private employer with
a labor contract, which became the policy at several other contraband camps in addition to the
Freedmen’s Bureau, demonstrating the importance of policies created by camp commanders to
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establishing policies later instituted by the Bureau.71 He wanted to reduce expenditures and
avoid dependency on the government, which both became cornerstones of Bureau policy after
the war. He stated that employers had to provide “good compensation” to the contrabands, at the
rate of twelve dollars a month for men and five dollars a month for women.72 Contrabands who
could not find a government job had to sign a labor contract with a private employer, and even
though the army had set wage rates, employers often “forced” contrabands to sign contracts
designating lower wages, and some even only provided “nothing more than food and clothing”
as compensation, and army authorities failed to intervene and prevent such mistreatment, despite
clear regulations that specified minimum wages.73 Peter Hack, for example, hired Sidney Hach
for one year but only provided food, clothing, and shelter as compensation, and the army never
compelled him to pay wages.74 Peter C. Mason, meanwhile, hired Harriet Selby for six dollars
every three months, but also required her to buy her own clothing and food, although he did
provide clothing for her children.75 As a final example, a Mr. Dix hired David Chandler for
fifteen dollars a month, but failed to provide food, clothing, or shelter for him or his family.76
Even worse for contrabands forced into an exploitative contract, the army “rigidly enforced” the
contracts and refused to allow them to leave an abusive employer no matter how harsh the labor
conditions.77 The system of labor contracts demonstrates the consequences of the army’s
emphasis on the free labor ideology, as officers focused on reducing dependence and forcing the
contrabands to work without regard to exploitative employers seeking to take advantage of the
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vulnerable contrabands. While army officers supervised the creation of the contracts, they failed
to ensure employers actually abided by their provisions, providing additional opportunity for
exploitation that continued until the end of the war in 1865. Finally, the lack of oversight by the
federal government allowed exploitation to continue and foreshadowed the strict contract
policies of the Freedmen’s Bureau that trapped contrabands in abusive labor relationships and
failed to intervene to stop rampant exploitation and mistreatment of contrabands across the
South.
The camps in Virginia also provide several examples of the tactics used by contrabands
to resist exploitation and to defend what they saw as their rights to economic autonomy and
freedom. They wrote petitions to local military commanders and even the federal bureaucracy in
Washington, DC, testified to army courts of inquiry, found private employment to earn a living
when the army failed to pay wages, and resisted impressment by fleeing in order to keep their
families together. These tactics demonstrate that contrabands held different views of their rights
and responsibilities than the military, and they would do whatever they believed necessary to
defend these rights. The fact that they would push back against the only institution keeping them
safe from re-enslavement demonstrates the vast gulf between the army’s and the contrabands’
ideas of the meaning of freedom. Their initiative foreshadowed freedmen’s activism under the
Bureau, as they inundated Bureau agents with thousands of complaints of mistreatment and
exploitation, even though they faced the very real threat of retaliation by their employers due to
the Bureau’s inability to protect the freedmen across the South. Contrabands did not simply
accept exploitation and mistreatment by the army and Bureau, but, as demonstrated at several
points in this section, asserted their rights as free laborers both during the war and during
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Reconstruction, meaning that the camps foreshadowed yet another aspect of Bureau
administration after the war.
The contraband camps in Virginia effectively demonstrate the consequences of the lack
of both federal oversight and a uniform contraband policy during the Civil War. The local
military commanders denied contrabands their wages, failed to improve the sanitary conditions
of the camps, impressed contrabands even when it led to the separation of families, failed to
mitigate abuse by soldiers, and reduced and even eliminated rations despite the fact that the
contrabands faced starvation. Missionaries and even the contrabands themselves repeatedly
petitioned the federal government to improve conditions, so officials in the military bureaucracy
and the War Department knew how bad conditions had become but still failed to act. Local
commanders could create their own policies, including strict enforcement of contracts, reduction
of rations, and the placement of contrabands on privately owned plantations, that would become
the cornerstones of Freedmen’s Bureau policies and programs after the war. The contraband
camps in Virginia further demonstrate the importance of contraband camps to the establishment
of Freedmen’s Bureau policy.
South Carolina: Hopes for Land for Contrabands Come to an End
The camps in South Carolina provide a unique perspective that is absolutely essential to
understanding how contraband camp policy contributed to Bureau policy by discussing attempts
to either provide or sell abandoned land to the contrabands rather than just allowing them to farm
it. The Bureau’s failure to distribute land to contrabands in South Carolina despite Sherman’s
land policy directly foreshadows the failed attempts at preemption and tax sales during the Civil
War. These sales demonstrate the low priority of the contrabands, as speculators rather than the
contrabands purchased most of the land. In addition, the introduction of plantation leasing in
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South Carolina, and the military’s inability to properly oversee the leasing program,
demonstrated the shortcomings of a policy of mandatory labor contracts, which would still
become Bureau policy despite its failure in leasing programs both in South Carolina and the
Western Theater. The camps in South Carolina also demonstrate the importance of missionaries,
as both advocates for the contrabands and as adversaries who attempted to impose their own
ideas of uplift even if they opposed the wishes of the contrabands. Finally, South Carolina
demonstrates the confusion over what to do with the contrabands at the end of the war, and how
the short-lived idea of land distribution came to be replaced by mandatory contract labor. A
detailed analysis of South Carolina camps is required for connecting the camps to Bureau policy.
Prior to the direct tax sales of abandoned land, missionaries and the federal government
engaged in a debate over the private leasing of plantations and who should be responsible for
paying and caring for the contrabands. Philbrick claimed that the government system was no
better than slavery since the contrabands did not receive wages or clothing, and he advocated
leasing plantations to ensure that the contrabands received proper compensation. In particular,
he argued that Colonel Nobles, a government superintendent, failed to provide rations or wages
to the contraband laborers, and neither the military command on the islands nor the federal
government took any action to compel him to provide proper compensation. According to
Philbrick, leasing would solve these problems by allowing private enterprise to take over a
dysfunctional government system, as the contrabands often received no wages and reduced
rations, even though they had families to support.78 Not all of those at the Sea Islands agreed
with him. Missionary Edward L. Pierce hated leasing and argued that lessees only wanted profit
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and would exploit the contrabands, leading to “the worst vices of the slave system.”79 In June
1862, an act of Congress would prove Pierce correct, as government land sales led to rampant
speculation and profit-seeking at the expense of the contrabands, clearly indicating the federal
government’s emphasis on profit, self-sufficiency, and avoiding dependency on the government
rather than the welfare of the contrabands.
The direct tax sales provide stark evidence of government complicity in allowing lessees
to exploit the contrabands, in this case by denying them access to land and selling it instead to
northern speculators who mistreated the contrabands to make a profit. The Treasury Department
deliberately set up the program to favor white businessmen and make as much as possible from
land sales rather than providing the contrabands with the ability to obtain land and become selfsufficient. The Direct Tax Commission formed to regulate the sales and favored wage labor
rather than independent land ownership, as they believed that wage labor constituted the only
way for the contrabands to avoid dependency on the government. As historian Lawrence N.
Powell writes, “Federal authorities were reluctant to lease or sell subdivided plantation tracts to
the freedmen.”80 In addition, he argues, northerners and government officials thought that blacks
needed to learn from businessmen before becoming qualified for land ownership, and that they
would not be able to farm on their own, which would result in them becoming dependent on the
government.81 In making these arguments, he correctly assesses the true motives of the
commission, which had the interests of businessmen and speculators rather than the contrabands
in mind. The Commission gained title to the land by claiming it for nonpayment of taxes and
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sold it at open land auctions, giving Northern whites a clear advantage over the destitute
freedmen, who could only bid for “charity land.”82
Many groups working with the contrabands saw the true motives of the sales and
criticized the federal government for undermining the ability of the contrabands to gain
economic independence and avoid working for the government at low and often unreliable
wages. Missionaries called for reforms, allowing the contrabands to preempt small plots of land
for later purchase when they had the financial means, and the sale of small plots of land to avoid
speculation, but the government did not change their policy, despite warnings of the profit
motives of lessees and speculators.83 Most telling, even army officials complained about the
sales, including Brigadier General Saxton, the commander of the Sea Islands and the army
officer in charge of contrabands, who stated that “these helpless people may be placed more or
less at the mercy of men devoid of principle” as speculators bought the land.84 Despite these
complaints, at the actual auctions, the Commission sold sixty thousand acres, twenty thousand of
which went to speculators and reserved for government and military use, leaving very little for
contrabands and leaving the path open to exploitation by lessees, who mostly wanted profits and
cared little about the welfare of the contrabands.85 The land sales also indicate how even army
officials in the area could not prevent the federal government from exploiting contrabands in
order to make a profit and increase government revenue. Most of the land purchased by army
officials ended up with speculators anyway through resale, which indicates that military officials
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charged with supervising the contrabands instead pursued profits at the expense of the
contrabands. The land sales illuminate the true motives of both military officials and the federal
government: making profits to support the larger war even if it meant exploitation of contraband
laborers, and these goals would remain in place throughout the Civil War and even during
Reconstruction under the Freedmen’s Bureau.86
Another example of government mistreatment of contrabands due to the focus on profits
is the failure of the land preemption initiative. This program, set up by Saxton and other
sympathetic officials on the islands, would have allowed contrabands to purchase land at $1.25
per acre for a maximum of forty acres, which constituted a sufficient amount of land for them to
gain true economic autonomy.87 Saxton did not consult the federal Direct Tax Commission
before announcing his plan and it met stiff opposition from the commissioners and officials in
the Department of the Treasury, which oversaw all sales of land for unpaid taxes, further
indicating the complicity of the federal government in the exploitation of contrabands, even
when military officials, mostly without success, tried to prevent such mistreatment. The
preemption debate clearly demonstrates how competing policies from different agencies of the
federal government undermined the entire contraband program, especially when abandoned
property was concerned. Tax commissioner William Henry Brisbane argued that “The true
friend of the Negro… ought to encourage white men to purchase plantations among them as
protectors, teachers, and employers” at government land auctions, which reflects the belief
common among both military and federal officials that contrabands did not have the education or
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the capacity to manage land on their own and should therefore remain as wage laborers.88 He
also argued that speculators would take advantage of the contrabands at any type of land auction,
but still called for the end of preemption based on a lack of available land for the contrabands.89
In September 1864, the Secretary of the Treasury cancelled preemption, which, Ira Berlin
argues, led directly to the destitution of the contrabands and to the entry of lessees who focused
on profit rather than black rights and dignity. They bought land at low prices and then proceeded
to exploit the contrabands as much as possible while military and federal officials did nothing,
which distinctly demonstrates the failure of federal contraband policy in South Carolina.
Competition between multiple agencies and the racism of federal officials led to the failure of a
program that could have provided economic autonomy for the contrabands and allowed them to
save enough to easily support themselves.90 As Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Smith, referring
to the eviction of contrabands who had preempted land that was later sold to whites, said, it was
a “monstrosity of administration as would shock the conscience of Christendom.”91 In contrast
to Virginia and Washington, where federal authorities never broached the topic of giving land to
the contrabands, officials in South Carolina briefly considered it before allowing speculators and
lessees to take over the land and exploit contraband laborers, and then failed to mitigate the clear
cases of abuse and exploitation.
In the land sales that followed the cancellation of preemption, fifty percent of the
available land went to lessees, who quickly hired contraband labor for the plantations at the
lowest wages they could possibly pay. As a missionary in the area lamented, “We are nothing
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now but speculators,” and land sales had done little to help the contrabands.92 The end of
preemption demonstrates the government’s focus on profits at the expense of the contrabands,
who not only were denied access to land for themselves but then faced with working for
exploitative lessees who would stop at nothing to make money, and faced little to no discipline
from the military or Treasury officials. Such exploitation continued after the establishment of
the Freedmen’s Bureau during Reconstruction, as sharecroppers exploited contrabands to the
same degree as lessees. As Colonel Smith stated, the government’s “yielding to the clamor of
greedy avarice” would have disastrous consequences for the contrabands, as the lessees
proceeded to exploit their laborers while army authorities did nothing to stop it.93
Lessees paid lower wages for planting and maintaining the crop than for picking in order
to force the laborers to stay on the plantations, and often provided only garden plots rather than
rations, forcing the contrabands to grow or buy their food with their meager wages, and often,
also clothing for themselves and their families, despite the low wages and inflated prices charged
for even basic goods.94 Even worse, according to the New York Tribune, planters would sell
their crops and “run away with the proceeds, leaving the Negroes in rags and foodless, with
winter just coming on,” clearly indicating that lessees focused on profit and exploited contraband
laborers to get it, and that local authorities did nothing to stop them. The army failed to provide
back wages or additional rations for contrabands who had been cheated by lessees and left with
no money after a year of labor.95 Lessees also used creative tactics to lower labor costs,
including cutting a month “into discrete units of labor-time” to reduce hours worked and
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therefore wages, and also cut wages for illness or days of work missed due to poor weather.96
Perhaps the most telling evidence of mistreatment is that many contrabands ran away from
lessees due to exploitation and abuse, and some even said that the lessees treated them worse
than their old masters had during slavery.97 These failures of oversight directly foreshadowed
the policies of the Freedmen’s Bureau, as overworked agents could do little to stop planters from
exploiting the freedmen by failing to pay wages, evicting them from the plantations, and not
providing rations or clothing as specified in the labor contracts. The fact that local military
authorities not only allowed the land sales to lessees but then did nothing to stop them from
abusing contrabands clearly indicates a focus on profits and ensuring the labor of the contrabands
rather than protecting their basic rights. As a New England aid society stated, the contrabands’
faith in Northerners is “too often abused” due to lessee mistreatment.98 In fact, a lessee from
Boston provides the clearest example of exploitation of contrabands by lessees in order to make
a profit, while army authorities and the Treasury Department stood by and did nothing.
Philbrick’s plantation clearly demonstrates the degree of exploitation practiced by
lessees. He purchased or leased one third of the land on St. Helena Island and hired contraband
labor. He claimed to pay $6.50 a month, but truly only paid $4.40 a month and did not pay the
laborers at all during “slack months,” so the contrabands truly only made $3.30 a month (or fifty
five cents a day), which was not enough to support themselves, much less their families that
depended on their labor.99 These rates, which compared very poorly to government salaries in
Virginia and Washington and even to wages in the South Carolina contraband camps earlier in
the war, indicate a focus on profit rather than contraband welfare. Military authorities failed to
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enforce their own wage regulations, allowing Philbrick to continue to exploit his laborers.100 His
opinion that high wages caused idleness and that blacks had to support themselves only further
reveals his true motives, as he expected contrabands to support themselves but then paid wages
that left them in near-destitution.101 As Powell argues, “Philbrick disdained the practice of
giving privileges to laborers” and “made them buy everything that they might need for their daily
existence” despite the very low wages he paid them, clearly proving his focus on profit.102 In
fact, he grew seventy three thousand bales of cotton for only twenty thousand dollars labor costs
and made eighty one thousand dollars profit, clearly indicating his real reason for leasing land in
South Carolina, especially since he initially arrived as a missionary supposedly devoted to
helping the contrabands before becoming a lessee.103
Both federal and military authorities could have stopped Philbrick’s clear exploitation of
contrabands but failed to act, which reflects the continued failures of federal policies and
oversight of the South Carolina contraband camps. Philbrick himself acknowledged his low
wages in a letter to the Direct Tax Commission, stating that he made his laborers use the crop to
feed themselves rather than issuing them rations and took away wages for subpar work and bad
weather that prevented work, showing both his clear exploitation of the laborers and the failure
of government officials to enforce their own regulations. The Tax Commission did nothing to
discipline Philbrick or require him to abide by military regulations and provide proper wages and
rations.104 Several of the contrabands working for Philbrick, having received no assistance from
the army or Treasury officials in South Carolina, wrote to President Lincoln in a desperate
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attempt to improve their labor conditions and end Philbrick’s abusive behavior. They stated that
Philbrick’s wages “were not enough to sustain live,” and that he charged excessive prices for
basic necessities at plantation stores even though his wages remained extremely low. Even
worse, despite the ban on corporal punishment instituted by the military almost as soon as the
contraband camps opened, one of Philbrick’s agents whipped a freedwoman and never faced
punishment.105 No record exists of Lincoln or any other government official disciplining
Philbrick or attempting to enforce their own orders and regulations, indicating a focus on the
larger war effort at the expense of the welfare of the contrabands and the inability of both the
Treasury and War Departments to effectively administer and formulate policies for the
contraband camps. Philbrick was just one of many lessees exploiting and physically abusing
contrabands in South Carolina, and federal authorities from Lincoln down to local military
commanders failed to do anything to prevent it, which set precedents for continued failures of
oversight and regulation not only during the Civil War but also under the Freedmen’s Bureau
during the early years of Reconstruction, which indicates that the contraband camps established
negative precedents for Bureau policy as well. Such neglect, along with the land sales
themselves and the failure of the preemption program, effectively demonstrates the federal
government’s focus on economy, revenue, and the larger war effort rather than protecting the
basic rights and welfare of the contrabands. This conclusion agrees with historians such as
William C. Harris, who argues that the federal government focused on maintaining the loyalty of
the Border States and the war effort before securing emancipation and contraband rights
throughout the war, and James M. McPherson, who argues that slaves who ran to Union lines
and entered contraband camps did force the federal government to focus more on emancipation,

105

South Carolina Freedmen to the President, 1 March 1864, in Freedom: The Lower South, ed. Berlin, et al, 297298.

125

but that the war effort always remained the central focus, especially since Union victory was
necessary to achieve emancipation.106
By this point, the continued exploitation of the contrabands caused “widespread distrust
of the intentions of the Government” among the freed people. The abuses only continued during
the later stages of the war, as the intervention of the Treasury Department into the land sales did
little to mitigate the continued exploitation and mistreatment of contrabands.107 The behavior of
common soldiers did little to change this attitude, as soldiers abused, raped, and robbed the
contrabands with seeming impunity despite the presence of officers who had the power to curtail
such behavior but failed to take any action due to incompetence, racism, or apathy towards the
welfare of the contrabands, while higher levels of the military command also failed to
intervene.108 At Saint Helena Island, seven intoxicated sailors beat several contrabands, killed
their cows that they relied on for their livelihood, and even attempted to rape several black girls
before the contrabands successfully subdued them, and the soldiers did not face any discipline
from their superior officers.109 William Mitchell, meanwhile, testified that soldiers stole his
mule, which he had been given by Union officers for his help on a military expedition, and the
officers again failed to intervene even to protect contrabands who had provided vital assistance
on military campaigns at risk of capture by the Confederates.110 In a truly horrific example of
soldier abuse of contrabands, drunken officers of the Twenty-Fifth Ohio raped a woman while
claiming to search for recruits, establishing that officers committed such depraved exploitation of
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contrabands and also never faced any discipline for clear violations of military law and the
proper conduct of an officer.111 According to General Saxton, the soldiers, who generally held
racist views, stole crops, livestock, and money and even sexually assaulted women, and did not
face anywhere close to appropriate military discipline for their actions. Such actions, he stated,
were “demoralizing to the negro and have greatly hindered efforts for their improvement and
elevation.”112 Even the highest military authority in the area knew that soldiers abused and
exploited contrabands and acknowledged the failure to address the problem, indicating that
protecting the contrabands was not the highest priority, and he never faced any discipline from
higher echelons of command for his failures to protect the contrabands living in military-run
contraband camps from abuse by their supposed guards and protectors. The abuse by soldiers
would continue, as recruiters for United States Colored Troops regiments used increasingly harsh
measures to gain recruits, even to the point of shooting contrabands they claimed to be deserters,
without penalties from army authorities or the War Department.113
The impressment of recruits demonstrates the degree of exploitation of contrabands
tolerated in South Carolina. In March 1862 General Hunter, commander of the Department of
the South, instituted a program of conscription of contrabands for United States Colored Troops
regiments.114 The fact that white soldiers in the area left for the front in Virginia hastened the
need to form regiments to defend the islands, which still faced the prospect of a Confederate
attack from mainland South Carolina but were very unlikely to receive additional reinforcements
from the regular Union army due to the campaigns in Virginia and the Western Theater. When
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enough volunteers did not come forward, Hunter resorted to impressment of contrabands by
force to fill the regiments, and recruiters quickly began to utilize brutal tactics to force
contrabands to enlist in the army.115 As Rose writes, “squads of soldiers forcibly herded them
into the camps” for enlistment.116 She further argues that the “military authorities treated the
islanders as suited their convenience, with utter disregard for the claims of humanity,” especially
since the draft occurred right after planting season, leaving only elderly and infirm men, women
and children to tend the crop, even though the army had cut back rations for workers on
government farms.117
Even when missionaries and contrabands complained about impressment, it continued
unchecked due to the pressing need to fill regiments. A missionary in the area wrote that “They
are carrying out the draft with excessive severity, not to say horrible cruelty.”118 According to
contraband minister Abram Mercherson, officers of the Twenty-Fifth Ohio, for example,
repeatedly abused contrabands who resisted impressment and even raped women while claiming
to search for recruits, and did not face any discipline from superior officers or from higher
military authorities in Washington.119 Another officer, according to a missionary, was “a terror
to the whole black population” due to his harsh tactics of impressment, which indicates that the
recruiters faced almost no regulation or oversight and could abuse contrabands without
discipline.120 The soldiers received monetary rewards for bringing in recruits, impressed men
with little regard for the welfare of families who depended on their wages, and often impressed
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men clearly unfit for service in order to collect bounties.121 When General Saxton “ordered an
indiscriminate conscription of every able-bodied colored man in the Department” in late 1864,
contrabands tried to run to the woods or swamps but still could not escape the impressment
squads, which oftentimes consisted of black soldiers.122 Military authorities indiscriminately
drafted contrabands for service regardless of whether they had existing jobs on plantations or
families to support. Once the contrabands reached the army, the exploitation continued, as
military officials failed to provide support to their destitute families despite promises made by
recruiters.
When soldiers impressed contrabands from their jobs, they gave no regard to making sure
the contrabands had received all the pay due them, even though the military owed months or
even years of back wages. According to a missionary, a “shameful delay in the payments” to
recruits had caused their families “suffering for want of the means to purchase clothing” and
other necessities, especially as the army cut rations for workers on government farms and in
contraband camps, which left contrabands without the means to purchase sufficient foodstuffs.123
Such delays, another missionary claims, resulted from bureaucratic slowness at the
Quartermaster’s Department, which handled payment for government laborers, indicating that
the federal bureaucracy failed to provide effective oversight or correct obvious problems with
compensation for contrabands, and such failures would continue under the Freedmen’s
Bureau.124 Even worse, a drought caused widespread crop failure in 1864, leaving “many black
women, children, and old people in desperate straits” since the miniscule wages given to soldiers
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were not enough to purchase food, especially since soldiers received wages irregularly at best
and farm workers also did not receive regular wages.125 At the same time, commissary officials,
trying to reduce expenses and prevent “dependency,” cut off rations completely to the families of
soldiers, resulting in destitution becoming, according to Berlin, “distressingly common” as
women and children had little to eat since even the food crops failed to thrive and they did not
have enough money to purchase food.126 As the commander of a black regiment stated, the
curtailment of rations rendered the families of his soldiers to a “deplorable condition” without
food or clothing, and the seven dollars a month wages for soldiers did not provide nearly enough
for purchasing basic necessities.127 Military authorities not only forced contrabands to enlist, but
then failed to pay them decent wages and cut off rations to their families despite a devastating
crop failure, leaving them destitute with no means of support. Neither the Direct Tax
Commission nor the Treasury Department nor the military bureaucracy intervened even on
behalf of the family members of black soldiers, which clearly demonstrates not only ineffective
federal oversight but also apathy towards the welfare of the contrabands, as local and federal
authorities allowed contrabands to starve rather than increasing rations.
The contrabands forced to enlist, meanwhile, suffered harsh treatment once they reached
the army. Quartermasters refused to provide them with tents despite having more than enough
for white recruits, refused to provide medical care to sick recruits, and also delayed their
payments much more frequently than they did for whites, even though black troops received
much lower wages than white soldiers.128 The white common soldiers exhibited a “degree of
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hatred really fiendish towards the black regiment” and not only abused the black troops but
continued to steal crops and livestock from their families left behind, further worsening the
already desperate food situation, and the army command in the area did nothing to discipline
them.129 The conscription of contrabands not only resulted in destitute families, but also in the
exploitation and abuse of soldiers drafted into the army but not given even decent treatment by
their officers and fellow soldiers, and their families were left impoverished and starving. In
1865, the arrival of thousands of refugees from Sherman’s March only worsened the situation, as
camps quickly became overwhelmed.
The camps became desperately overcrowded, but fears of dependency overcame efforts
to help provide for the contrabands. When General William Tecumseh Sherman marched
through Georgia in 1864, thousands of slaves fled to his army. By the time he reached
Savannah, ten thousand contrabands followed, and Sherman wanted to send them somewhere
else to increase the mobility of his army for future campaigns in the Carolinas. In addition,
members of his army “had abused defenseless ex-slaves” and generally held racist views, which
led to continued abuses of contrabands, while Sherman failed to intervene or provide any
discipline.130 Sherman sent the contrabands to the Sea Islands, where they arrived destitute and
in desperate need of government aid, which quickly strained the available supplies on the Sea
Islands, but neither the military nor the federal bureaucracies sent additional supplies for the
thousands of new contrabands. The military commander in the Sea Islands, meanwhile, focused
on the need to “lessen the number of idle and dissolute persons” in the area and sent all
contrabands without a job to the poor house, where they would labor on a “chain gang” for no
wages, even though many could not find a job through no fault of their own due to the shortage
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of job opportunities on the islands for thousands of new arrivals and that the families of laborers
forced onto the chain gang faced starvation.131 Military authorities began destroying boats used
by some contrabands to gain their livelihood through fishing, in order to prevent smuggling to
the Confederacy but truly to force all of the contrabands onto plantations, even though many
made enough to support themselves and their families by fishing both for subsistence and for
profit by selling fish to soldiers and missionaries.132 The loss of boats, according to plantation
superintendent Theodore Holt, “greatly distress[ed] many hundreds of poor men and families,
whose dependence for food is chiefly fish” and were physically unable to perform farm labor,
leaving them dependent on rations from military authorities focused on cutting rations as much
as possible due to overwhelming fears of dependency.133 The contrabands did find freedom with
Sherman’s army, but still not decent treatment, as they either had to work on a plantation or face
unpaid labor under brutal conditions in a workhouse. Neither the Treasury Department nor any
level of the military bureaucracy made any attempt to intervene and end the pervasive
exploitation of destitute contrabands, which once again demonstrates the consequences of the
federal government’s inability to create a uniform contraband policy during the Civil War, which
led to policies such as ration cuts and mandatory labor contracts that became hallmarks of the
Freedmen’s Bureau. Ironically, Sherman stepped in to try to help, but he ultimately failed to
provide the contrabands with the land they needed to truly gain independence.
In February 1865, Sherman met with several black leaders to develop a long-term plan
for the contrabands in South Carolina and Georgia, not motivated by moral concern for their
welfare but from the pressing need to relieve the desperately overcrowded camps on the Sea
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Islands and to keep contrabands away from his army during the campaign through the Carolinas.
Garrison Frazier, one of the black leaders, stated that the contrabands needed land which they
could farm until they earned enough to purchase it from the government.134 In addition, he
called for the end of impressment, stating that blacks wanted to be soldiers and that they would
enlist voluntarily, as long as their families received rations or sufficient wages to ensure an
adequate food supply.135 Sherman agreed, setting aside the islands from St. John’s River in
Florida to the South Carolina Sea Islands “for the settlement of the negroes” and even stated that
only blacks could live on the islands, allowing them to manage their own affairs without
interference from the federal government, the military, or missionaries.136 He also banned
conscription and impressment and designated forty acres and a mule condemned from the army
but still fit for farm labor per family, with priority given to families of soldiers. Finally, he
ordered military authorities to give contrabands “possessory title” to the land until his plan was
approved by higher authorities.137 Sherman instituted a policy far ahead of the federal
government’s contraband policy and did not seek approval from the federal government before
implementing it, which clearly demonstrates the importance of local commanders to the
development of contraband policy and programs. While Sherman’s policy did not become part
of the Freedmen’s Bureau program, it still indicates the importance of local commanders and
contraband superintendents to the formation of federal contraband policy.
Once the contrabands began to take possession of the land, Sherman’s ideal policy
quickly disintegrated, leaving contrabands on land without permanent title. Army authorities and
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missionaries did not have enough shelter or clothing to distribute to the contrabands, and many
contrabands died of disease before they could begin to farm.138 Even worse, Sherman’s
promissory title to the land did not hold up permanently, as the contrabands lost their land during
Reconstruction to former Confederates who had received pardons and the right to their
property.139 Sherman not only promised contrabands land when they truly only had temporary
title, but then Treasury authorities gave the land back to the very men who had held the
contrabands as slaves. Sherman’s land program ended four years of government mistreatment of
the Sea Islands contrabands.140 It still reflects the importance of local policies and programs to
the formulation of policies for the Freedmen’s Bureau in 1865 and 1866, as his land policy
created a model for independent land ownership that the Bureau failed to implement despite the
presence of a clear-cut example.
The contraband camps in South Carolina during the second half of the Civil War
demonstrate the importance of local military commanders, superintendents of contrabands, and
missionaries in the formulation of policies and programs that foreshadowed the policies enacted
by the Freedmen’s Bureau during Reconstruction. The failure to redistribute land to the
contrabands, the enactment of mandatory labor contracts, low wages, reductions in rations, and
the failure to mitigate abuse by soldiers and officers all remained problematic in South Carolina
after the war despite the formation of the Freedmen’s Bureau. The Bureau shared the focus on
free labor and avoiding dependency on the government that guided contraband policy in the
South Carolina camps during the Civil War. In addition, the protests launched by the
contrabands against exploitative government policies, and the failure of the federal government
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to address their concerns, also set precedents for the Bureau, as contrabands flooded the Bureau
with complaints, but Bureau agents often failed to take substantive action. Finally, the focus on
property rights that led to the failure of the land sales during the Civil War continued to guide
federal contraband policy during Reconstruction, as the Bureau provided little to no assistance to
contrabands who wished to obtain their own land, meaning that most freedmen remained in
exploitative wage labor arrangements similar to those found in South Carolina. The camps in
South Carolina clearly demonstrate the consequences of ineffective federal oversight of the
camps due to the lack of a uniform federal contraband policy, and the importance of the Civil
War contraband camps to the establishment of policies for the Freedmen’s Bureau after the war.
The story would be very similar in North Carolina, as contrabands there remained in exploitative
wage labor arrangements that foreshadowed the labor contracts established by the Bureau in
1865 and 1866.
Conclusion
The story of the camps in Virginia and South Carolina during the second half of the Civil
War is vital to understanding how contraband camp policy contributed to policies and programs
enacted by the Freedmen’s Bureau during Reconstruction. The focus on dependency, racism,
and a desire to maintain economy led to policies that undermined the autonomy of the
contrabands and contradicted the free labor ideology that was supposed to govern contraband
programs. The reduction of rations for families of workers, the failure to pay wages, the
impressment of men for labor or enlistment, the imposition of mandatory labor contracts, and the
failure to distribute land to the contrabands all prevented them from obtaining economic
autonomy and becoming self-sufficient, meaning that contraband policy undermined its own goal
of eliminating dependency on the government. The same labor policies would continue under

135

the Bureau, as agents compelled contrabands to sign labor contracts on plantations, even if they
could make a better living elsewhere. The camps in Virginia and South Carolina clearly
demonstrate the that policies created in the contraband camps set the stage for the development
of Bureau policy, and the camps in North Carolina and Washington, DC, provide even more
examples of the connection between contraband camps and Bureau.
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CHAPTER 3
DEPENDENCY IN EASTERN THEATER CONTRABAND CAMPS, 1863-1865

By the second half of the Civil War, the camps in North Carolina and Washington, DC,
became overcrowded and disease-ridden, and army commanders faced dilemmas about how to
care for the ever-growing numbers of contrabands. In Washington, DC, the army abandoned
Camp Barker and moved the contrabands to Freedmen’s Village in Arlington, just south of the
District, where they hoped that the abundant land would reduce overcrowding and disease.
Failures in oversight, despite the camp’s location in the national capital, led to continued
exploitation, including a lack of wages, poor sanitation, and high rates of disease. Military
commanders who feared dependence on the government compelled contrabands to sign labor
contracts and even separated their families. Policies in both of these camps created several
models for the Freedmen’s Bureau, which lucidly demonstrates the importance of the contraband
camps to the establishment of policies and programs of the Bureau during the early years of
Reconstruction.
The camps in Kentucky are also essential for understanding contraband camps during the
Civil War and how they contributed to the shaping of Bureau policy. Kentucky’s status as a
border state meant that the contrabands there remained in legal limbo throughout the war, as
local military commanders remained unsure of whether they could accept contrabands into the
lines, whether the contrabands or their masters should receive wages, whether USCT enlistment
could proceed, and how to handle the families of USCT soldiers. The lack of a coherent federal
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contraband policy had the most significant consequences in Kentucky, as commanders at Camp
Nelson repeatedly advocated the expulsion of all contrabands from the camp due to concerns of
confiscating the property of loyal masters, economic efficiency, and fears of dependency, and
actually evicted all the contrabands from Camp Nelson in late 1864. A clear federal policy on
the status of contrabands in the border states could have made a significant difference in
Kentucky, and the lack of such a policy led to unnecessary exploitation. The closure of Camp
Nelson immediately after the end of the war established a model for other camps to follow, both
immediately after the war and under the Bureau. The camps in Kentucky, while they never
introduced leasing, remain vitally important for understanding how policies formulated in the
camps contributed to the development of Bureau policies and programs during early
Reconstruction.
The discussion of the camps in North Carolina, Washington, DC, and Kentucky during
the second half of the Civil War is crucial to understanding the connection between contraband
camps and the Bureau. Contrabands in these camps faced involuntary relocation, labor
impressment, ration reductions, and inadequate wages, and all of these problems would plague
the Bureau after the war. In addition, misguided policies, such as a focus on avoiding
dependency, reducing expenditures as much as possible, and closing the camps as quickly as
possible, undermined the ability of the army to achieve the self-sufficiency for contrabands that
they hoped to obtain. Finally, this chapter indicates the consequences of the lack of a coherent
contraband policy, as camp commanders in each location came up with their own policies and
programs and faced no federal oversight when these policies failed.
Before analyzing the contraband camps, a brief discussion of the Union Army’s treatment
of white refugees will provide a useful point of comparison, as they often received more lenient
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treatment than the contrabands despite their questionable loyalty. For example, in New Orleans,
Union quartermasters provided rations not only for the families of newly enlisted Union soldiers,
but also for any widows and destitute persons, regardless of their loyalty, and continued issuing
these rations until the recipients could either find work for themselves or left the area.1 In total,
more than six thousand New Orleans residents received rations at some point in 1862. In
Vicksburg, meanwhile, the Union army not only provided rations to clearly disloyal residents,
but also sold them firewood and other supplies at cost.2 Finally, the army in Missouri taxed
disloyal whites to pay for the care of Union refugees but not for contrabands, which clearly
demonstrates the higher priority of the white destitute.3 The generosity of treatment of white
refugees contrasts starkly with the administration of contraband camps, where superintendents
often cut off rations even to the destitute and compelled contrabands to move to government
farms or leased plantations, where lessees often failed to provide rations at all. The fears of
dependency could not totally explain the treatment of contrabands in camps across the South,
and even their unquestionable loyalty could not provide them with better treatment than white
refugees of quite questionable loyalty to the Union. The racism that plagued the North during
the Civil War played a factor in the administration of contraband camps, as the same
administrators that cut off rations to contrabands often generously handed them out to white
refugees. The first example of ration cutoffs in a contraband camp in the second half of the Civil
War, Washington, DC, provides clear evidence of this unequal treatment.
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By late 1863, Camp Barker in Washington, DC, became so overcrowded and diseaseridden that the Quartermaster’s Department finally acted and began searching for a new location
for the contrabands, mainly due to fears that disease would spread from the camp into the city
than from any concern for the welfare of the contrabands. Lieutenant Colonel Greene, the chief
quartermaster, recommended land in Arlington, Virginia where contrabands could farm and also
live in a rural area free of disease outbreaks and the poor sanitation of an urban camp.4
Accordingly, quartermasters set up a one thousand acre space with five large farms for the
contrabands to grow subsistence crops, which the army hoped would allow them to curtail the
issue of rations.5 In addition, quartermasters promised schools, job training, and ample housing
for the contrabands, in addition to wages of ten dollars a month for work at the village.6 When
smallpox again hit Camp Barker in December 1863, Nichols and Colonel Greene opened
Freedmen’s Village and began to transfer the contrabands without consulting them on whether
they wanted to leave the camp, hoping that they would be eager to leave Camp Barker for an
idyllic life on a farm.7 The reality would prove to be quite different, as, after a move marked by
brutality and wanton physical abuse, contrabands arrived to find a half-finished complex with
inadequate shelter, leading to further outbreaks of disease the village was designed to prevent.
The closure of the camp in favor of locating the contrabands near farming land foreshadowed
Bureau policy after the war, as Bureau agents tried to close camps as quickly as possible and
relocate contrabands onto plantations so they could support themselves. The camp in DC set an
important example for Bureau policy as early as 1863.
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When Greene announced the move to the contrabands at Camp Barker, many resisted the
planned relocation. They feared separation of their families and also hated Nichols, who many
saw as abusive.8 One contraband told a missionary that he “would rather starve in Washington”
than move to another camp under Nichols.9 Greene and Nichols ignored their complaints and
began to move the contrabands in winter 1863-1864. The failure to account for the wishes of the
contrabands set a precedent that would be repeated again and again in camps across the South
and during Reconstruction. Camp commanders and Bureau agents often believed that only they
truly knew what was best for the contrabands despite constant protests from the contrabands
themselves and the missionaries who attempted to advocate for their rights.
Most of the contrabands fled Camp Barker to avoid having to move, and had to find
housing and food on their own in the already overcrowded and inflation-plagued city.10 Many,
according to Winkle, ended up “homeless, helpless, and starving,” and the army did nothing to
help them since they refused to move to the new settlement in Arlington.11 In addition, soldiers
cleared contraband settlements in the District and surrounding areas and forced the inhabitants to
move to the Village. For example, soldiers cleared a well-appointed camp on General Robert E.
Lee’s property at Arlington that was located near the village, and ordered all contrabands to
leave, even “a dying child.”12 Reacting to the move, one contraband stated that he would return
to his “old master” and that he had been treated worse by the Union army than by his owner.13
Louisa Jane Barker, a missionary, agreed, stating that the move constituted “a tyranny worse
than their past experiences of slavery.”14 Even worse, General Christopher C. Augur, the
8
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commander of the Department of Washington, ordered the move because the settlement “injured
the look of the Estate which the government intended to sell at the best advantage,” which
demonstrates perhaps more than anything else the neglect of contraband welfare by military
authorities and the degree of exploitation they accepted in order to achieve economy and avoid
dependency on the government.15 The forced move followed the precedent set in Virginia and
also served as a model for later camp closures after the end of the war.
When the contrabands who remained with the army reached the camp, they found
conditions little better than those they had left behind. The military had not yet finished building
the cabins due to the hasty transfer of the contrabands, forcing contrabands to sleep in tents,
“shivering against the cold wind and damp ground,” and the exposure led to yet another outbreak
of smallpox, even though they had been moved out of Camp Barker to avoid smallpox.16
Nichols and Greene, continuing the emphasis on economy, forced the contrabands to buy
firewood in the winter and banned them from cutting their own supply, causing many to suffer
without heat during a bitter winter and even deaths from exposure.17 Quartermasters also
diverted supplies from the village to contrabands working for the army, further worsening the
shortages of basic supplies.18 As a missionary stated, shortages of food, clothing, and medicine
caused “much suffering,” and a lack of doctors only worsened the misery of the sick.19
Contrabands faced exploitative labor practices very similar to those in Virginia and South
Carolina. The labor practices, including low wages and impressment, which created yet another
model for sharecropping and other exploitative practices that emerged during Reconstruction,
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also, according to Winkle, “emphasized the profitability and military contributions of the camp
at the expense of the contrabands’ needs.”20 Men received ten dollars a month, but the five
dollar deduction remained intact, and contrabands also had to pay three dollars in monthly rent
for their cabins, leaving them with almost no money to buy supplies, including firewood.21 In
addition, in a system similar to leasing in South Carolina, Nichols continued to hire the
contrabands out to private employers, and would not let them quit their jobs and return to the
village even if their employers abused them.22 His model for leasing would be followed along
with South Carolina’s in the camps of the Mississippi Valley, which will be discussed in chapter
four. Nichols primarily viewed the camp as a source of military labor and government revenue,
and began to impress contrabands for work on the fortifications and other military jobs despite
their protests and the separation of families that ensued.23 Just as in Virginia and South
Carolina, recruiters for the United States Colored Troops impressed contrabands and forced them
to enlist, even interrupting a church service to search for recruits. This example indicates how
precedents set in one camp could shape policies in other camps, as commanders in DC saw that
forceful impressment had been carried out without federal interference in other camps as the
need for manpower overcame moral scruples.24 When Greene replaced Nichols with Captain
Joseph M. Brown in 1864, conditions slowly improved within the village, and many contrabands
who remained there and managed to avoid impressment began to see it as home rather than a
temporary camp.25 Impressment continued, and Nichols re-emerged at Mason’s Island, where
conditions would be much worse for the contrabands sent there from the village.
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The island became a temporary employment depot, where fears of dependency drove
policy decisions. Nichols and Brown also set up Mason’s Island as a temporary employment
depot in 1864 to find jobs for able-bodied contrabands so they would no longer be dependent on
government support. Captain Brown sent contrabands who could work from the village to the
island whether they consented or not, which represents another example of camp commanders
failing to take the wishes of the contrabands into account. As Berlin states, “He displayed scant
sympathy for the freedpeople’s desire to control the conditions under which they worked and
lived.”26 Nichols hired contrabands out to private employers and even separated children,
including Carter Holmes, from their parents and apprenticed them to area farmers, and then
failed to intervene when these employers mistreated their contraband laborers.27 These policies
set yet another example not only for plantation leasing in Mississippi but also for the labor
contract and apprenticeship policies of the Freedmen’s Bureau, which would lead to the
separation of hundreds of children from their families after the war. For contrabands waiting to
be hired out, conditions on the island were dreadful, and neither Nichols nor the army
quartermasters intervened. The barracks had no beds, forcing contrabands to sleep on the floor,
and they quickly became overcrowded as Brown sent contrabands faster than Nichols could hire
them out.28 As a result, disease spread quickly, and forty-eight contrabands died in August 1864,
followed by sixty in September.29
The labor practices and conditions on Mason’s Island illustrate the priority of economy
and self-reliance by Nichols and the quartermasters. Brown and Nichols focused on hiring the
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contrabands out and removing them from government support, without regard to the
consequences for the contrabands, including disease and horrid conditions on the island,
separation of families, forced hiring of children, and abusive employers. For the contrabands on
Mason’s Island freedom did mean an escape from slavery, but it did not mean an end to
separation of families, impressment and forced labor, indicating the degree of army mistreatment
of contrabands in Washington, D.C. The failure of the federal government to address the
exploitation clearly demonstrates the consequences of the lack of federal oversight of the camps,
even in the federal capital itself.
While most of this section covers the District of Columbia, a brief analysis of the
experiences of contrabands in Alexandria, just south of the Potomac in Virginia, is warranted
here since they also experienced mistreatment at the hands of the army, and the federal
government also failed to intervene to prevent exploitation. General Samuel P. Heintzelman, the
commander in Alexandria, refused to build housing for the contrabands in order to keep them
away from the city due to fears that they would spread disease, but more and more kept coming
despite his efforts.30 By December 1862, according to the New York missionary, twelve hundred
contrabands lived in twenty-five houses, and the military refused to build any additional houses
or provide alternative shelter.31 For the contrabands, Union lines meant freedom, and they kept
arriving in order to gain “freedom, safety, and employment” despite the horrendous conditions.32
The provost marshal, John C. Wyman, stated that the lack of housing required “the crowding of
them to such a degree as must prove exceedingly dangerous to their own, and perhaps to the
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health of the city.”33 As Wyman feared, the lack of shelter contributed to the spread of disease
among the contrabands, meaning that the housing policy caused the very problem it was intended
to prevent, and led to the avoidable deaths of hundreds of contrabands, and the lack of a federal
policy contributed to this clear neglect. A missionary with the Rochester Anti-Slavery Society
stated, that “women and children are sick and dying, not for want of necessary food, but for want
of suitable shelter from this cold storm.”34 Smallpox began to spread in the overcrowded city,
causing high mortality among the susceptible contrabands, including five hundred deaths in
winter 1862. The smallpox patients, according to the New York missionary, an unnamed
member of the New York Meeting of Friends, were “very much neglected,” and a lack of
firewood in the hospital during the winter only increased mortality rates.35 Heintzelman still
refused to build barracks, stating that contrabands would be dependent on government support
and not work if they received free housing, indicating the emphasis on self-reliance rather than
the welfare of the contrabands.36 The numbers of contrabands in the city, however, finally
forced him to build barracks to alleviate the overcrowding and disease that pervaded the city,
but, while the contrabands received shelter, they also faced another form of exploitation.37
In an effort to “reduce expenses and foster self-reliance,” Heintzelman and Albert
Gladwin, the superintendent, charged rent for barracks rooms, even though contrabands working
for the government rarely received regular wages.38 Gladwin charged the contrabands four to
five dollars a month for space in a room that held twelve to sixteen people, even though many
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contrabands working for the government had not received any wages for five to six months.
Neither the army nor the federal bureaucracy made any effort to pay the contrabands their back
wages, which indicates the consequences of the lack of a clear federal policy.39 If contrabands
could not pay the rent on time, even due to illness or the lack of wages, Gladwin evicted them
and forced them to survive on their own in the city with no help from the government.40 These
contrabands, reported Harriet Jacobs, were “packed together in the most miserable quarters,
dying without the commonest necessities of life,” and could only receive help from overwhelmed
aid societies.41 Gladwin forced those unable to work to relocate to Arlington, even though the
move resulted in the separation of families.42 The contrabands remaining in Alexandria could no
longer receive government rations and had to purchase their own food, even if they had not
received any wages.43 Gladwin and the army authorities focused on self-reliance and reduction
of government expenses rather than the welfare of the contrabands to the degree of evicting those
unable to pay rent through no fault of their own to die on the streets with no access to rations or
medical care. Medical care, in fact, remained lacking even for the contrabands able to remain in
the barracks, despite the fact that a few more surgeons and medical supplies could have
prevented at least some of the deaths.
In the overcrowded barracks in Alexandria, smallpox continued to spread and army
medical authorities did nothing to stop it. The only nurses were contrabands themselves, and
conditions in the hospital continued to deteriorate. According to missionary Ulysses B. Ward,
the contrabands received “little if any medical attendance,” and the decaying hospital became
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“the complete realization of destitution and misery.”44 As a result, mortality rates rose to a peak
of seven hundred deaths in two months, and the medical neglect continued, as a surgeon only
came to the hospital every two days if that.45 In addition, soldiers confiscated blankets from
contrabands, even the sick, claiming that they constituted government property, and then sold
them for their own profit and never faced discipline for such obvious corruption, clearly
demonstrating the degree of army exploitation of contrabands in Alexandria.46 As Captain
William McLean Gwynne, an army inspector sent to investigate conditions in the city, stated,
their “condition is made much worse by being made free,” as a lack of wages, exorbitant rents,
ration cutoffs, and the lack of medical care combined to create terrible conditions for the
contrabands.47 New York missionaries reported their findings on the dreadful conditions in
Alexandria directly to President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton, and the federal
government still took no action.48 The fact that the War Department did nothing in response to
his report and actually praised the army for teaching self-reliance exemplifies the low priority
given to contraband welfare, and the focus on reducing expenses no matter how bad the
conditions.49 The military, specifically camp superintendents, attempted to inculcate selfsufficiency and economic autonomy to the contrabands, but then failed to pay wages, impressed
them for labor, and forcibly recruited them into the army, which undermined the very free labor
ideas they were trying to promote. Federal authorities not only failed to stop the military from
exploiting contrabands, but actually praised them and directly contributed to its continuation,
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effectively demonstrating the mistreatment of contrabands by both military and federal
authorities in the Washington area. These failures also demonstrate both the consequences of the
lack of a federal policy and the precedents set for mistreatment of contrabands and freedmen by
the Freedmen’s Bureau.
The contraband camps in Washington, DC, and Alexandria, Virginia, clearly demonstrate
the consequences of the lack of a federal policy and inadequate federal oversight for the
contraband camps. Nichols and the camp commanders failed to address the poor sanitary
conditions of the camps, forced the contrabands to sign labor contracts, separated their families,
and charged high rent for squalid barracks in Alexandria, and neither the federal government nor
the military bureaucracy intervened, despite the camp’s location in the national capital. The
camp created multiple examples for policies and programs enacted by the Freedmen’s Bureau,
including mandatory labor contracts, failure to address poor sanitary conditions, sending
contrabands to private employers, apprenticing children away from their families without
parental consent, and failure to provide sufficient medical care. The camps in Washington
clearly demonstrate that examples for Freedmen’s Bureau policy originated in the contraband
camps during the Civil War. These policies would also become models for the western
contraband camps that opened during the second half of the Civil War, especially plantation
leasing, the separation of families for labor, the failure to provide sanitation, and inadequate
oversight of leased plantations. These policies led to failure to pay wages, a lack of sufficient
rations, the turning off of contrabands at the end of the year without paying wages, and the
forced transport of contrabands from the camps to leased plantations.
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North Carolina: A Failed Colony
To the south in North Carolina, meanwhile, several more precedents for Freedmen’s
Bureau policy emerged. The settlement at James City became the first independent contraband
settlement, where the contrabands supported themselves with little aid or protection from the
government, and it became a model for future camps and settlements in the Western Theater and
for the Freedmen’s Bureau. The failure of the land program in James City provided further
precedent for the emphasis on labor contracts rather than land distribution as the governing
policy of the Freedmen’s Bureau. The colony in Roanoke Island also aspired to independence,
but the lack of adequate arable land and overcrowding undermined these lofty objectives.
Instead, contrabands at Roanoke Island faced rampant corruption, paternalism from the army and
from missionaries, violent abuse by soldiers, and an ongoing lack of wages that persisted
throughout the war and into Reconstruction. Roanoke Island demonstrated the failure of freelabor programs and foreshadowed the mismanagement that would plague the camps in the
Western Theater during the Civil War and the Freedmen’s Bureau programs across the South
during Reconstruction. These two camps demonstrate the consequences of the lack of a clear
federal policy, as neither the military bureaucracy nor the federal government intervened to
address misconduct and corruption by military leaders, or to address the deteriorating conditions
in the camps. A discussion of the camps in North Carolina during the second half of the Civil
War is essential to understand how the failure of independent contraband settlements led to
policies and programs later adopted by the Freedmen’s Bureau during Reconstruction. It also
further demonstrates the importance of the wartime contraband camps to the formulation of
Freedmen’s Bureau policy.
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In 1863, recruitment began in North Carolina for the United States Colored Troops,
which quickly led to impressment. The recruiters resorted to the brutal impressment tactics
utilized in Virginia and South Carolina, which indicates ineffective federal oversight of
recruiting in camps across the South. As Click states, the recruiters treated “the freedmen worse
than they had been treated under slavery” and soldiers often impressed contrabands when they
reported to paymasters to receive their wages. The contrabands did not receive their wages and
were compelled to enlist in the army, which meant irregular wages at best.50 The soldiers did
not receive their wages on time if at all after they enlisted, which made it impossible for them to
support their families back on Roanoke Island. According to Tubbs, a regiment of 1,100 colored
soldiers in New Bern did not receive any pay, which made it very difficult to feed their families.
Even worse, the paymaster for the regiment used the money for wages to trade cotton illegally,
which indicates the lack of effective oversight of the black regiments in addition to the
contraband camps.51 In addition, medical care for the soldiers remained inadequate throughout
the war, as incompetent surgeons and a pervasive lack of supplies hampered the ability of the
army. As Tubbs states, smallpox spread throughout a regiment in New Bern, and the disease
spread to the contraband camp, which indicates the consequences of the failure to take a simple
quarantine measure to prevent epidemic disease.52 Tubbs’s statement in his letter that the disease
only affected “n-----rs” reflects the racism pervasive among officers and soldiers in North
Carolina, and clearly demonstrates that it played a major role in the mistreatment of
contrabands.53 The contrabands in North Carolina faced the same problems with military
impressment as contrabands in Virginia and South Carolina, but the consequences were worse

50

Click, Time Full of Trial, 130-131.
Charles H. Tubbs to Sir, 4 February 1863, in the Charles H. Tubbs Papers.
52
Charles H. Tubbs to Sir, 28 June 1863, in the Charles H. Tubbs Papers.
53
Ibid.
51

151

due to the comparative lack of job opportunities for the contrabands on Roanoke Island. It
remained difficult for women and children to support themselves, and the military authorities at
the camp did little to address the worsening situation.
Contrabands also faced impressment for labor in addition to military service. In
November 1863, several contrabands signed a petition to General Butler complaining that they
had been “impressed by the authorities to labor on the Public works without compensation” and
that they could not support their families who depended on their wages.54 The freedmen
emphasized their “Willingness to Contribute to the Cause of the union in anyway consistant with
there cause as Freemen and the Rights of their Families,” indicating that they were willing to
work for the government as long as they received the treatment they believed to be just, such as
receiving enough money to support their families.55 The contrabands recognized their rights and
complained to the army when they were mistreated, which foreshadows the extensive volumes of
complaints made to Bureau agents after the war as freedmen asserted their newfound rights,
indicating that the contraband camps set yet another precedent for Bureau policy. The fact that
no response to the petition signed by more than fifty contrabands exists in the record also
foreshadows the lack of effective Bureau response to the complaints of freedmen after the war.
A lack of staff often prevented agents from enforcing their verdicts against employers, whose
exploitation of freedmen differed little from that imposed by the army in the contraband camps.
Contrabands also faced nonpayment of even their very low wages. As Click writes, the
army “frequently took advantage of the labor the freedmen provided… but only begrudgingly
and infrequently” provided support for the laborers and their families, even though there were
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few opportunities for outside employment on Roanoke Island.56 By the end of the war in 1865,
the army owed the freedmen in Roanoke Island alone more than eighteen thousand dollars in
back wages, and some contrabands had not been paid in over three years.57 The Department of
Negro Affairs, rather than improving the situation, increased the bureaucratic red tape in the
colony and hampered the ability of the army to pay contrabands their wages, which demonstrates
that excessive organization and bureaucracy can have the same negative consequences as a lack
of organization, particularly when two different agencies fail to work together.58 For example,
Superintendent Horace James often did not receive sufficient funds to pay contraband wages due
to bureaucratic infighting between the Treasury and War Departments over which agency was
responsible for contraband wages, which indicates a trend that would be repeated with even
worse consequences in the western contraband camps.59
In addition, the army reduced the rations issued to contrabands in order to reduce
dependency on the government, but failed to account for the lack of wages, meaning that the
contrabands faced starvation if they could not find another way to pay for food. The ration
constituted of ten ounces of pork or sixteen ounces of beef, sixteen ounces of bread or sixteen
ounces of corn meal, and ten pounds of vegetables, all issued weekly.60 In late 1864, the army,
wanting to, according to historian Chandra Manning, demonstrate the self-sufficiency of the
contrabands to disprove racism, “sharply reduced or cut off rations to all island inhabitants who
could not pay for them or were not directly laboring for the government,” including the families
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of United States Colored Troops soldiers, who had been promised support by recruiters.61 These
policies anticipated patterns that would be reflected in Freedmen’s Bureau policy, as Bureau
agents consistently cut rations to freedmen, and eventually issued them only to the absolutely
destitute who could not work due to illness, advanced age, or disability.62 In addition, the lack of
wages in North Carolina would continue into Reconstruction, indicating the Bureau’s inability to
correct wartime deficiencies in providing for the contrabands. The fact that Roanoke Island was
set up as a model colony only makes these deficiencies more glaring and indicates the failure of
the army’s free labor policy in the contraband camps.
As in Virginia and South Carolina, missionaries from the North arrived at Roanoke Island
to assist the contrabands. As Click writes, “Although the military authorities were responsible
for the official supervision of the freedmen’s camps in North Carolina, the real caregivers were
the northern missionaries who offered day-to-day assistance to the former slaves,” especially
given the deficiencies in military support of the contrabands.63 Most of the missionaries came
from the American Missionary Association, which focused on perfecting society through social
reform.64 A debate soon began between the AMA and the National Freedmen’s Relief
Association, which focused on more practical goals such as self-reliance and education, and
these disputes hampered the ability of missionaries to provide for the contrabands.65 The
constant guerrilla attacks greatly undermined the ability of missionaries to keep schools open on
the mainland, and led to desperate overcrowding on Roanoke Island, as contrabands fled to the
colony to escape the near-constant guerrilla raids. A lack of teachers compounded the problem,
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as each teacher had one hundred or more students by 1864. In addition, the army, rather than
supporting the schools, sent soldiers to raid the schoolhouses and impress students for work
away from the camps without consulting their parents, which led to dramatic declines in
attendance as parents kept their children out of school due to fear of impressment.66 The army
could confiscate school buildings at any time for military purposes, and provided no financial
support to the schools or the teachers, indicating that the military placed a very low priority on
educating the contrabands even though they expected them to learn self-reliance and the skills
necessary to survive in a free-labor economy.67 The federal government also did not establish
any policies for supporting or even protecting contraband schools from guerrillas. The
contrabands had to rely on missionaries throughout the war for education, and the opinions of the
missionaries towards the contrabands made this governmental failure even more problematic.
Ideas of dependency also undermined the ability of aid societies to help contrabands.
The missionaries, according to historian David Silkenat, “focused on education rather than the
more pressing material needs of black refugees,” even as overcrowding and shortages worsened
on Roanoke Island in 1864.68 The missionaries shared the government’s fear of creating
dependency among the contrabands, and refused to provide material aid to contrabands who
were able to work, no matter how destitute their families or even if they had just arrived from a
camp on the mainland.69 Missionaries even denied aid to contrabands who were owed back
wages from the government and had no way to pay for even basic supplies. 70 According to
Greenwood, the missionaries saw the contrabands as “childlike” and unable to care for
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themselves, which indicates the racism and paternalism pervasive among northern missionaries
during the Civil War.71 In fact, they viewed African-American culture as “primitive and foolish”
and tried to replace it with “white, middle-class Protestant values they deemed superior” despite
the fact that the contrabands already had a thriving culture.72 The American Missionary
Association maintained segregated schools in Beaufort despite the protests of the contrabands,
and the contrabands founded the Colored Freedmen’s Aid Society to free themselves of
paternalist and even racist missionaries. The contrabands were not mere dependents on white
assistance, but clearly able to help themselves and organize to protest mistreatment and
exploitation.73 In addition, the actions of the missionaries provide even more evidence that
policies that they believed would help the contrabands actually ended up undermining their
ability to support themselves, but the army and missionaries failed to learn from these failures
and did not change their policies. These attitudes had even more severe consequences by late
1864, as the crowding on Roanoke Island and at Beaufort became desperate due to both guerrilla
raids and Sherman’s campaign in the Carolinas, and neither the army nor the missionaries could
adequately respond to the burgeoning crisis.
The army also failed to sufficiently respond to disease in the camps. In September 1864,
smallpox struck the severely overcrowded city of Beaufort, and killed one thousand victims of
both races. As Silkenat argues, soldiers and white Unionist refugees had lower mortality rates,
vastly better medical care, and more access to vaccination than the contrabands, who faced
incompetent surgeons and shortages of medical supplies, both of which could have been easily
corrected by the army.74 At Roanoke Island, meanwhile, the sudden arrival of thousands of
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contrabands from Sherman’s army led to “severe overcrowding, malnutrition, and disease” and
forty to fifty deaths a day before the camp administration finally began to act.75 They sent the
contrabands to abandoned plantations despite the guerilla threat and the fact that no hospitals
existed for these outlying plantations, and the mortality rate remained at thirty a day until the end
of the war. The contrabands did not have any choice in whether to go to a plantation, as the
army impressed them to hasten the process of emptying the contraband camps.76 The camp at
Roanoke Island set a precedent for the process of closing the camps that began soon after the end
of the war in 1865, and would be repeated across the South by the Freedmen’s Bureau during the
early stages of Reconstruction. Contrabands faced eviction from the camps and transfer to
abandoned or leased plantations as sharecroppers or tenants, which denied them any real chance
for economic independence and indicates the importance of the camps to the formulation of
Reconstruction policy.
A second contraband camp in North Carolina demonstrates the failure of both the attempt
to create a model contraband settlement and of attempts to distribute land to the contrabands. In
1863, after Confederate guerrilla raids forced the closure of outlying camps, James set up a new
settlement for two thousand seven hundred freedmen, which contained eight hundred houses that
would be built by the contrabands, meaning that they could set up their own settlement.77 By
1865, the settlement contained a school, several churches, a hospital, a blacksmith, and a
successful food crop, since the land at James City was much more suitable for cultivation than
the land at Roanoke Island.78 James also remained concerned about dependency on the
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government and cut off rations except for contrabands who absolutely could not perform any
type of work, and did not resume rations even for families of soldiers. He compelled
contrabands to pay for clothing, even if they could not afford it.79 After the war, meanwhile, the
contrabands strenuously argued that they had a right to remain on the land as farmers, and even
expressed a willingness to pay the government rent until they could afford to purchase the land.80
Colonel Eliphalet Whittlesey, the Bureau commissioner for North Carolina, closed the James
City settlement and ordered the freedmen to sign labor contracts on local plantations in Pitt
County. In fact, Whittlesey owned several plantations himself and hired freedmen to work on
them in violation of Bureau policy, and never faced discipline from the Bureau or the federal
government, which demonstrates that poor federal oversight continued even after the
establishment of the Freedmen’s Bureau. On his plantation, freedmen worked for five dollars a
month for women and fifteen dollars a month for children along with rations, and had access to a
school.81 While these labor terms were generous, the freedmen truly wanted the right to work
their own land and achieve economic autonomy, but contraband superintendents and Bureau
agents who followed the precedents set in the South Carolina contraband camps forced them to
sign labor contracts instead, which further demonstrates the importance of contraband camps in
setting precedents for both policies in later camps and Bureau policy.
The camps in North Carolina further demonstrate the importance of the contraband
camps to the establishment of both Bureau policy and problems after the war. The failure to pay
adequate wages, the separation of families, the enforcement of mandatory labor contracts, and
the failure to provide land for the contrabands all foreshadowed the problems that plagued the
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Bureau after the war, and also clearly demonstrate the lack of federal oversight of the camps
during the war, and which would continue after the war as the overwhelmed Bureau could never
provide sufficient staffing or supervision to cover the entire South. Also, the racism of several of
the officers in North Carolina foreshadowed the racism that would plague the Bureau, as many
agents frequently favored white Southerners over freedmen, which will be discussed in much
more detail in chapter five. Finally, the camps in North Carolina illustrate the important role of
missionary societies in helping to care for the contrabands. They would become much more
important after the war as the Bureau began to terminate its support for the freedmen, leaving
missionary-run schools as the only tangible source of aid in a region violently hostile to their
interests. An analysis of the camps in North Carolina is essential to understanding Bureau policy
after the war.
Kentucky: First Attempt to Close a Camp
While the army in Louisiana and Mississippi focused on leasing as a way to empty out
the contraband camps, the military in Kentucky used an entirely different approach. Unlike any
other state discussed so far in this dissertation, slavery remained legal in Kentucky for the
duration of the war, which meant that contrabands could not safely venture outside of heavily
guarded camps to farm abandoned land. The army and the missionaries who played a major role
in camp administration contracted the contrabands out to railroads, despite the fact that slavery
remained legal and the contrabands faced the constant danger of re-enslavement or even death if
captured by guerrillas or slave patrols. By the latter stages of the war, the number of contrabands
quickly began to overwhelm the military, who resorted to an unauthorized sudden closure of the
camp in the dead of winter that resulted in numerous deaths. While the military quickly reopened the camp, the expulsion created a model for later camp closures under the Bureau after
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the war. An analysis of Camp Nelson in Kentucky is essential for understanding the operation of
contraband camps in a border state where slavery remained legal, the disorganized and
haphazard process of camp closures, and the contracting out of contrabands to private
companies, all of which set important precedents for later Bureau policy.
One of the major problems with contraband camp administration in Kentucky, and the
Western Theater as a whole, was the emancipatory politics of the military commanders in the
area. According to historian Kristopher Teters, the officers in the Western Theater fell into four
categories: very conservative officers who refused to admit any contrabands to their lines and
wanted to maintain the institution of slavery in all respects, moderately conservative officers who
only admitted contrabands who worked for the Confederate army while leaving the institution of
slavery mostly alone, moderate officers who admitted any slaves owned by rebels, and radical
officers who admitted any fugitive slaves no matter what and hoped to dismantle the institution
of slavery entirely.82 In Kentucky, the officers tended towards the very conservative viewpoint,
which, combined with Kentucky’s status as a border state, made it very difficult for contrabands
to seek refuge within Union lines. William Tecumseh Sherman, for example, believed that all
slaves “should be returned to their masters” and that he had “no legal right to tamper with
slavery” in a loyal state.83 Don Carlos Buell, meanwhile, owned eight slaves himself and
believed in the constitutional right to own slaves. He ordered his commanders to refuse
admittance to contrabands no matter the loyalty of their owners, and reprimanded commanders
who violated his orders.84 Henry Wager Halleck, finally, who commanded the entire Western
Theater, issued General Order No. 3 which argued that contrabands gave information to the
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enemy and therefore should be excluded from Union lines, despite a lack of solid evidence to
back up his claims.85 The officers in command in Kentucky combined personal beliefs, a focus
on border state loyalty, and fears of spying to exclude contrabands from Union lines altogether,
until the Second Confiscation Act in 1862 required the army to admit fugitive slaves owned by
disloyal masters. In addition, Teters argues, the very success of the Union army in the West
undermined emancipation, as Halleck and his subordinates believed that emancipation was
unnecessary to Union victory due to the army’s series of victories in 1862.86 It would take the
Confiscation Act, in addition to the slower pace of Union victory in the West, to change
contraband policy in Kentucky from exclusion to admittance to the contraband camps.
In March 1863, Ambrose Burnside became commander of the Department of the Ohio,
which included Kentucky, and his mission was to help Unionists who faced constant threats from
Confederate guerrillas, but he quickly had to come up with a plan for the burgeoning contraband
population as well.87 Soon after arriving in Kentucky, he named Speed S. Fry, a missionary, to
establish a contraband camp near Lexington, as slaves ran to the Union army in large numbers
despite the fact that slavery remained legal in Kentucky and the Emancipation Proclamation
technically did not apply. The Article of War prohibiting the army from returning fugitives no
matter the loyalty of their master permitted Burnside to establish and maintain a contraband
camp, as long as his troops did not launch raids to entice slaves to escape.88 In addition, the
camp served as a base for United States Colored Troops recruitment and training in Kentucky,
which constituted the only reason that Ulysses S. Grant approved of its establishment and
maintenance, since he believed that Union control of east Tennessee negated any need for a large
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Union garrison in Kentucky. In fact, the camp became the third largest recruiting depot in the
nation by the end of the war in 1865.89 Burnside despised African-American soldiers and only
went along with recruitment grudgingly, meaning that the very existence of the camp remained
in limbo throughout the war. Another pressing issue right from the beginning was how to
employ the contrabands due to the camp’s location in a slave state, and Burnside and Fee came
up with a unique solution.
Due to the fact that contrabands could not farm abandoned land in Kentucky, Burnside
decided to impress the contrabands to work on roads and railroads. He issued General Orders
No. 41 on August 10, 1863, which required Fee to impress six thousand slaves to construct and
maintain roads near the camp in Lexington.90 The order did not specify wage scales or even
require that the contrabands receive pay. Burnside allowed contrabands from Mississippi to
Kentucky to work on the roads, as long as they remained separate from local contrabands, as he
did not want abolitionist sentiment to spread amongst the Kentucky slaves, which he feared
would make them “demoralized and worthless.”91 Due to fears about hiring contrabands in a
slave state, Burnside ordered that the masters of the contrabands be paid fifteen dollars a month,
but no wages paid to the laborers, as he remained concerned that the army was illegally hiring
contrabands in a loyal state.92 In fact, one of his aides, Brigadier General Burbridge, paid owners
of impressed laborers even if they had not taken the oath of allegiance, meaning that concerns of
maintaining border state loyalty overcame those of proper treatment of the contrabands, even as
the army was trying to convince them to sign up for service in the army.93
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Burnside and Fry faced the problem that slavery remained legal in Kentucky, so the very
existence of Camp Nelson technically violated Kentucky law, which led to attempts to return
contraband to their owners. The Emancipation Proclamation did not apply to Kentucky, so most
of the slaves fled from loyal masters, which created numerous legal issues because confiscation
constituted a war power that should only apply to disloyal masters. As a result, some soldiers
began to return contrabands to their owners, despite the Article of War that prohibited such
actions. In June 1864, one colonel tied together several contrabands and forcibly returned them
to their owners even though they had successfully reached Camp Nelson, and he faced no
discipline, which indicates the impact of Camp Nelson’s location in a border state, and the
consequences of the lack of any guidance from Washington on how to handle contraband camps
in loyal areas.94 Soldiers allowed slave owners to enter the camp to search for their escaped
fugitives, and forced the contrabands to leave with their owners. One cook who had lived in
Camp Nelson for six months found herself forced to return to her owner, who was known all
over the area for his excessive cruelty.95 That same month, meanwhile, Colonel A.H. Clark, the
post commander, ordered all black women in the camp “without authority” to be arrested,
whipped, tied by the thumbs, and forced out of the Union lines, where they faced almost certain
re-enslavement.96 The War Department rescinded this blatant violation of the Article of War
banning the military from returning fugitives, but it set a precedent for a later, much harsher
expulsion later in the war that no authorities in Washington could stop.
Recruits and their families also faced the specter of expulsion and harsh treatment despite
their willingness to enlist in the army, and the lack of a national policy concerning the treatment
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of USCT families allowed the administrators of Camp Nelson to institute any policies they
pleased. In May 1864, Clark rejected recruits who had faced constant violence from guerrillas
and slave patrols to reach the camp, stating that he had “no authority to accept them,” and the
War Department did not intervene to compel him to accept recruits and begin the enlistment
process.97 Once enlistment finally began in June 1864, recruits rejected as unfit were sent away
rather than gaining acceptance in the camp, despite the fact that they would almost certainly face
harsh reprisals from guerrillas or their owners, as Clark and Burnside never truly accepted the
existence of the camp and wanted to empty it as soon as possible, due to Kentucky’s location in a
border state and fears of dependency on the government.98 On July 3, 1864, Fry acted on that
mission, and ordered that only recruits and contrabands working for the military could remain in
the camp, and that women and children, even if they had family members in the army or working
for the government, had to leave the camp. Owners did not even have to take the oath of
allegiance to obtain their slaves, meaning that the overwhelming desire to empty the camp
overcame concerns over the loyalty of the masters and that the Union army was willing to help
Confederate slave owners rather than loyal contrabands.99 Due to the sheer number of
contrabands in the camp, the need to enlist a sufficient number of recruits, and bureaucratic
difficulties, the expulsion did not take place until winter, meaning that the contrabands were sent
out of the camp during one of Kentucky’s harshest winters in history.
On November 23, 1864, Fry ordered all women and children evicted from the camp,
despite the fact that most of them had husbands or fathers serving in the army. According to
Captain Theron E. Hall, “all were suffering with cold and hunger” and even starving and
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freezing to death.100 One soldier who enlisted in the USCT stated that the recruiter promised him
that his wife and children could remain in the camp for the duration of his service. The military
compelled his wife and children to leave the camp even though his child was severely ill, and the
child later died of exposure during the desperate search for shelter after leaving the camp.101 The
military took no action to assist the contrabands, even though they expelled them from a camp
located in a slave state and they faced the very real threat of re-enslavement or even death at the
hands of Confederate guerillas.102 News of the expulsion quickly reached the North, as the New
York Tribune reported that “armed soldiers attack humble huts inhabited by poor negroes” and
that “slavery or even death itself would be a positive blessing” to the contrabands expelled from
the contraband camps, as the Union military did not promise protection for the contrabands even
in a slave state.103
The expulsion from Camp Nelson demonstrates multiple important points. First, it
established a model for how to close a camp, which became the policy that several camp
commanders followed across the nation when the war ended, as the government hoped to rid
itself of the burden of caring for contrabands, especially after the Thirteenth Amendment ended
slavery in 1865. The expulsion further demonstrates that policies developed in the contraband
camps shaped the policies pursued by the Freedmen’s Bureau during early Reconstruction.
Secondly, the expulsion elucidates the consequences of inadequate federal supervision of the
camps, as federal officials failed to act until days afterwards, by which time several contrabands,
almost all women and children, had died from exposure to below-freezing temperatures with no
shelter. The lack of timely federal intervention is especially galling considering that Fry and
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other officials at Camp Nelson had repeatedly threatened to evict women and children from the
camp, so the actual expulsion did not come as a surprise to the federal bureaucracy, but they had
failed to take action on these earlier threats. The expulsion at Camp Nelson both established a
precedent for later Bureau policy and clearly illustrated the effects of inadequate federal
oversight of the camps, even when the War Department had advance knowledge of what was
about to happen at Camp Nelson.
In December 1865, reacting to the negative press on the expulsion, Adjutant General
Lorenzo Thomas ordered Fry to accept all women and children in to the camp and to “take back
all you have sent out” from the camp.104 Thomas intervened to free missionary T. E. Hall, who
had been arrested by Fry for helping contrabands enter the camp, even though the War
Department ordered Fry to permit women and children.105 The conditions in the camp,
meanwhile, had greatly worsened since the expulsion. Soldiers tore down the homes built by the
contrabands, meaning that they had to live in large communal barracks that worsened outbreaks
of epidemic diseases, particularly during the harsh winter.106 According to missionary Abisha
Scofield, the contrabands were “very destitute and most all complaining of being unwell” due to
the conditions in the barracks and the harsh weather.107 Another missionary, John Fee, reported
that “much distress and mortality” prevailed in the camp, as pneumonia spread easily through
barracks that housed up to one hundred and fifty contrabands per building.108 Conditions
worsened throughout the winter as more and more contrabands arrived at the camp and
overwhelmed the available shelter. As the commissioners of investigation of colored refugees
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for Kentucky, who represented a missionary organization, reported, the contrabands “have the
right to some kind of assistance, and the government alone has the means and ability to furnish
it,” meaning that the camp now had to provide for the women and children, especially when they
were the families of USCT soldiers.109 Conditions continued to deteriorate, and the looming end
of the war raised fears that the camp would close again and throw the contrabands out into a state
where slavery still remained legal right up until the end of the war.
The army tried to improve conditions by reopening the camp late in the war. On March
3, 1865, General Orders Number Ten freed all families of USCT soldiers and ordered camp
commanders to provide “benevolence and charity” to them in order to increase enlistments.110
This order resolved the question of whether these families were free given the camp’s location in
a border state, and removed the major justification for evicting them from the camp. Even
though slavery remained legal in Kentucky, USCT families could not be evicted from the camp
or mistreated, and slave owners would be expressly prohibited from entering the camp to reclaim
their former property. Soon after the issuance of the order, the war came to an end, calling into
question the need for the contraband camps to remain open across the South, not just in
Kentucky. Inspector General Jas. A. Hardie inspected the camp on May 13, 1865, and reported
that the “establishment is in excellent condition” with cottages being built to replace the
barracks, with rent of twenty-five dollars a month to teach the contrabands self-sufficiency.111
He still stated that slave owners should be responsible for caring for ill and elderly slaves, who
had no business coming to the camp, even though the camp constituted the only means in
Kentucky to ensure freedom from slavery. Finally, he argued that “Camp Nelson is apparently
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an extravagant experiment and the necessity for its maintenance is not clear,” meaning that the
government should shut it down as soon as practical, despite its location in a border state.112
Missionary John Fee, meanwhile, echoed the arguments of missionaries in South Carolina and
stated that the military should confiscate the land of disloyal planters and distribute it to the
contrabands so they could farm it and become self-sufficient, while additional land could be sold
to pay for schools.113 His plan received no support, however, as the government continued to
focus on closing the camps to reduce expenditures and ensure that the contrabands achieved selfsufficiency and avoided any dependency on the government. The process of closing Camp
Nelson set precedents that would be followed across the South in 1865 and 1866.
After the end of the war, the military wanted to shut down the camp, but the process did
not progress quickly. In June 1865, the Assistant Adjutant General for the Department of
Kentucky, Captain E.B. Harlon, argued that the hospital at Camp Nelson was too large and could
be cut without significant consequence in order to reduce government expenditures on the
camp.114 The hospital, however, was very necessary for the camp, and mortality only increased
after cuts in medical care, as almost two hundred contrabands died of disease in June 1865 alone,
according to Fee.115 Another problem facing the army was the fact that few white men would
hire the contrabands, making it difficult to find them jobs outside of the camp and extending the
life of Camp Nelson well into the fall of 1865, as the army had great difficulty finding alternative
arrangements for the contrabands.116 By July 1865, the camp still contained almost 1,500
women and nearly as many children, and only seventy one women had found employment
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outside the camp, meaning that the military and the Freedmen’s Bureau would have to come up
with a new plan for dismantling the camp.117 Their solution would set a precedent for both
Freedmen’s Bureau policy during Reconstruction and the closure of the camps across the South
and Border States.
On October 13, 1865, the Department of Kentucky, commanded by General Farwell,
ordered the closure of Camp Nelson, even though slavery remained legal and an investigation by
General Scofield revealed that masters abused USCT families.118 Fisk was to “begin in earnest
the work of closing the camp” and ensure that contrabands found jobs elsewhere, preferably with
their old masters. Masters still tried to reclaim freedmen as their property, refused to release the
children of USCT soldiers, and even tried to claim the wages earned by freedmen, which made it
very difficult to find jobs for the contrabands outside of the camp.119 General Farwell, who was
charged with organizing the closure of the camp, feared that evictions from the camp would
“drive free women and children into cruel bondage” by compelling them to work for their old
masters, who would try to replicate slavery as closely as possible.120 Fisk, representing the
government’s position, argued that it would be “far better that there be some suffering than to
continue Camp Nelson Refugee Home” at government expense, which indicates the singleminded focus on closing the camps and ending government support of the freedmen that shaped
Bureau policy in 1865 and early 1866.121 The closure of the camp proceeded despite his protests,
however, and schools closed in October 1865. To expedite the transportation of freedmen, the
army took over the Kentucky Central Railroad, which had refused to transport contrabands due
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to fears of transporting fugitive slaves out of the state. While the army sent USCT regiments to
protect the railroad, the contrabands still faced the very real threat of their masters trying to
reclaim them, as slave owners flooded the rapidly emptying camp to attempt to find their slave
property.122 The closure of the camp constituted a dire threat to the very freedom of the
contrabands, as they faced being expelled into a state where slavery remained legal and the army
was strongly compelling them to work for the very masters they had fled. The policies
established during the closure of Camp Nelson would shape the procedures for the closure of
contraband camps across the South and for the establishment of early labor policies for the
Bureau.
By late October 1865, the military began to cut rations at Camp Nelson, and only those
unable to perform any type of labor could still receive rations, which the army hoped would
compel the remaining contrabands to leave the camp.123 By November, over sixteen hundred
contrabands remained in the camp, and Fisk began to send large numbers of them north to work
in Ohio, but faced great difficulty finding employers who would accept the contrabands.
Northern fears of a massive influx of freedmen who would take their jobs limited the willingness
of northern employers, particularly in the Midwest, to accept freedmen laborers.124 With the
North closed off, Fisk turned to the South, particularly Mississippi, as a destination for the
contrabands, despite very real fears that the freedmen would be exploited and mistreated in
Mississippi, as the leasing system provided ample evidence for exploitation of contrabands in
Mississippi.125 Fisk proposed sending children to Vicksburg to be apprenticed to planters,
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meaning that he was so desperate to close the camp that he was willing to forcibly separate
families just to get the freedmen out of the camp.126 Very few freedmen volunteered to go to
Mississippi, as they knew that going to the Deep South cotton plantations could only bring
exploitation and abuse due to the institution of the leasing program, which will be discussed in
detail in the next chapter. By the end of 1865, the attempt to rapidly close Camp Nelson had
largely failed, and over a thousand freedmen still remained at the camp, leaving the Bureau to
decide what to do with the remaining freedmen, and the numbers only grew as USCT soldiers
mustered out and returned to their families in the camp.
The camps in Washington, DC, North Carolina, and Kentucky, further demonstrate the
importance of the contraband camps to the formulation of Freedmen’s Bureau policy. The
refusal to allow the contrabands to obtain land, the enforcement of mandatory labor contracts, the
failure to address poor sanitation that led to disease outbreaks and high mortality, the curtailing
of rations and clothing, and the failure to pay wages on time if at all began as problems in the
camps of Washington, DC, North Carolina, and Kentucky, but continued to plague the Bureau
after the Civil War. In addition, the failure of federal oversight allowed these problems to
remain unchecked throughout the war due to the lack of a national contraband policy, and the
situation would improve little under the Bureau, as corrupt agents faced little to no discipline for
the exploitation of contrabands. In the camps in the states of Mississippi and Louisiana,
meanwhile, the lack of oversight would be even more acute and conditions would become even
worse than those in the eastern camps, especially after the army hastily implemented plantation
leasing but provided little to no supervision of lessees, which led to rampant mistreatment and
exploitation which previewed the realities of labor contracts under the Bureau during
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Reconstruction. The story of the plantation leasing program in the Western Theater of the Civil
War is also vital to understanding why the contraband camps and contraband labor programs
remained vital to the formulation of Bureau policy. It is to their story that this dissertation turns
to complete its analysis of the contraband experience during the Civil War.
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CHAPTER 4
PREVIEWING THE BUREAU: LEASING IN MISSISSIPPI AND LOUISIANA, 1863-65

In contrast to the camps in the eastern theater of the Civil War, camps in Mississippi and
Louisiana did not remain populated for extended periods, as the military and Treasury
Departments shifted to large-scale plantation leasing to empty the camps and make the
contrabands self-sufficient. Leasing suffered from a severe lack of federal oversight, as local
military commanders, burdened by a lack of adequate staff, constant campaigning, the ongoing
guerrilla threat, and the vast distances between plantations, failed to adequately enforce the
leasing regulations. Lessees driven by a desire for profits also exploited the contrabands with
little consequence. An in-depth examination of the leasing programs in the two states allows for
a discussion of the role of the Treasury Department in federal contraband policy, and how
bickering between the Treasury and War Departments greatly undermined the effectiveness of
the plantation leasing programs. Discussing both Louisiana and Mississippi gives two different
case studies of leasing programs and the reasons behind the failures of both, from guerrilla raids
and constant campaigning in Mississippi to bureaucratic bickering and excessively harsh
regulations in Louisiana.
Finally, these two leasing programs created several models for Freedmen’s Bureau
policy, including the hiring of contrabands to private employers, the institution of sharecropping,
the preference of former masters in finding employment for contrabands, and the attempt to set
minimum wages or shares. The leasing programs also foreshadowed several failures of the
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Bureau, including inadequate supervision of employers, compelling contrabands and freedmen to
work for abusive former owners, not permitting freedmen to leave abusive employers, and
failure to protect freedmen from guerillas and other violence from southern whites. An
examination of the camps in Louisiana and Mississippi is vital to understanding how the
contraband camps shaped Bureau policy during Reconstruction, and it also highlights the
differences between eastern and western contraband camps.
This chapter is organized geographically for several reasons, all of which strengthen the
analysis and provide clear connections to Bureau policy after the war. First, it demonstrates the
ad-hoc nature of wartime contraband policy, as the Army in the two states instituted very
different leasing programs, despite similar overall goals for leasing policy as a whole. Second, it
illustrates how very different military situations, from a relatively stable Union occupation in
Louisiana to constant military movements and guerrilla warfare in Mississippi, greatly affected
the institution and effectiveness of leasing policy. Third, it elucidates how varying levels of
federal oversight, and particularly bickering between the War and Treasury Departments over
control of the leasing programs in the two states, undermined the effectiveness of contraband
policy in both regions. Finally, it highlights the difficulties faced by the Bureau in establishing
its programs and policies at the beginning of Reconstruction, as agents faced two very different
precedents for leasing that had their own strengths and weaknesses. A geographic organization
works best to understand how the two different leasing programs both shaped and created
challenges for the establishment of Bureau policy after the war. This analysis starts with
Mississippi before shifting to Louisiana.
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Contraband Camps and Leasing in Mississippi
In 1862, as the Union army moved into Mississippi, slaves began running to the camps,
forcing army commanders to create a policy on whether to admit them to the camps and how to
care for the rapidly growing numbers of contrabands. However, due to “ongoing warfare” and
military movements, many commanders saw caring for contrabands as an unnecessary burden,
and did little to formulate a coherent policy for contraband camps in the state, leading to vastly
different conditions across the numerous camps.1 For example, in 1863, a Colonel McDearmont
gave two locals near Vicksburg permission to convince their escaped slaves to return. According
to observer J.H. Denver, McDearmont stated, “If any of them want to go away yet, let them go
for we have enough to do to take care of our soldiers without feeding and taking care of
worthless” fugitives, and advocated forcing the contrabands out of Union lines despite the threat
of re-enslavement.2 Navy Commander Craven, meanwhile, evicted forty contrabands from an
island off Vicksburg “to be returned to their owners,” even though the owners clearly supported
the Confederacy.3 Both of these actions violated a July 1862 Article of War passed by Congress
prohibiting the return of fugitive slaves, indicating commanders in the field ignored policies
enacted by the federal government due to concern with military campaigns, to the detriment of
the contrabands who thought that Union lines meant freedom and safety from re-enslavement.4
Such inaction by the federal government would be repeated under the Freedmen’s Bureau, which
failed to address forced apprenticeship and even the impressment of freedmen by former owners
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throughout the Reconstruction period, which further indicates the importance of contraband
camp policy to the programs and failures of the Freedmen’s Bureau.
Even contrabands who entered Union lines faced mistreatment. In July 1862,
commanders in Mississippi received orders from the army command for the Department of
Mississippi not to pay any wages to contrabands and to charge them for clothing costs, in order
to provide compensation to masters at the end of the war.5 Early in the war, the army remained
unsure of how to handle contrabands, and, with little guidance from Washington, failed to pay
contrabands and even excluded them from the lines. The federal government did little or nothing
to stop even clear violations of the 1862 Article of War, further indicating the failure of federal
oversight of the camps. The constant influx of fugitives forced a change in this policy, which
provides further evidence that the contrabands themselves often drove federal policy. The
change is clearly explained in a letter from Henry Halleck, the Union commander in the Western
Theater, to Grant, where he declared that “the policy of the government [is] to withdraw from the
enemy as much productive labor as possible.”6 In addition, he cited reports that officers in
Grant’s army “not only discourage the Negroes from coming under our protection but, by ill
treatment, force them to return to their masters.”7 Halleck, and the high command in
Washington, ordered Grant to accept and properly treat the contrabands, but did not give any
additional guidance. The lack of a coherent policy, combined with the exigencies of a
continuing military campaign, led to disastrous consequences for the contrabands, and followed
precedents set in the eastern theater camps that also faced a continual lack of federal oversight or
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guidance that permitted commanders to exploit contrabands with impunity, and such inaction
would continue under the Bureau during Reconstruction.
In summer 1862, Grant’s army occupied Corinth, Mississippi and quickly faced a
massive influx of fugitives that he had to find a way to care for. Grant, according to historian
Cam Walker, “had no particular love for the freedmen,” but needed to find a way to house the
contrabands without impeding the movements of his army, which was beginning to advance
towards Vicksburg.8 He appointed John Eaton, an army chaplain, as Superintendent of
Contrabands and ordered him to “take charge of the contrabands… see that they are properly
cared for, and set them to work picking… all cotton” on abandoned plantations, but failed to
ensure that the plantations would be protected from Confederate guerrillas, and also did not
provide any oversight mechanism to ensure that contrabands received humane treatment in the
camp.9 When Eaton took office, he stated, “I hope I may never be called on again to witness the
horrible scenes I saw” in Grant’s camps, as the army was unable to provide for such a large
number of fugitives.10 Eaton appointed Grenville Dodge, one of Grant’s aides, to set up a
contraband camp near Corinth by November 1862.11 The camp would quickly be seen as a
model for other camps, but it was also plagued with racism, mistreatment, and exploitation due
to efforts to save government expenditures and failure to address racism by common soldiers and
officers assigned to the camp. Corinth demonstrates the failure of oversight at both the local and
federal levels, as the contrabands remained a very low priority for the army due to military
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campaigning, and the federal government failed to intervene to ensure that contrabands received
wages, rations, and housing in compensation for valuable labor for the army.
While the contrabands at Corinth lived in tents at first, they quickly built their own
homes, and established schools and churches with the help of aid workers from the American
Missionary Association.12 In addition, Chaplain J.M. Alexander, a missionary who replaced
Dodge in 1863, set up “working parties” to pick cotton on abandoned plantations, and also grow
foodstuffs for subsistence.13 In addition, Alexander recruited a regiment of United States
Colored Troops to guard the camp, who not only prevented Confederate guerrillas from
threatening the residents but also raided nearby plantations to free additional slaves, which
reflected examples established in North Carolina and Virginia earlier in the war.14 By the end of
the growing season in fall 1863, the camp had produced a profit of four to five thousand dollars a
month for the government, indicating the value of contraband labor to the Union war effort. It
did not lead to any improvements in federal contraband administration or a more defined
policy.15 Eaton called the camp “admirably organized” and the best-run camp in the state in an
1863 report.16 The characterization of the camp as a “model camp” and an exemplar for all other
superintendents to follow is depressing.17 For while the camp had vastly better conditions than
those at Vicksburg or Natchez, the contrabands there still suffered a lack of wages, epidemic
disease, abuse from racist soldiers, and even the threat of re-enslavement despite their location in
a camp securely behind Union lines. Corinth, despite its characterization as a superior camp, still
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indicates the degree of mistreatment and exploitation of contrabands by the Union army,
especially due to concerns of economy and avoiding dependency on government resources.
One of the major problems at Corinth was a lack of supplies. Eaton described a shortage
of clothing, food, and shelter, especially for women and children, and stated that it resulted in
“great suffering” amongst the contrabands as winter approached.18 Partly due to the shortages,
epidemic diseases, including pneumonia, typhoid fever, and measles ravaged the camp,
especially during the winter of 1862-1863, indicating that at least some of the mortality could
have been prevented by improved access to supplies.19 Even the contrabands who escaped
disease still faced mistreatment. Contrabands who worked for the government received no pay,
and camp officials sometimes a fell a year behind in wage payments, leaving the contrabands
unable to provide for their families, especially since they had to turn all personal property over to
the quartermaster upon arrival.20 The lack of pay illustrates the emphasis on economy rather
than contraband welfare, as the profit made by the camp was only possible due to unpaid
contraband labor, confiscation of contraband property, and a failure to purchase adequate
supplies, and the superintendents of the camp faced no discipline from the military or federal
bureaucracy for obvious exploitation of laborers.
Even worse, the contrabands also faced racism from the soldiers and superintendents
supervising the camp, which reflects a problem that plagued not only the camps but also the
Freedmen’s Bureau during early Reconstruction. Common soldiers, according to Smith, saw it
as “a matter of curiosity to see the intense prejudice against the blacks,” and even Dodge
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frequently used racial slurs to refer to the contrabands.21 Racism moved beyond simple language
and sentinels shot two contrabands while guarding the camp, leading to their replacement with
United States Colored Troops.22 Even worse was the failure to protect contrabands sent out on
raids of nearby plantations. The army often sent small groups of USCT soldiers, often assisted
by civilian contraband scouts familiar with the area, on raids of nearby plantations. Their small
numbers and lack of available backup if they ran into trouble often meant recapture or worse for
the soldiers and contrabands in the raiding parties. These raids were a common practice
throughout the South, especially in the South Carolina Sea Islands, but the soldiers and
contrabands always faced the very real threat of re-enslavement or death if the raids went wrong,
since regular troops would rarely back up the raiding parties. Secessionist planter C.R. Berteau
captured a contraband from Corinth who was raiding plantations for military recruits and
remanded him to the state courts for sale into slavery, indicating the devastating consequences of
the failure to provide military protection to contraband raiding parties, especially since only a
few soldiers would be needed for each expedition.23 The contrabands at Corinth, while better
treated than others in the state, still faced racism, a lack of wages, shortages of basic supplies,
epidemic disease, and even a lack of protection and the threat of re-enslavement, indicating the
emphasis on economy rather than contraband welfare. The poor conditions at Corinth
demonstrate the lack of federal oversight, which became even more of a problem for Mississippi
due both to the distance from Washington and the focus on the Eastern Theater that remained
constant in both the military and federal bureaucracy for the duration of the war. For the
contrabands, their situation was about to become much worse.
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In the winter of 1863-1864, General William Tecumseh Sherman set out on the Meridian
Campaign, and he needed the men in the Corinth garrison to reinforce his army, which led to the
closure of the Corinth camp. The contraband camp suddenly closed without any advance notice,
which indicates the impact of constant military campaigns on contraband camps across
Mississippi and the low priority of the contraband camps in Union policy in Mississippi.
Throughout the war, contraband camps would be little more than temporary due to the constant
movement of the army, and contrabands constantly faced the prospect of abandoning crops and
settlements with little notice, which hampered the ability of the military to administer a freelabor program that would teach the contrabands self-reliance and the skills needed for economic
autonomy. The constant military campaigning was one major difference that sets Mississippi
apart from the eastern contraband camps, which were located in regions securely occupied by the
Union Army. As Walker writes, the “exigencies of military victory rendered futile any hope of
long-term stability for the camp.”24 Sherman did not care about the contrabands and only
focused on military necessity, and the sudden move in the harsh winter caused devastating
consequences.25 In particular, the move came during the harvest, forcing the contrabands to
leave their crops, including foodstuffs, behind after a year of hard work.26 Once the camp was
evacuated, the contrabands faced a move sixty miles north to Memphis in temperatures that
reached eleven degrees below zero with only tents as shelter, and many died of exposure during
a march that Walker termed “terrible days of suffering.”27 The evacuation clearly demonstrates
the emphasis on military necessity, especially since Sherman’s sudden move caused a hasty
evacuation in horrendous weather. Since the weather caused significant delays in the Meridian
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campaign, the contraband camp closed much faster than necessary, which exacerbated the
suffering of contrabands even more, as even a week of delay could have allowed them to gather
the harvest and ensure sufficient food for the winter. As Walker writes, the Corinth camp itself
became a “casualty of the war,” as the camp that, despite its flaws, provided the best conditions
for the contrabands closed due to the exigencies of military campaigns, beginning a winter of
suffering for the contrabands that only became worse upon their arrival in Memphis.28
The contrabands from the Holly Springs camps, also located in northern Mississippi,
joined the Corinth contrabands in Memphis, which led to severe overcrowding and the scale of
the guerrilla problem in Mississippi. In December 1862, Confederate raiders attacked the camp,
left poorly defended due to the need for reinforcements in the ongoing military campaigns,
capturing several contrabands and selling them into slavery.29 The guerrillas hoped to both
capture contrabands to re-enslave them in order to replace the slaves that had fled local
plantations, and to undermine Union control of Mississippi by forcing the Union Army to use
men and resources to fight guerrillas instead of the regular Confederate Army. In addition, they
also hoped to undermine emancipation in the region by deterring slaves from fleeing to Union
lines, as the fact that those who sought shelter with Union troops still ended up re-enslaved could
scare some would-be runaways into staying on the plantations and working for the Confederate
war effort.30 The remainder who managed to elude the guerrillas faced a rapid evacuation to
Memphis that became even worse than the conditions faced by the Corinth contrabands, which
indicates a lack of preparedness and the consequences of the lack of a uniform federal policy that
would lay out guidelines for evacuation and camp transfers. A rare blizzard hit the area,
28
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resulting in forty “miserable deaths” from exposure, and white soldiers stole supplies from the
already vulnerable contrabands and did not face any discipline, which indicates that the
Mississippi camps faced the same failures of local oversight as the Eastern Theater camps.31
Once the contrabands arrived in Memphis, they found a camp plagued by horrendous conditions,
epidemic disease, and rising mortality rates that grew to shocking levels throughout 1862 and
1863, indicating the devastating consequences of an emphasis on military necessity rather than
contraband welfare, and also the lack of effective oversight at either the federal or local levels.
The contrabands at Memphis faced much worse conditions than they had experienced at
Holly Springs or Corinth. The hospital was “wretched in the extreme,” and had almost no
supplies of medicines or vaccines.32 The negligent surgeon refused to address the conditions,
worsening the outbreaks of disease and causing horrendous consequences.33 A smallpox
epidemic ravaged the camp, and one thousand contrabands died during the winter of 1863. The
casualty rates indicate the scale of medical neglect, especially preventable problems such as
supply shortages and incompetent physicians.34 Incompetent surgeons plagued camps across the
South, as the lack of any oversight of their abilities led to incompetent and racist surgeons
obtaining and keeping posts at contraband camps, and also later to obtain positions as Bureau
surgeons, indicating that the Freedmen’s Bureau failed to solve obvious problems that plagued
the camps. A lack of clothing and shelter also contributed to disease, as the contrabands lived in
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tents without fuel supplies in harsh winter weather.35 In addition, the administrators of the camp
had “only bitterness and contempt, resulting in the violence and abuse of these helpless people,”
and often failed to pay the contrabands and even stole their minimal property.36 The work
regimes instituted by these administrators also proved abusive. For example, one groups of
contrabands had to work in bitterly cold water from sunup to sunset, and then return to tents with
no fire or blankets, causing them to “die by scores,” and the survivors did not receive any wages
for their toil.37 The contrabands in Memphis faced squalid conditions, rampant disease, and
abusive administrators, indicating the emphasis on economy and military necessity, as the army
sent refugees from the closed Corinth and Holly Springs camps to a camp already plagued with
neglect and abuse so that Union military objectives could be met. The camp indicates the glaring
failure of federal oversight and the consequences of the failure to establish a uniform contraband
policy, as clear violations of Halleck’s own policies occurred with no consequences for the camp
administrators. The hasty evacuation of Corinth and Holly Springs created examples that would
be repeated later in the war in Kentucky, with even worse consequences, and at the end of the
war during the expedited closure of the contraband camps. The story would be the same in
Vicksburg, as considerations of economy, avoiding dependency, and military necessity
consistently trumped contraband welfare.
General Grant and his army arrived in the area surrounding Vicksburg in early 1863,
intent on capturing the city and taking control of the Mississippi River, but fugitive slaves began
running to his lines almost immediately, forcing him to decide how to care for them while not
hindering the movements of his army. As historian Martha Bigelow writes, “Grant’s very army
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was threatened with demoralization and disease if these homeless, starving… people were not
cared for.”38 As in Corinth, he directed Eaton to set up camps for the contrabands to provide
housing and to keep them away from his army, which needed to move freely during the ongoing
campaign.39 The camps would be temporary until the contrabands could find jobs elsewhere and
no longer require government expense, indicating the emphasis on economy and avoiding
dependence, especially since the sheer numbers of contrabands quickly overwhelmed the ability
of the army to find jobs and housing for them, especially the large numbers of women and
children.40 This attitude towards the camps led to neglect, squalid conditions, and mistreatment,
especially when the program of plantation leasing, the epitome of avoiding government
expenditures, became policy in 1863.
Prior to leasing, the contrabands faced horrendous conditions in the sprawling network of
camps surrounding Vicksburg. Union soldiers guarding the camps resented the duty and
harbored virulently racist attitudes, and their officers did little or nothing to discipline them, a
problem that became even worse due to the constant changes of personnel from military
campaigning. As Ballard writes, most “cared little for blacks, for they had clearly come south to
restore the Union,” indicating how military necessity and racism could combine to the detriment
of the contrabands.41 Such attitudes led to violent abuse of the contrabands, especially women.
As historian Nancy Bercaw writes, “soldiers and officers sexually abused them, allowed them to
starve, threw them out of camp, and denied them access to… wages or rations,” all because they
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saw them as “loose” or immoral, despite clear family structures among the contrabands.42 These
attitudes reflect the racist attitudes that predominated across American society during the
nineteenth century, even among northerners, reduced the urgency of addressing the abuse of
contrabands among military officers, and also contributed to inadequate federal oversight of the
contraband camps. Racism would also plague the Freedmen’s Bureau after the war, as racist
agents flagrantly mistreated freedmen with little to no consequence. This abuse not only
illuminates the scale of racism, but also the failure to address such flagrant mistreatment, as
officers not only ignored the perpetrators but participated themselves in the violence, which
clearly demonstrates the low priority of contraband welfare.43 The most telling example of such
callous exploitation occurred at Milliken’s Bend, across the river from Vicksburg.
At the camp, according to Ballard, “soldiers had little use for… slaves other than finding
ways to take advantage of them,” which led to rampant depravity.44 For example, Private John
O’Brien beat a young boy until he was unconscious and blinded, and “fellow soldiers cheered
him on” rather than intervening.45 Officers did not punish the soldier for the attack or refer him
to a court-martial, indicating indifference to even the most brutal forms of mistreatment.46 Rape
and beatings became “commonplace” at the camp, and officers who shared the racism of their
soldiers did nothing to punish the perpetrators, despite their orders to protect the welfare of the
contrabands.47 Even worse, the abuse increased after smallpox broke out in the camp.48 As
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Ballard writes, “interactions between federal soldiers and freedmen… foretold that many of them
would go from one type of slavery to another,” and the abuses only stopped when contrabands
left the camp for leased plantations.49 The contrabands across the Vicksburg area not only faced
racist soldiers and camp superintendents, but also squalid camps, epidemic disease, and a lack of
basic supplies and medical care due to a focus on economy and the continuing view that the
contraband camps should only be temporary until the contrabands could be placed on
plantations, which created an example that would be followed across the camps in the Western
Theater and during the early years of Reconstruction across the South.
The wide-ranging network of camps on both sides of the river surrounding Vicksburg
was constantly plagued by squalid conditions and rampant epidemic disease. James Yeatman, an
agent for the Western Sanitary Commission, stated that “this negligence and failure to comply
with obligations have greatly disheartened the poor slave,” many of whom died in the camps
before having a chance to truly experience freedom.50 At President’s Island, the camp flooded
repeatedly and remained constantly damp, leading to poor health, which was worsened by a
severe lack of clothing and proper shelter, and the military failed to move the camp to a more
sanitary location or to issue sufficient supplies.51 At the camp at Young’s Point, meanwhile,
“sickness and death were frightful,” thirty to fifty contrabands a day died of disease, and during
the winter the mortality rate rose to seventy-five a day.52 According to Brigadier General Joseph
Wadsworth, “nearly all the suffering and mortality incident to this great social change has
existed and is still to be found” due to a lack of shelter, clothing, food, and even mediocre
medical care, resulting in rising mortality rates, and neither the local military bureaucracy or the
49

Ibid, 86.
Yeatman, Report, 4.
51
Ibid, 2-3.
52
Ibid, 12.
50

187

federal government did anything to intervene, which indicates the consequences of the lack of a
clear, uniform contraband policy.53 The hospitals, in particular, clearly demonstrate the
emphasis on economy rather than the health of the contrabands. The War Department cut off all
medical supplies to contraband hospitals in 1863, forcing all supplies to come from already
overwhelmed aid societies, which inevitably led to desperate shortages, especially in the western
camps since aid societies tended to focus most of their missionaries and donations on camps in
the eastern theater.54 The lack of medicines, combined with the squalid conditions, led to rising
mortality rates, especially during winter. According to Bigelow, for example, the Young’s Point
camp was “a charnel house, with thousands of people dying without well ones enough to intern
the dead” or to care for the sick, and surgeons struggled mightily to obtain supplies without any
help from the government.55 As the Richmond Daily Dispatch reported, the contrabands “perish
as if swept off by pestilence” due to the lack of food, shelter, and medical care.56
The squalid conditions and high mortality clearly reflect the devastating consequences of
the emphasis on economy and the idea of the camps as temporary on contraband welfare. The
denial of medical supplies to contraband hospitals and the failure to provide sufficient food,
shelter, and clothing indicate a focus on economy and avoiding dependence on the government
rather than contraband welfare, even when the need was desperate and obvious. Army officials
saw the camps as temporary and hesitated to expend vast efforts in improving conditions,
especially when plantation leasing began in 1863. The view of camps as temporary would guide
federal policy during 1865 and 1866, as the rapid closure of the camps often left contrabands
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homeless in areas with few jobs available, forcing many to return to their former owners for
employment. Even before leasing, officials did little to address conditions in the camps, leading
to high mortality rates that could have been prevented with proper medical care and supplies,
indicating the low priority of contraband welfare in the Vicksburg area.
Even the contrabands who escaped epidemic disease still faced mistreatment and
exploitation. Many contrabands who worked for the government did not receive any wages for
difficult labor in a harsh climate. Some at Milliken’s Bend and Goodrich’s Landing, for
example, had not received any wages for over a year, and also did not receive rations, making it
very difficult to feed their families.57 Some army paymasters even gave contrabands counterfeit
money and never faced discipline for their actions, clearly demonstrating the degree of callous
exploitation of contrabands in Vicksburg and the lack of oversight by local military command
and the federal government.58 As Frankel writes, “many had worked for two to twelve months,
and never received a cent or rag yet as reward,” and “complaints about nonpayment of wages
became a constant theme during the war,” indicating that army high command never made an
effort to address the problem, due both to ideas of economy and fears of dependency, and the
inability of the federal government to oversee the payment of wages.59 In addition to failure to
pay wages, officials in Vicksburg, fearing idleness and dependency, charged contrabands a fee to
obtain a permit to remain in the city which had to be renewed every month, even if they had a
job and could support themselves.60 In 1863, the rule was amended to require contrabands to
work for the government, even if private employers paid much higher wages, and that any
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contraband without a permit would have to leave the city and return to the squalid camps.61 The
tax and lack of pay clearly demonstrate the focus on economy and avoiding dependence at the
expense of contraband welfare, and also the degree of exploitation permitted by negligent
commanders. The permit system defeated the very idea behind the concept of free labor, as the
free labor ideology argued for the right to choose your employer freely based on pay and work
conditions, and that the laborer should be able to improve economically by choosing employers
that pay sufficient wages. Fear of dependency on the government undermined the very ideology
behind the contraband labor program, and contributed to the introduction of an even more
exploitative system in plantation leasing.
An even more blatant form of mistreatment that undermined the very freedom of the
contrabands, impressment, also became prevalent in Vicksburg, reflecting precedents set in
Virginia and the Carolinas. Camp superintendents forced men to work for the army, even if they
had found better paying jobs elsewhere.62 For example, superintendents compelled contrabands
to work for the army at promised wages of twelve dollars a month if they wanted to stay in the
camp, which they rarely received, when private employers paid as much as forty-five dollars a
month, and many went months or even years without any pay, leaving them with no way to
support their families.63 In addition, army recruiters impressed men “by force” and separated
them from their families, leaving women and children to suffer in the camps or on leased
plantations with no means of support, especially since paymasters also failed to pay black
soldiers regularly.64 Impressment demonstrates the consequences of fears of dependency, as
only work for the military could be legitimate, despite the fact that many contrabands preferred
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to work in the city for higher wages. In addition, the failure to pay impressed contrabands
illuminates the degree of exploitation, as army commanders forced contrabands into unpaid labor
that seemed to resemble slavery. As Yeatman writes, “Under such treatment he feels that he has
exchanged one master for many masters,” and not received actual freedom at all.65 For the
contrabands, the situation would only get worse, as plantation leasing introduced a whole new
form of exploitation.
In response to the horrific situation in Mississippi, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton
sent Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas to the region to set up a new system of contraband labor,
which indicated significantly increased federal involvement in the contraband program in order
to bring down expenditures from the contraband camps. Federal oversight would soon
deteriorate into bickering between different bureaucratic departments, which could sometimes be
worse than no oversight at all, meaning that federal supervision of the camps still remained
ineffective. By the time he arrived, the situation in the camps had deteriorated even further as
the capture of Vicksburg brought thousands of new contrabands into the already overcrowded
camps.66 Thomas saw these camps as temporary employment depots and wanted the
contrabands to only stay there until they could find work outside the camp, preferably back on
the plantations.67 Other army officials also shared this view. In a letter to Thomas, General
Wadsworth argued that leasing would provide jobs for twelve thousand contrabands and end the
high mortality in the camps. He stated that “leasing would be the most conducive to the welfare
of the freedmen” and the government, which would no longer have to support contrabands.68 In
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addition, military necessity played a significant role in the development of leasing, as Grant
wanted a “loyal population,” preferably Northerners, on the west side of the Mississippi River to
protect his supplies during the Vicksburg Campaign.69 Finally, Thomas believed, lessees would
also support those unable to work and relieve the government of the burden of supporting the
destitute, meaning that the army would only have to support the new arrivals in the camps for
short periods.70 Persuaded by these arguments, Thomas and the army officials instituted
plantation leasing in Mississippi, but the reality, hampered by ineffective federal oversight,
proved far different from the ideal laid out in the regulations, and Thomas also failed to consult
the contrabands prior to instituting leasing.
The army nominated three commissioners to lease plantations to “persons of ‘proper’
character and qualification” and allowed the lessees to find laborers in the contraband camps,
meaning that they did at least attempt to judge the fitness of applicants.71 Thomas also specified
wages of seven dollars a month for men and five dollars for women along with rations and
housing, but also allowed lessees to deduct clothing costs.72 In his order, he echoed the above
arguments, stating that he wanted contrabands supported by private enterprise rather than
government welfare and that a Unionist population would help to secure the area against both the
regular Confederate army and guerrilla raids. His statements that the system would “secure, as
far as possible the just rights of employer and employed” and that lessees would feel obligated to
“elevate this unfortunate race” proved far from true, as they focused more on profits than the
rights of black laborers.73 The lessees, rather than being benevolent employers who wanted to
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protect the contrabands, became “greedy adventurers” who “treat the Negroes brutally, and
chastise them worse than their former masters did,” according to Navy Admiral David D.
Porter.74 The lessees mistreated the contrabands, denied them wages, rations, clothing, and
access to schools, and ran away after Confederate raids and left the contrabands to fend for
themselves in areas unprotected by Union soldiers. Even worse, the army tolerated such
practices and contributed to the problem by leasing plantations in areas vulnerable to
Confederate attack, indicating that the lessees, with military and government approval, exploited
the contrabands to gain profits, which provided a preview of the labor conditions freedmen
would face under the Bureau after the war, where ineffective federal oversight allowed planters
to exploit sharecroppers and tenants with little consequence.
When lessees acquired land in areas not protected by the Union army, their laborers faced
the possibility of capture and enslavement by Confederate guerrillas. As Gerteis argues, the
lessees absconded when guerrillas attacked their plantations, leaving the contrabands to “fend for
themselves.”75 In Natchez, only 115 out of four hundred lessees remained after several guerrilla
raids, the rebels re-enslaved one thousand contrabands, and the military did not send any
additional troops to the plantations. Near the Mississippi River, meanwhile, guerrillas captured
and re-enslaved 1200 contrabands, indicating the scale of the guerrilla problem and the fact that
the lessees cared so little for their laborers that they ran to safety while leaving the contrabands
to face re-enslavement or worse at the hands of the rebels.76 In addition, some lessees lost all
chance for profit when guerrillas destroyed the cotton crop, but still chose to remain on the
plantations and overcharged for goods, “cut off rations, and failed to pay wages” in order to try
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and salvage some economic benefit, indicating that they remained focused on profits at the
expense of the contrabands. Neither the army nor the Treasury Department intervened to address
such blatant violations of the leasing regulations, demonstrating that federal oversight rarely
went beyond written regulations.77 The government also failed to protect either the lessees or the
contrabands and allowed leasing of plantations in areas they knew were not protected by Union
troops, which, as Eaton wrote, resulted in a “massacre of negroes” as profit-minded lessees cared
so little for the contrabands that they would knowingly expose them to the danger of guerrillas in
order to make money and government authorities stood by and did nothing to stop it.78 While
guerillas are partially to blame for these depredations, army authorities knew they were a
problem and still not only leased plantations in insecure areas but also failed to provide
protection, indicating the degree of government complicity in lessee exploitation, as the army
remained focused on finding work for the contrabands and clearing out the camps, even at the
expense of the safety of the contrabands, and these same objectives would guide the closure of
camps across the South at the end of the war, demonstrating once again the importance of the
camps to the establishment of Bureau policy.
Even when lessees avoided the problem of guerrilla raids, they still exploited the
contrabands by failing to provide proper food, wages, and clothing while making large profits for
themselves, and neither the army or any federal agency intervened and compelled them to abide
by the federal government’s own leasing regulations. As Gerteis writes, “Even the best planters
admitted that there was nothing to prevent them from defrauding their hands,” and lessees found
numerous ways to do just that.79 Half of lessees made fifteen to twenty-five percent profit while
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paying the contrabands in scrip rather than wages and overcharging for goods at plantation
stores, which resulted in the contrabands accumulating large debts with little hope of paying
them off, and foreshadowed one of the most common methods for the exploitation of freedmen
during Reconstruction. One lessee even made a profit of eighty thousand dollars but never paid
a single cent in wages and never faced discipline from the military or the federal bureaucracy.80
In addition to nonpayment of wages, lessees denied healthcare and refused to provide rations for
the ill or those who could not work, and according to Gerteis, fifty percent even used corporal
punishment on the contrabands despite regulations prohibiting the practice.81 The lessees
blatantly violated federal labor regulations and faced little to no consequence, which
demonstrates the failure of federal oversight and foreshadowed the failures of the Bureau.
Examples abound of such lessee mistreatment of contrabands in the Mississippi Valley.
Lessees on the Raleigh Plantation, for example, denied rations to the family members of workers
and also refused to issue clothing, even to the workers. Lessees Alexander and Smith,
meanwhile, refused to provide medical care or clothing and charged “exorbitant prices” at the
plantation store.82 Lessee J.W. Green refused to provide any rations at all and forced the
contrabands to survive by hunting for their own subsistence, indicating the degree to which
lessees would exploit contrabands to make a profit, and the consequences of ineffective federal
oversight, as neither the army nor the federal bureaucracy intervened to compel him to issue
rations.83 An army officer inspecting plantations reported no lessees fully obeying labor
contracts. He stated that many had “an utter disregard of even the commonest principles of
humanity” and saw the contraband as a “mere brute, from whom the greatest amount of labor
80

Powell, New Masters, 90-92.
Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman, 162-164; Berlin, Freedom, 635.
82
Maj. Julian E. Bryant to Captain, 10 October 1863, in Freedom, ed. Berlin et al, 729-734.
83
Ibid, 732-733.
81

195

should be gained at the least possible expense,” and argued that the leasing system was worse
than slavery.84 Brigadier General John P. Hawkins agreed, stating that contrabands were
“working by the day for the merest pittance” and that the slave “master’s treatment of them was
parental compared to what we now permit.”85 Despite these reports, the army failed to intervene
to mitigate clear examples of lessee exploitation, despite the presence of regulations from the
federal government. James E. Yeatman, a Sanitary Commission agent and abolitionist, also
argued that lessees treated contrabands worse than slaveholders had and that they were more
interested in profit than decent treatment.86 These testimonies and examples clearly indicate that
lessees would do anything, from refusing to provide clothing and rations to even denying basic
medical care, in order to turn a profit. Rather than helping the contrabands learn how to achieve
economic autonomy, they treated them worse than the slaveholders, and the contract system
meant that the contrabands had no way to escape, which undermines the very idea of free labor
and rising economically through work. Whether under the control of the Treasury or the Army,
government authorities remained focused on preserving order and did little or nothing to prevent
the base exploitation and abuse of contrabands by lessees focused solely on profits, and such
neglect foreshadowed the inadequate response to planter abuse of freedmen under the Bureau.
In March 1863, the Treasury Department took over control of abandoned lands from the
War Department and the Army, but failed to truly improve conditions for the contrabands. One
Treasury agent stated that lessees “were not… unprincipled persons eager to enrich themselves at
the expense of the Negro,” but the reality was far different, and the agents did little to remedy the
situation, and in fact even contributed to it by failing to address clear cases of abuse.87 As
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Gerteis argues, the system “created ample room for exploitation” as both the agents and the
lessees focused on crop yields and making profits for the government rather than the welfare of
the contrabands. William P. Mellen, the Treasury agent, voided all leases, but simply rented the
land out to new white lessees rather than allowing contrabands to rent it, as Yeatman and Chase
had desired, which follows the precedent set in the land disputes in South Carolina.88 In
addition, he created home farms with no wages in order to coerce contrabands onto leased
plantations and to empty the remaining contraband camps.89 As Gerteis states, Mellen “sought
more coercive means to force freedmen onto plantations,” but without real regard for the actual
conditions they faced, and the fact that many contrabands could not physically perform difficult
agricultural labor in the harsh Mississippi climate.90 The Treasury agents did try to prevent
abuse by requiring payment of monthly wages and controlling prices at plantation stores, but
they did not have enough staff to adequately enforce even these basic measures, which
foreshadowed the woeful understaffing of the Bureau. The higher wages under the Treasury
system did not significantly improve conditions for the contrabands since they only received half
each month, had to buy their own food and clothing, and still faced exploitative prices at the
stores.91 Even worse, Treasury agents leased plantations in areas not secured by the army,
leading to lessees abandoning their laborers to face the wrath of Confederate guerrillas, which
indicates that they did not learn from the earlier guerrilla raids on lands leased by the army.92
This last policy, in fact, contributed to Lincoln’s decision to return control of the plantations to
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the Army, who he believed could better protect the contrabands.93 The decision failed to
improve conditions, as exploitation and guerilla raids continued under army administration.
General Thomas and the army retook control in March 1864, lowered wages, and only
required payments at the end of the year in order to compel contrabands to remain on the
plantations the entire year. They also required the lessees to provide food, clothing, and
healthcare.94 Thomas focused on the war effort and ignored the need to protect lessees from
guerillas and failed to enforce wage payments and other regulations, meaning that the army did
no better than the Treasury Department in supervising the lessees despite the presence of more
officers on the ground. Neither the higher levels of military bureaucracy nor the War
Department intervened to uphold their own regulations. As Gerteis argues, Thomas wanted a
system as close to slavery as possible, and such attitudes allowed lessees to exploit contrabands
with little fear of consequences.95 In fact, the army directly contributed by cutting off rations to
all contrabands not on a plantation, which forced them to remain with lessees despite terrible
conditions, and fails to account for contrabands physically unable to work on plantations.96 This
policy foreshadowed the Bureau’s policy of reducing and then completely cutting off rations to
all freedmen, in order to force them to find a job on a plantation and end government
expenditures on the welfare of the freedmen. The army’s failure to provide protection also
caused devastating consequences, as lessees fled and forced contrabands to fend for themselves
despite the continued presence of rebel guerrillas.97 More commonly, lessees failed to abide by
the labor contracts and denied contrabands basic necessities while army authorities stood by and
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did nothing. One lessee forced his contrabands to buy their own food and clothing while still
paying the lower wages, despite making $450,000 in profits.98 George Howard, another lessee,
beat contraband Clinton Hamilton two hundred times with a stick when he claimed illness and
had not paid him any wages for over a year. Army authorities fined him one hundred dollars for
using corporal punishment, but did not force him to provide back pay or even to direct the fine to
Hamilton’s wages, clearly indicating the government’s complicity in lessee exploitation.99 Army
control failed to improve conditions for the contrabands, as lessees continued to exploit and
abuse them while authorities more focused on winning the war did little or nothing to prevent it,
and even actively contributed by failing to provide military protection.
Overall, profit-minded lessees in Mississippi exploited, abused, and mistreated their
contrabands in order to make money. Both Treasury and Army authorities not only tolerated but
also actively encouraged such abuses by failing to provide protection from guerillas, requiring
contrabands to remain on plantations run by abusive lessees, not intervening when lessees clearly
violated labor contracts, and by forcing contrabands to leave the camps and work on leased
plantations, even when they could find jobs elsewhere . As Powell states, “To men bent on
making a fortune in a hurry, it was almost irresistible” to exploit contrabands, and many did just
that and suffered no consequences for their basic violations of human rights.100 Government
authorities, meanwhile, wanted “the system of free labor… to approximate… the usages of
slavery” to maintain order so that they could focus on winning the war with as few distractions
as possible.101 This policy of compelling contrabands to work on leased plantations set a direct
precedent for Bureau policy after the war, as Bureau agents enforced mandatory labor contracts
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for labor on plantations as sharecroppers or tenants, and very few freedmen escaped this
exploitative labor system. In addition, the failure of the army and Treasury agents to effectively
supervise the leased plantations foreshadowed the same failures of the Bureau, as overwhelmed
agents proved unable to mitigate the rampant exploitation and abuse of freedmen on plantations
across the South. In Mississippi, lessees, with the support of both the Treasury and the army,
exploited and mistreated contrabands in order to make a profit while the authorities remained too
focused on the war and avoiding dependency on the government to intervene and stood by in the
creation of a system, that as Armstead Robinson writes, was “worser dan Jeff Davis.”102
Contraband Camps and Leasing in Louisiana
In Louisiana the Union Army arrived in 1862 hoping to begin the process of
reconstruction and viewed emancipation and the welfare of contrabands as a decidedly secondary
concern. According to Louis Gerteis, a “successful occupation seemed to require the goodwill of
slaveholders,” especially since many of the slaveholders who remained claimed loyalty to the
Union.103 Some planters remained so determined to keep slavery intact that they refused to grow
any crops and sent their slaves to the government rather than institute free labor, even though it
meant a significant loss of profits.104 At first, army policy favored such actions by the planters
due to the unstable military situation. General Benjamin Butler, the commander in the area,
ordered the army to return all fugitives who physically could not work on plantations, even to
slaveowners who had not taken a loyalty oath, despite a ban on returning fugitives passed by
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Congress earlier in 1862 and even the Second Confiscation Act.105 Such a policy “alienated
Louisiana blacks from their would-be liberators” and temporarily delayed emancipation in the
state. It also foreshadowed the Bureau’s efforts to compel freedmen to sign contracts with their
former masters after the war, no matter how badly those masters had mistreated them as slaves,
which provides yet more evidence that contraband policy shaped Bureau programs and policies
during Reconstruction.106 The slaves did not give up their hopes for freedom, and eventually the
sheer numbers of slaves running to Union lines, especially those unable to work, compelled the
government to enact a series of policy changes that led to the exploitative leasing system.
When the army initially occupied Louisiana, masters who remained loyal to the
Confederacy often ran to Texas with their most valuable slaves, leaving only women, children,
the elderly, and the unfit, and many of these slaves ran to the Union Army, creating a question of
how the government should handle the constant influx of fugitives.107 The military did not have
nearly enough jobs for them, and to make matters worse, loyal masters demanded the return of
their slave property.108 Once the Second Confiscation Act passed, the army had no choice but to
accept all fugitives into the lines no matter the loyalty of their masters, and large contraband
camps began to emerge to provide temporary housing until the government and the army could
find a more permanent solution.109 The camps quickly became overcrowded and lacked
sufficient supplies of shelter or clothing, leading to rampant disease and high mortality rates.110
Butler had not learned from the overcrowded camps in Virginia and set up similar camps in
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Louisiana, indicating that failures often plagued multiple contraband camps due to the lack of a
national policy that could have properly addressed the initial shortcomings of contraband policy
early in the war. The contrabands “were living on the verge of starvation,” and clearly the
government needed to try another system.111 Ironically, the slaves “had forced the issue” by
running away, but their actions contributed to the development of leasing and its devastating
consequences.112
As in Mississippi, the army turned to leasing in Louisiana due to economic
considerations. According to William F. Messner, the military had to set up a system where
“black men would play a central role while “a sizable number of white people… doubted the
capacity of blacks to function as freedmen.”113 The presence of abandoned sugar plantations
with large potential for revenue for the government to fund the both war effort and the local
contraband camps also contributed to the development of leasing, as the revenue from leased
plantations would pay for supporting contrabands unable to work.114 In addition, for
reconstruction to occur, the economy had to recover, meaning that plantations needed to be
cultivated, either by the government or private enterprise. Accordingly, in January 1863,
General Butler issued General Order 91, which confiscated plantations abandoned by disloyal
masters in an “attempt to revive the plantation economy, to harvest the crops for the profit of the
government, and to deal with unemployed blacks.”115 Soon afterwards, the army hired the
Charles A. Weed Factioning Company, a northern business enterprise, to harvest sugarcane for
the government by using contraband labor. No record exists of any effort to ensure that the
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company would properly compensate contrabands and treat them humanely, indicating that the
overwhelming desire to restart the economy and raise money trumped concern for the welfare of
the contrabands. The northerners only paid one dollar a day for the backbreaking labor and
imposed “strict controls” to keep the contrabands from leaving before completion of the
harvest.116 Despite the clearly exploitative nature of this program, army officials deemed it a
success because it removed contrabands from the camps and from government payrolls and also
made them self-sufficient, and the system of leasing began to take shape soon after.117
In January 1863, the army set up the Sequestration Commission to decide on the loyalty
of plantation owners and confiscate the property of rebels, which led to the development of a
leasing system.118 If plantations did not make a profit under government control, the
Commission leased them to Northern businessmen, who had little concern for the basic rights of
black laborers. As Ripley argues, “profit took precedence over consideration for laborers” in the
leasing process.119 The lessees turned out to be speculators who exploited and mistreated their
laborers to make higher profits, and the government authorities did little or nothing to stop it,
which foreshadowed the inability of the Bureau to enforce labor contracts after the war.120 For
example, when the lessees arrived at the plantations, they evicted blacks who had already begun
cultivating crops and forced them to either sign labor contracts or leave the property, and the
army did nothing to prevent such blatant exploitation.121 The Sequestration Commission also
standardized the labor contracts that all lessees had to sign in order to hire contraband laborers.
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The contracts promised either wages or a one-twentieth share of the crop, decent food, clothing,
and treatment, but also required the contrabands to remain on the plantation or face forced labor
on the public works, and stated that simply working on the plantation constituted agreement to
the contract, giving the contrabands no real chance to accumulate capital and also prohibiting
from leaving even the most abusive employers.122 By the end of the war, two-thirds of the
contrabands in Louisiana worked under these conditions on one thousand leased plantations.123
However, according to Messner, “few of the black workers… profited at all” and only changed
from “exploited slave… to exploited wage earner.”124 As John Eaton stated, by instituting
leasing the government “placed unconsidered thousands in danger of oppression and in actual
and present want.”125 By tolerating abuses such as corporal punishment, the leasing of
plantations in areas plagued by guerrillas, nonpayment of wages, and even by actively favoring
the lessees, the government contributed to the rampant exploitation of contraband labor.
The first example of lessee mistreatment, and government complicity, is the use of
corporal punishment to discipline the contrabands, meaning that the discipline on the plantations
closely resembled that enforced under slavery. According to Powell, the lessees attempted to
“perpetuate” the plantation order, which meant retaining as many aspects of the old system as
possible in order to maximize profits, as many believed that contrabands would not work without
physical coercion and nearly military-style discipline.126 Despite labor contracts that prohibited
whipping, beatings, and other forms of corporal punishment, lessees violently abused their slaves
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and army and Treasury authorities either stood by or even actively participated in the abuse. The
lack of federal oversight of the leasing program meant that they faced no discipline for failing to
enforce their own regulations, which demonstrates the consequences of the lack of a federal
contraband policy.127 Lessee George Benham, for example, used chains and beatings in order to
discipline contrabands who did not work hard enough, and received no punishment from military
authorities.128 The contrabands working on the plantation of a Mr. Mandra, meanwhile,
complained that he treated them “with great cruelty” in a complaint to army authorities. General
Hanks, the commander of the Bureau of Negro Labor, ordered the practice to stop but never
followed up to ensure that the abuse had truly ended.129 Such attitudes on the part of the army
indicated an emphasis on control of the contrabands and the idea that only whipping would
suffice to keep the contrabands at work.130 In addition, the continued use of corporal punishment
by lessees clearly demonstrates their lack of regard for black rights and sole focus on profits, and
the government’s tolerance of their violations of labor regulations that prohibited any form of
physical abuse. Finally, it foreshadows the failure of the Bureau to adequately supervise
plantations and prevent physical abuse of the freedmen, as agents overwhelmed with complaints
could not adequately enforce Bureau regulations and received little assistance from the
bureaucracy in Washington.
Another example of army neglect of contraband laborers is the fact that military
authorities prohibited contrabands from leaving the plantations to escape abuse and exploitation,
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which clearly contradicts the idea of free labor that was supposed to define the contraband labor
system. The system of yearly contracts meant that contrabands had to remain on the same
plantation for the duration of the contract or face punishment and loss of wages, even for the
time already worked.131 As Gerteis writes, “On occasion, provost marshals adopted the brutal
methods of slavery to enforce discipline.”132 For example, a contraband only known as Gabel
left the plantation without a pass to enlist in the army, which violated regulations requiring a pass
for any contraband leaving his or her employer. The provost marshal, Captain Sawyer, beat him
viciously and sent him back to his employer, a lessee, who beat him again and placed him in the
stocks for eighteen hours, and then tied him to a tree during the evening so mosquitoes could bite
him.133 While this example may be extreme, it indicates the emphasis on controlling the
contrabands and tolerating abusive lessees to preserve law and order, even to the point of
undermining recruitment into the United States Colored Troops. As Ripley writes, “corporal
punishment bordering on the sadistic became common,” especially for those caught off the
plantation.134 Government patrols also routinely forced blacks back onto the plantations or to
forced labor on the levees, no matter how badly they had been mistreated by their employers.135
The slave patrols, therefore, had simply been replaced by military patrols, meaning the
contrabands had not escaped all aspects of slavery, especially since many saw the right to travel
as a vital aspect of freedom. For the contrabands, this system meant that they did not have true
freedom, as they had no way to escape abusive lessees who exploited them to gain profits,
particularly by failing to provide proper wages, clothing, and rations, despite government
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regulations to the contrary, and the Treasury Department and army both failed to enforce their
own regulations and faced little to no supervision from higher federal authorities.
The most common form of exploitation in Louisiana, cheating contrabands out of their
wages and failing to provide rations and clothing, remained prevalent during the entirety of the
system of leasing despite clear regulations prohibiting the practice. As a New England aid
society wrote, “In consequence of the… ill-will of their employers, they were often treated in
bad faith… swindled out of their earnings, or defrauded in the matter of food and clothing.”136 A
lessee named Charles Ward refused to pay wages and only provided food, clothing, and shelter
to his laborers, and his behavior remained far from atypical.137 As Ripley states, lessees “violated
contracts by charging blacks for… medical supplies… or by charging them for rations” on days
when weather or other factors prevented work.138 A contraband named Sam complained to the
provost marshal that he never received wages for months of work at Camille Plantation, and,
although no record exists of whether the provost marshal took action, the incident clearly reveals
how far lessees would go to make profits off their workers.139 Too often, overwhelmed provost
marshals would be unable to respond to complaints due to a lack of adequate protection, as
Confederate guerrillas continued to plague the area and made visits to the plantations perilous. A
revenue collector inspecting leased plantations reported that “Negroes employed on these
plantations were generally cheated out of their pay” and that conditions on government
plantations remained vastly better than those on leased plantations, clearly indicating that lessees
had little regard for black rights and that the government did not act to prevent such abuses since
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their plantation managers did not mistreat blacks to the same degree.140 As Messner wrote, “The
emphasis of most Northern speculators” remained “profits, often to the disregard of their
workers’ welfare.”141
Military authorities often supported the lessees and overlooked such abuses despite the
consequences for the contrabands due to a focus on economy and ensuring the contrabands had
consistent employment so the contraband camps would no longer be needed. As Messner
argues, the army actively worked with lessees and therefore contributed to rather than prevented
exploitation of laborers, which all too often foreshadowed the actions and attitudes of Bureau
agents, who often supported planters due to concerns about vagrancy and outright racism,
including the idea that freedmen were naturally lazy and would not work without coercion and
constant supervision, despite ample evidence to the contrary.142 Such attitudes were often due to
the fact that army officials remained more concerned about crop yields and maintaining order
than ensuring the rights of contrabands.143 As Ripley writes, “Contrabands were primarily
considered as laborers essential to the Federal policy of reviving the plantation economy,” and
high yields took precedence over decent treatment.144 The army tried to enforce wage payments
by banning crop sales until all laborers received wages, but many lessees still sold their crops
and fled without paying any wages at all and did not face any discipline, which indicates the
ineffectiveness of military oversight of the lessees. In fact, the Sequestration Commission often
took such a large portion of the crop for rent and taxes that lessees could not afford to provide
their workers with food and wages, which clearly indicates that the army shared the lessees’ sole
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focus on profits at the expense of laborers.145 Provost marshals also favored lessees in labor
disputes and even stole wages and crop shares from the contrabands, further contributing to
mistreatment and abuse.146 Another example is the refusal of lessees to support those unable to
work, which meant that the government had to support them. Rather than forcing lessees to
comply, the government placed these contrabands in overcrowded camps, which not only meant
bad living conditions but also split up families., and undermined the goal of utilizing the leased
plantations to close the contraband camps and reduce government expenditures on the
contrabands.147 This failure foreshadowed another shortcoming of Bureau policy, when the
Bureau had difficulty finding jobs for elderly or infirm contrabands, and often had to maintain
home farms or labor camps much longer than they preferred to. These examples clearly indicate
that military officials actively contributed to the exploitation of contrabands by Northern lessees.
When the Treasury took over in late 1863, little changed, as lessee and government exploitation
continued unabated.
In October 1863, the Treasury Department took control of abandoned and leased
plantations from the army and instituted their own regulations, as the army was eager to rid itself
of the complexities of supervising leased plantations when they needed these resources for
military campaigns. The Treasury rules called for wages of fifteen to twenty five dollars a
month, but withheld half until the end of the year and also required the contrabands to buy their
own food and clothing, even though they only received partial wages and prices were high due to
wartime shortages.148 In addition, lessees had to provide housing and one acre garden plots for
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growing food and could not sell crops until they had paid wages.149 The regulations did not
require the lessees to provide access to schools, meaning that contrabands who desired an
education often had to traverse several miles of guerrilla-infested territory to reach an often
overcrowded missionary school. Enforcement remained lax and lessees continued to exploit the
contrabands. A Mr. Pierce, for example, refused to pay wages and only provided food and
clothing, and what he did provide was substandard and not enough to support family members
who did not work. Treasury authorities ordered him to pay wages, but never followed up to
ensure compliance or attempted to correct the deficiencies in rations and clothing.150 In addition,
the Treasury permitted lessees with insufficient capital to lease plantations, causing nonpayment
of wages and poor plantation management.151 Such lessees also continued the practice of
evicting those unable to work and even gave up and left without paying wages when the army
worm destroyed the 1864 cotton crop.152 The Treasury takeover did nothing to stop the
exploitation of contrabands and only perpetuated the abusive practices of the old system,
especially due to the lack of adequate agents to ensure supervision of the plantations and to
protect the contrabands from abuse, both at the local and federal levels, indicating the
consequences of poor federal oversight and the lack of a national contraband policy. As Eaton
wrote, the lessees remained focused on profit, but even more so under the Treasury system when
they no longer had to provide food and clothing and could further exploit the contrabands by
charging high prices for such essential goods.153 The Treasury relinquished control to the army
in early 1865, and the original system returned along with its lower wages, and mistreatment of
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the contrabands only continued, clearly indicating government complicity in the exploitation of
contrabands by profit-minded lessees.154
Overall, whether under Treasury or Army control, lessees in Louisiana abused, exploited,
defrauded, and cheated their contraband laborers in order to make a profit, and government
authorities either stood by without intervening or actively took part in the abuse, and faced no
discipline or supervision from Army or Treasury authorities in Washington. As one contraband
testified in April 1865 after army authorities regained control, his master treated him better than
the lessee, who refused to pay even the lower wages mandated under the military system, and the
military failed to intervene to compel him to uphold the contract. He argued that lessees “only
care for money” and could care less about the welfare of their workers as long as profits
remained high.155 Lessees treated their contrabands no better than southern planters, and, as
Ripley argues, “Lessees… were the most flagrant offenders because… they were less vulnerable
to recourse if the initial deception succeeded” since they could easily return North and escape
punishment.156 Louisiana lessees, with the help of the government, remained focused on profits
at the expense of their laborers and routinely mistreated them to improve crop yields, and the
failure of the army and federal government to address such clear exploitation of the contrabands
set precedents for the failure of the Freedmen’s Bureau to adequately supervise planters to ensure
they upheld the labor contracts that the Bureau itself required the freedmen to sign.
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Conclusion
By the end of the Civil War, the camps in the western theater remained in flux, as leased
plantations in Mississippi and Louisiana faced the uncertainty of transition from the War
Department to the Bureau. Contrabands in Kentucky faced a dire situation with few available
jobs, attempted transfers to Mississippi, the possibility of separation of their families, and a
military command desperate to close the camp that constituted their only refuge in a state still
very hostile to freedmen. Understanding the story of these camps during the Civil War is
essential to developing a clear picture of Bureau policies across the western theater during
Reconstruction, as policies developed in all three camps created models for the Bureau,
including sharecropping, the attempted rapid closure of the camps, compelling contrabands to
work for their old masters, and the mandatory signing of annual labor contracts with no
provisions for escaping abusive employers prior to the end of the contract. These camps also
provide a clear demonstration of the consequences of inadequate federal oversight, as the War
and Treasury Departments bickered over leased plantations to the detriment of the contrabands,
and neither department took the necessary steps to ensure that its agents on the ground enforced
their own regulations, meaning that employers often abused and exploited contrabands with
impunity. The War Department’s oversight of the Kentucky camps was so inadequate that
commanders there could blatantly violate federal policy with little consequence. These
shortcomings of oversight would continue under the Bureau, especially in late 1865 and early
1866 when multiple agencies of the federal government struggled over how to close the camps
and transition the freedmen to self-sufficiency independent from any government support, and
that story is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
THE BUREAU IMPLEMENTS CONTRABAND CAMP POLICIES

After the Civil War, the Freedmen’s Bureau, founded in 1865, began to close down the
camps and hire the contrabands out to local whites through contract labor. The Bureau
indentured children to whites, often their former owners, to try and make them self-sufficient.
These programs directly reflect policies developed in the contraband camps, including contracts
on leased plantations, requirements that all contrabands work, and avoiding economic
dependency. Southern states passed Black Codes that directly undermined the Bureau’s labor
program, and President Johnson quickly began to issue pardons that eliminated any chance for
the freedmen to obtain land. The Bureau also remained understaffed and plagued with
incompetent and racist agents who cared little for the freedmen, which reflected a model set in
the contraband camps. In addition, the lack of staff reflected a continuation of the shortcomings
of plantation leasing in Mississippi and Louisiana, where inadequate personnel could not hope to
monitor the widely scattered plantations. Finally, the Bureau faced consistent violence from
guerrillas and the Ku Klux Klan, and the failure of the Bureau and the Army to adequately
protect the freedmen followed the example of contraband camps. This chapter further
demonstrates that both the policies and the shortcomings of the Freedmen’s Bureau originated in
the contraband camps during the Civil War.
The Bureau did operate under a single set of uniform guidelines set at headquarters in
Washington, meaning that a federal policy for freedmen finally emerged, but only after the
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conclusion of the Civil War. The Bureau clearly demonstrates the differences between a written
policy at the federal level and execution of the policy on the ground, as a lack of staff, constant
white violence, and the desire of freedmen to obtain land rather than work for wages all
undermined the ability of Bureau agents to uniformly enforce these federal regulations, so
enforcement remained uneven at best. Especially by 1868, as the Bureau began to wind down
operations, agents became less and less willing to investigate outrages and intervene in labor
disputes, which directly undermined the ability of freedmen to obtain economic autonomy. On
the other hand, the rigid policies for the Freedmen’s Bureau sometimes hampered the ability of
agents to make decisions based on local circumstances, especially since each state tended to have
its own particular labor system based on the local economy and predominant crop. The Bureau
finally had a national policy to work with and supposedly adequate federal oversight, but this did
not always lead to positive consequences for the freedmen.
The Bureau’s policies directly reflected those instituted in the contraband camps for
several reasons. First, many agents began their careers in the contraband camps and thus had
familiarity with these policies. Second, even if agents had not worked in a contraband camp at
all, they faced very similar circumstances, and instituted the same policies as contraband camp
commanders. Examples included labor contracts, reductions of rations, indentures and
impressment, and a focus on closing the camps as soon as possible. The Bureau also faced the
same shortcomings as contraband camps due not only to similar policies but similar
philosophies, including an overwhelming focus on avoiding dependency, the reduction of
government expenditures as much as possible, and an emphasis on labor contracts rather than
independent land ownership or working in other fields even when such jobs paid higher wages
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than contracted plantation labor. As this chapter demonstrates, the contraband camp policies
discussed in chapters one through four created models for Bureau policy for numerous reasons.
The Bureau also had to take into account the goals of planters and other employers, who
had their own ideas for how to manage labor, and those of freedmen, who pursued land
ownership and attempted to avoid wage labor on plantations as much as possible. The agents,
without adequate policy guidance from Washington, had to find a compromise between two
vastly different ideas of labor management and also resolve labor disputes, help freedmen find
available wage labor, and manage the support of destitute freedmen who could not work on
plantations. The divide between Bureau agents and planters over whether to implement wage
labor or sharecropping also undermined Bureau operations early in Reconstruction, as agents had
to decide which labor system to implement based on the needs of both planters and freedmen.
Sharecropping did not emerge all at once across the South, but gradually emerged as the most
prevalent replacement for slavery mainly as a compromise between planter desire for labor
control and the desire of the freedmen for economic autonomy.
The Bureau failed to meet its own standards, not just current moral standards. The
Bureau claimed to focus on helping the freedmen adjust to freedom and gain economic
autonomy so they could become self-sufficient. Instead, agents instituted mandatory labor
contracts, did not allow freedmen to leave abusive employers prior to the termination of the
contract, and did not provide nearly enough enforcement to ensure that planters complied with
the terms of even Bureau-approved contracts. The Bureau also did not redistribute land to the
freedmen or allow them to take jobs off of plantations, which undermined their own goal of
helping the freedmen become self-supporting. The Bureau’s policy of apprenticeship removed
the labor of children from families who badly needed every family member to work to make a
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living, and also continued the forcible separation of families that freedmen had faced under
slavery. Even worse for freedmen, the Bureau focused so much on avoiding dependency that
they cut rations and closed camps as quickly as possible, even in areas where freedmen faced
dire job prospects and often had to return to their former masters for work, which clearly
undermined the idea of free labor that supposedly guided Bureau policy. The fact that the
Bureau could not sufficiently protect the freedmen from white violence further undermined its
own policies, especially after Bureau courts closed and freedmen had to resort to the civil courts
for justice, even though these courts rarely provided equal justice if they tried cases involving
freedmen at all. The Bureau could not uphold its own policy objectives, and each of these
failures, and the causes behind them, are the focus of this chapter.
This chapter will be organized thematically rather than by state as in previous chapters
for several reasons. First, the Bureau was a national organization that deployed agents across the
South, so freedmen across the South fell under the control of the same agency that, at least on
paper, would follow the same rules no matter their location. The reality would be far different,
as agents often instituted their own policies due to inadequate enforcement from the Bureau and
differing circumstances in each locality. Second, the policies of Reconstruction affected every
state in the same way, so their impact would be similar across all of the former Confederate
states. Finally, a topical analysis of the Bureau and Reconstruction, discussing the closure of the
camps, Presidential Reconstruction and the Black Codes, sharecropping and contract labor,
apprenticeship and indenture, white violence and terrorism, and the end of the Bureau, would
better elucidate the shortcomings of Bureau policies, and how these policies originated in the
contraband camps during the Civil War. This analysis would also more clearly demonstrate the
continued inadequacy of federal oversight even under the Bureau.
216

The analysis of Reconstruction will consist of four major parts. The first part will be a
discussion of the closure of the camps and Bureau efforts to compel the contrabands to leave the
camps and find jobs on plantations or other under private employers. This section will discuss
why the Bureau wanted to close the camps so hastily and how the process played out in several
contraband camps. The second part will focus on national policies related to the Bureau during
Presidential Reconstruction, as well as provide a discussion of the impact of the Black Codes. A
discussion of national policy provides essential context for understanding Bureau actions on the
local level, and also the shortcomings of the first attempt at creating a uniform policy for
freedmen. The third part will shift the focus to the local level to discuss several Bureau policies,
including contract labor and apprenticeship, and shortcomings of the Bureau at the local level,
including lack of staff, racism, and the inability to prevent white violence against freedmen. The
fourth part, finally, will discuss the end of major Bureau operations in 1868, when the agency
began to gradually shift towards an exclusive focus on education. The analysis discusses policy
at the local and national level, and clearly demonstrates that Bureau policies originated in the
contraband camps during the Civil War.
Closing the Contraband Camps
During late 1865 and early 1866, the Bureau began to close down contraband camps
across the South for several reasons. First, they believed that closing the camps would actually
improve conditions for freedmen by limiting the spread of disease. For example, Horace James,
the commander of the James City camp in North Carolina, argued that hiring freedmen out to
white farmers would prevent overcrowding and disease as well as “assist native whites who
would treat the freedmen fairly,” reflecting an often-misplaced optimism in the treatment of
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freedmen by white employers.1 While closing the camps would help prevent epidemics, it did
not insure that employers provided freedmen with adequate medical care, so closing the camps
did not prevent the spread of disease.
Another reason was the desire to preserve private property, as camps often stood on land
confiscated from Confederate owners, who now stood to regain their land under Johnson’s
pardon programs. The overwhelming concern for preserving private property, even for
Confederates, trumped the ability to keep the camps open and to provide land for the
contrabands. James attempted to persuade the federal government to allow the freedmen to
purchase land near the camp so they could become independent farmers, but Johnson and
Congress rebuffed him by stating that private property was more important than the economic
autonomy of freedmen.2 In South Carolina, meanwhile, freedmen evicted from the contraband
camps had no chance of gaining their own land, despite Sherman’s famous Field Order Fifteen.
As early as November 1865, freedmen had to leave land they had been cultivating while living in
the contraband camps so it could be returned to its previous owners. The freedmen could remain
on the land until the current crop was harvested and obtain the full profit from the crop, but had
to leave the land immediately after that and contract with a white employer.3
The freedmen protested the loss of their right to obtain land in South Carolina by sending
numerous petitions to the Bureau, by holding protest meetings and advocating their cause with
local military officials, and by refusing to sign contracts with employers for as long as possible.
The Bureau, they argued, abandoned its wartime allies and removed “all right to the soil they
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stand upon save such as they can get by again working for your late and their all-time enemies”
as contract laborers.4 They could not truly be free, they stated, if they had to work for an
employer rather than farm their own land as independent land owners. They also argued that
they did not want to work for their former masters who had abused them as slaves and would
likely continue to do so without a constant military presence, which the freedmen knew would
not last very long.5 They requested that the Bureau should “Help us to reach land where we shall
not be slaves nor compelled to work for those who would treat us as such” by allowing them to
purchase land and become self-sufficient, especially since the idea of self-sufficiency dictated
the course of Bureau policy.6 Their pleas went unanswered, as federal Reconstruction policy
focused on restoring property to its previous owners rather than ensuring that freedmen had a
right to land. The Bureau only viewed wage labor as an acceptable way to obtain selfsufficiency and therefore compelled freedmen to sign contracts, even though ownership of land
created complete economic autonomy. The restoration of private property combined with fears
of dependency to create the major impetus for closing camps across the South and transitioning
the freedmen to plantation labor.
While these two reasons certainly played a significant role in motivating the Bureau to
close the camps, the major justification was avoiding dependence on the government and
compelling the contrabands to become self-sufficient by working for white employers, usually
on plantations. The Bureau believed that the contrabands had to become self-supporting as soon
as possible so that the agency itself could disband and relief efforts in the South could cease.
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Bureau agents wanted to instill the free-labor ideology across the South, since they firmly
believed it to be the best solution to revive the southern economy and ensure that the freedmen
worked and did not become dependent on charity. Finally, many agents believed that freedmen
did not have the capability to work for themselves due to inherent laziness and a lack of
knowledge of proper farming techniques, and had to work as wage laborers as preparation for
eventual landownership, but never specified how long this preparatory period had to last or what
qualities the freedmen had to demonstrate to prove their readiness for land ownership. The focus
on dependency came from several factors and, as it had in the contraband camps, remained the
driver of Bureau policy throughout Reconstruction.
Camp commanders cut rations in order to compel the contrabands to leave the camps and
find work on their own, even in areas that faced a lack of available jobs. On Roanoke Island, for
example, General Schofield cut off rations for all families of USCT soldiers, even though the
soldiers had not been paid in eight to ten months, and their families faced starvation without
rations since little of the island could be cultivated.7 By July 1865, all rations to freedmen had
been cut off and they had no way to support themselves, since jobs were almost nonexistent on
the island and the army continued to cut off rations, meaning the freedmen had to agree to labor
contracts with employers on the mainland just to survive, which satisfied the government’s
desire that they become self-sufficient.8 By 1867, therefore, the camp had completely
disappeared, as all of the freedmen moved to the mainland during the severe winter of 18661867. As historian Patricia Click writes, the “Bureau officers focused their energies on removing
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the colonists rather than helping them through the winter” or ensuring that they signed fair
contracts on the mainland.9
The freedmen protested in a petition to the Bureau commissioner in which they argued
that their service in the army justified much better treatment by the military. They stated that the
recruiters promised them that their families would receive full rations if they enlisted, but they
only received half rations and could only eat on seven out of ten days. Even worse, they accused
a Mr. Streeter, the superintendent of the camp, of stealing rations.10 They stated that Streeter
“takes no notice of their actual suffering and sells their rations and allows it to be sold,”
indicating the degree of corruption that often came with the closures of camps.11 James did
nothing to address the concerns of the freedmen and actually ordered the ration cuts despite the
fact that he had not paid the freedmen the wages due them. The petition reached the highest
level of the Bureau bureaucracy, and General Howard ordered rations to resume to the families
of soldiers, but also for the process of closing the camps to continue, meaning that fear of
dependency still drove Bureau policy, even in the face of obvious evidence of exploitation of
freedmen in an area with few job opportunities.12 The North Carolina camps provide a clear
example of the emphasis on avoiding dependency at all costs even when it clearly undermined
the ability of the freedmen to obtain economic autonomy.
Camp Nelson in Kentucky provides another example of the fear of dependency as a
motivation for closing down the camps. Commanders there had been trying to expel the
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contrabands since 1864, and had made a short-lived attempt to empty the camp in the winter of
1864, as described in detail in chapter three. By early 1866, the Bureau decided to send the
freedmen to Mississippi to work on plantations, despite their protests that they had no desire to
go to the Deep South where they knew conditions would be harsh. Even the missionaries at
Camp Nelson feared the freedmen would be mistreated and exploited in Mississippi, but they
had no power to stop the army and Bureau’s determined efforts to shut down the camp no matter
what the cost to the freedmen.13 By January 1866, the difficulty in obtaining transportation
meant that 1500 women and children remained in the camp “in every conceivable condition of
wretchedness and sorrow” as the Bureau cut rations to compel the contrabands to accept
transportation to either Mississippi or the North, despite the fact that transport delays left the
contrabands with no way to support themselves.14 The Bureau resolved the delays by February
and compelled freedmen to leave the camp either for transportation or to contract with local
white laborers. The Bureau turned over the buildings at Camp Nelson to the quartermaster for
sale, meaning that the closure of the camp would directly benefit the federal government.15 The
camp closed entirely on March 20, 1866, after the last freedmen had left.16 The question of how
to support destitute freedmen would continue to plague the Bureau in Kentucky for several
months after the closure, meaning that the problems that faced the contraband camps did not
simply disappear after they closed, but rather continued to hamper Bureau efforts to ensure
economic autonomy for the freedmen. Not only the policies but also the problems faced by the
Bureau originated in the contraband camps during the Civil War.
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On April 21, 1866, General Scofield reported that paupers, including the “blind, sick,
halt, and lame” continued to live near the site of the former camp, and he did not know how to
handle them. Bureau policy called for him to refuse to provide any more subsistence for the
freedmen, and the local county authorities at Nicholasville refused to take any action to assist the
destitute freedmen.17 Scofield did not even have the resources to follow Bureau orders that
compelled him to send the freedmen back to their home counties to find work on plantations. He
began to pay for rations out of his own pocket until transportation could be obtained, which led
to him running afoul of Bureau authorities for undermining the goal of complete self-sufficiency
for freedmen.18 On May 23, 1866, Scofield received orders to leave the camp and stop providing
any type of support to the freedmen, and to evict any freedmen living in buildings on or near the
site of the former camp.19 The situation worsened in September, when a mob attacked freedmen
on plantations near the former camp, and Scofield could do little to nothing to stop it due to a
lack of troops. Freedmen faced the threat of death for complying with Bureau policies that
required them to find work on plantations but then failed to provide adequate protection, which
directly reflects the shortcomings of the plantation leasing programs in Mississippi and Louisiana
during the Civil War.20 Even worse, another mob drove the remaining missionaries out of the
camp in December 1866, meaning that the only school in the area for the freedmen had to close
due to a lack of teachers, as the Bureau did not provide teachers but only supported schools run
entirely by missionaries. The freedmen in Kentucky did not have access to a school until 1868,
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when another group of missionaries obtained land from the Bureau to start a school, but they also
quickly lost support as the Bureau withdrew from Kentucky entirely.21
The closure of Camp Nelson lucidly demonstrates the consequences of the Bureau’s
emphasis on avoiding dependence and quickly closing the camps rather than ensuring that all
freedmen, especially those who could not work due to disability or illness, received adequate
support. The Bureau reflected the emphasis on mandating self-sufficiency by reducing rations
and evicting freedmen from camp housing that had begun at Camp Nelson during the Civil War,
which demonstrates yet again the importance of policies formulated in the contraband camps to
shaping Bureau strategy during Reconstruction. The closure of Camp Nelson demonstrates the
continued inadequacy of federal oversight, as the same problems that plagued the camps, such as
the failure to prevent white violence, the failure to protect plantations, and the over-emphasis on
labor contracts and the subsequent failure to ensure that planters did not exploit the freedmen at
harvest time continued to plague the Bureau, despite supposedly increased federal oversight and
resources. The closure of Camp Nelson clearly demonstrates the continuity between contraband
camps and the Bureau, especially in terms of labor policy and inadequate military protection.
The closure of the camps directly led to later Bureau policies of mandatory labor
contracts and apprenticeship and also reflected policies enacted in the contraband camps.
National policies also made a significant impact on Bureau policies on the ground. Johnson’s
reconstruction program, with its emphasis on private property rights and reconciliation, directly
hampered the Bureau, as it limited the ability of the freedmen to farm their own land. These
policies, which will be examined in depth below, led to reduced support for the Bureau
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throughout the Reconstruction period, as many blamed it for undermining the effort to restore
order and economic prosperity to the South by hampering the ability of planters to manage their
own economic affairs. The problems of short staffing and a lack of funds for the Bureau
throughout its short existence can be traced to the problems of Presidential Reconstruction,
demonstrating that national policy worked in tandem with policies created in the contraband
camps to hamper the ability of the Bureau to assist the freedmen on the journey to economic
autonomy.
The restoration of land became the first policy enacted during Presidential
Reconstruction. President Andrew Johnson wanted to end Reconstruction as quickly as possible
and also ensure the restoration of property to Southerners, even if they had fought for the
Confederacy. He stated that the former Confederate states only had to ratify the Thirteenth
Amendment, which prohibited slavery, nullify secession, and repudiate Confederate debt to
regain admission.22 He stated that the distribution of land to freedmen would “disrupt the
national economy” and undermine the restoration of cotton production, in addition to violating
the Constitution by confiscating private property without due process of law.23 Johnson’s policy
shut the freedmen out of any access to land of their own, as the Bureau returned even the land in
the South Carolina Sea Islands that Sherman had promised to the freedmen to its owners by the
end of Presidential Reconstruction.
Special Field Orders from Savannah, Georgia, reflected the situation across the South, as
it stated that former owners could return to their lands and evict any freedmen currently residing
on their plantations. All freedmen without land had to sign a labor contract with a white
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employer or leave the area. As the order stated, “Freedmen, if left to work for themselves, and
control their own labor, will not obtain any considerable success.”24 The context of the order
makes it even more draconian, as a crop failure in 1865 caused “widespread destitution,” and the
state only gave aid to whites while providing nothing to aid the freedmen who faced starvation
since they did not receive adequate crop shares.25 The order clearly demonstrates the
consequences of the Bureau’s refusal to provide land to the freedmen, as it quickly led to
destitution and locked the freedmen into exploitative sharecropping arrangements. In fact, the
Bureau returned over nine hundred thousand acres of land that could have been distributed to the
freedmen, which meant that the Bureau lost a major chance to provide economic autonomy for
the freedmen, which remained their basis for the true definition of freedom. As historian Steven
Hahn writes, freedmen saw their freedom as incomplete “unless it brought access to land,” which
clearly demonstrates that the Bureau and the freedmen had vastly different ideas of the definition
of freedom and that these conflicts between national policies and the goals of the freedmen
would clash throughout Reconstruction.26 The vast resources of the Bureau and the federal
government would often lead to their definitions of freedom dominating Bureau policies and
programs, which continued the general trend of policy set during the Civil War.
Johnson’s lenient policies during Presidential Reconstruction led Southern state
legislatures to pass laws known as Black Codes, which imposed draconian restrictions on the
freedmen to attempt to create conditions as close to slavery as possible without violating the
Thirteenth Amendment. Freedmen who could not prove that they had signed a labor contract for
a white employer faced arrest for vagrancy, which meant that the very act of searching for a job
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had become illegal. The South Carolina Black Code, for example, mandated apprenticeship,
labor contracts, required that freedmen work from sunrise to sunset every day except Sunday,
prohibited freedmen from leaving their employer without permission, and only permitted
freedmen to work on farms or other agricultural jobs.27 Local courts could declare AfricanAmerican parents unfit and apprentice their children to whites, usually former owners, without
their consent.28 Children would be removed from families “who easily satisfied the basic
requirements of the child’s welfare” in order to secure cheap labor for white employers. The
understaffed Bureau not only failed to stop these apprenticeships but instituted the policy itself
later in Reconstruction, indicating that even racist and unjust practices could be maintained by
the Bureau in the name of ensuring self-sufficiency for the freedmen.29 In Memphis, the local
police arrested freedmen and confined them in jail for so long that they lost their jobs, and then
charged them with vagrancy, which came with heavy fines. When the freedmen could not pay
the fines, the police sold them to white employers to cover the fines, which meant that slavery
had been instituted in all but name.30 A representative labor contract signed under the Black
Codes from North Carolina demonstrates the harsh restrictions on freedmen during this period.
It required freedmen to work during all daylight hours, to eat all meals in the field, to provide
their own clothing and medical care, to attend to the plantation livestock while not keeping any
stock of their own, to work under an overseer, and to not leave the employer for any reason prior
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to the end of the contract.31 This labor contract attempted to replicate slavery as closely as
possible, but these harsh restrictions would reappear in Bureau contracts that also strictly
restricted the economic mobility of freedmen, meaning that the Bureau remained so focused on
avoiding dependency that it would replicate contracts created under the Black Codes to ensure
that freedmen worked regularly.
Freedmen protested the Black Codes by petitioning all levels of the Bureau and federal
bureaucracy, which gave Radical Republicans even more evidence to criticize Presidential
Reconstruction. One freedman in Fayette, Mississippi argued that the state laws prohibiting
freedmen from leasing land undermined their ability to obtain economic autonomy, and that he
wanted to “show to the world that we would work and that we was willing to work” on their own
land without the repressive system of contract labor, meaning that the harsh Black Codes
prevented the freedmen from becoming self-sufficient.32 As he stated, “We are shut out from of
all the rights of freedmen and freemen” due to the requirement to sign labor contracts with
planters, often their old masters, even though they gave their lives for the Union in the war.33 In
fact, he argued, the 1857 slave codes remained largely in effect in Fayette, which clearly
indicated that whites did not accept emancipation and hoped to re-institute slavery.34 Another
group of Mississippi freedmen petitioned the governor for redress, hoping that he could rescind
the oppressive Black Codes. They argued that “honest, trutheful, and industrious” freedmen
deserved the right to make a living as they pleased rather than be compelled to sign yearlong
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labor contracts.35 They also stated that the state’s economy could not survive without their labor
so they should be treated humanely by state and local authorities. The freedmen asked for the
right to choose their own employer and to leave abusive employers without facing arrest for
vagrancy and to rent land if they could afford it so that they could support themselves as tenant
farmers rather than sharecroppers.36
In Florida, meanwhile, freedmen who wanted to set up their own businesses rather than
work as plantation laborers faced high taxes intended to compel them to return to the plantations,
even if they could make a living off of their enterprise. Several grocers in Tallahassee signed a
petition to the Bureau arguing that the “unbearable” taxes prevented them from continuing their
business that charged fair prices to the freedmen so they could avoid exploitative prices at whiterun stores.37 The freedmen not only avoided dependency, but helped other local freedmen
support themselves, but still faced local laws intended to drive them out of business. These
petitions demonstrate that the freedmen recognized the injustice of the Black Codes and saw the
federal government as an ally who would defend their rights, especially given their loyalty and
sacrifice for the Union during the war. They hoped that the Bureau would give them a true
opportunity for economic autonomy, but its policies instead focused on avoiding dependency
through the very contract labor that the freedmen hoped to avoid.
The Black Codes directly undermined the ability of freedmen to achieve economic
autonomy. As historian Erik Mathisen states, “White Mississippians had reconstituted a base of
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power in state and local governments that increasingly sought to legislate freedpeople back into
slavery in all but name,” indicating the inadequacy of Presidential Reconstruction for protecting
the freedmen, as the lenient terms of readmission allowed many former Confederates bent on
restoring slavery to re-establish political power.38 The stark injustices of the Black Codes would
contribute to a dramatic shift in federal policy, as Radical Republicans realized that much
stronger federal action would be required to protect the freedmen from white southern
intransigence.
The Black Codes, along with 1866 riots in Memphis and New Orleans that specifically
targeted freedmen, led to much greater public support for the Radicals as it became obvious that
white southerners would not treat freedmen justly unless forced to by federal regulations or
occupation. In Memphis, white residents murdered at least forty-six freedmen, and possibly
more as the total is not certain due to inadequate records, along with at least one hundred
thousand dollars of property damage.39 As Eric Foner writes, the riots and Black Codes “led
many northern Republicans to doubt whether the white South was genuinely prepared to accept
the reality of emancipation.”40 Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 over Johnson’s
veto which guaranteed freedmen the right to sign contracts, to sue in court, and to the “equal
protection… of person and property.”41 Johnson’s opposition to the bill foreshadowed his
continued opposition to the Freedmen’s Bureau, which he claimed would only result in
dependency, especially since he believed that the freedmen would not work without coercion.42
As Hahn writes, Johnson supported a vision of the South “run by and for white people with
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blacks in a subordinate laboring class” with few rights or chances for economic advancement.43
Johnson’s intransigence would lead the Radicals, with the assistance of freedmen who quickly
rallied to the Radical cause and organized political organizations for the first time, to institute
much stricter Reconstruction policies. Radical Reconstruction clearly demonstrates the
importance of the freedmen themselves to influencing Bureau policy, which continues a
precedent set in the contraband camps during the Civil War.
The federal law establishing the Bureau, passed in 1866, demonstrates several aspects of
Radical Reconstruction policy and also effectively elucidates how policies and programs began
in the contraband camps influenced Bureau policies during Reconstruction. The act called for
the establishment of a contract labor system, with wages of twenty-five dollars a month for first
class hands, twenty dollars for second class hands, fifteen dollars for third class hands, and
wages ranging from eighteen to ten dollars a month for women.44 Written contracts would be
required, and planters would have to provide housing, medical care, fuel, access to a school, and
one acre per family for a garden plot.45 To ensure that freedmen received their wages, a lien
would be placed on the crops until the planter proved to the Bureau that all wages had been paid
in full. The act instructed the Bureau to nullify contracts when planters abused or otherwise
mistreated their employees, which the supporters of the bill hoped would ensure that the
freedmen received fair compensation and would not face the threat of abuse.46 Freedmen who
could not work would live on home farms run by aid societies, where they would perform as
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much work as physically possible in return for housing and rations along with access to a school
for their children. The government would spend no money on these farms and rely completely
on aid societies, which became problematic since aid societies often ran into financial difficulties
and also had no way to defend the farms from white violence.47 Only the elderly and orphans
would be allowed to live on the home farm, meaning that freedmen who could perform even
minimal amounts of agricultural labor would have to sign labor contracts for very low wages and
they would still have difficulty supporting themselves and their families .48 Finally, the bill
failed to provide any oversight mechanism for the home farms, meaning that the Bureau had no
way to ensure that aid societies were properly treating the freedmen and that the freedmen
remained secure from white incursions and violence.49
The initial Bureau bill, which Congress passed over President Johnson’s veto, clearly
contains numerous shortcomings that reflected the failings of contraband policies in camps
across the South. The designation of minimum wages without an effective oversight mechanism
outside of the crop lien, which would be very difficult for a short-staffed agency to enforce,
reflects the failures to pay wages on time or at all that plagued almost every contraband camp at
some time or another, and plagued some camps, particularly those that relied on plantation
leasing, throughout the duration of the war. In addition, the requirement for mandatory labor
contracts reflects the policies in Louisiana and Mississippi, where contrabands were required to
work on leased plantations even when better, higher-paying jobs were available in cities such as
New Orleans, Vicksburg, and Natchez. Working under any arrangement other than a military or
Treasury Department-approved contract became seen as vagrancy, despite the fact that these jobs
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often paid much more than plantation labor. The aversion to freedmen working in cities would
continue under the Bureau, which consistently pushed freedmen to work on plantations and then
refused to allow freedmen to leave abusive employers, which also continued a shortcoming of
contraband policy. The failure to support home farms, meanwhile, reflects the inadequate
support of contraband camps during the Civil War across the South, as the camps faced constant
shortages of food, shelter, clothing, and other basic supplies that often had to be filled by aid
societies and missionaries, demonstrating that the Bureau’s reliance on these societies did not
constitute a new policy but rather continued a failed precedent from the contraband camps. The
failure to ensure any mechanism of protection for the home farms, finally, continues the
precedent set in the contraband camps of failing to protect the contrabands from guerrilla attacks,
which particularly plagued camps that relied on farming either abandoned land or leased
plantations, including North Carolina, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Contrabands in these camps
faced the constant threat of re-enslavement despite their presence in a camp ostensibly run by the
Union Army, and freedmen on plantations across the South faced the same threats from white
vigilantes, including the Ku Klux Klan during the later phases of Reconstruction. Bureau policy
was problematic from the outset, and would work even less effectively on the ground, as the
institution of these policies remained inconsistent throughout the Reconstruction era.
The following section will discuss the shortcomings of Bureau policy at the local level by
focusing on labor contracts, apprenticeship and indentures, the racism that plagued the agency
throughout Reconstruction, and the inability to protect freedmen from white violence, especially
after the formation of the Ku Klux Klan. By focusing on these shortcomings on the local level, a
clearer picture of the shortcomings of national Bureau policy can begin to emerge. It can also
indicate the inadequacies of these national policies, as agents often used their discretion to
233

enforce policies in a manner they thought to be appropriate, even when it contradicted federal
Bureau policies. Despite the presence of a supposedly uniform set of policies and guidelines, the
Bureau faced the same problem as the contraband camps in that local agents often created their
own policies or enforced existing federal policies in a way they thought appropriate, meaning
that the shortcomings of the Bureau also originated in the contraband camps. Bureau agents
often came up with their own solutions to local problems rather than utilizing the national policy
created in Washington, which directly reflects the model created in the contraband camps. In
addition, agents often did not have the military protection necessary to follow all of the policies
implemented in Washington, and cutbacks to the Bureau in 1868 only exacerbated the problem.
Finally, Bureau agents failed to learn from the failures of contraband camp policy and continued
to implement the same policies, which indicates that they had clear examples of failure but did
not use these examples to change their policies.
The first policy created by the Bureau was the system of labor contracts that often
prevented the freedmen from achieving self-sufficiency. The policy reflected a model created in
the contraband camps, particularly Louisiana and Mississippi, where freedmen had been required
to sign contracts with lessees that were ostensibly examined and then enforced by military
officers. A lack of staff, apathy and racism among the officers, a lack of sufficient troops to
protect the contrabands from violence, and widespread abuse and exploitation of the contrabands
by the lessees made it clear that the system could not protect the freedmen or provide them with
a path to economic autonomy. As Steven Hahn states, the “contraband policy at Fort Monroe…
established a framework that army officers would follow in other areas of the occupied South”
throughout the Reconstruction period, indicating yet again the importance of contraband camp
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policies to shaping the policies and programs of the Freedmen’s Bureau.50 The failure of the
Bureau to distribute land to the freedmen meant that the freedmen could not support themselves
on land plots and needed to find some sort of regular work in an economically devastated South,
and the Bureau saw mandatory labor contracts as the best solution to ensure the freedmen
achieved self-sufficiency as quickly as possible.51 The system of labor contracts followed the
free labor ideology prevalent in the North, where the “free exercise of individual rights of
contract” without interference from the government constituted the central tenet, along with the
idea of rising up the economic ladder through saving and working hard, rather than constantly
changing jobs in search of higher wages.52 The Bureau, according to Steven Hahn, “focused
chiefly on supervising and enforcing labor contracts” that mostly consisted of sharecropping
arrangements due to the pervasive lack of cash in the South, and which led to rampant
exploitation of the contrabands despite ostensible Bureau supervision.53
Sharecropping quickly led to the exploitation of the freedmen, indicating that Bureau
policies intending to help the freedmen actually ended up undermining their ability to advance
economically. The system of sharecropping consisted of a contract relationship where the
planter agreed to compensate the freedmen by providing a share of the crop rather than wages
due to the fact that most planters desperately lacked any form of cash, at least in 1865 and 1866
when they had not yet accumulated profits from the sales of cotton.54 The Bureau ostensibly
required the planters to pay the freedmen before they sold the cotton for profit, but the lack of
adequate staff often meant that planters could avoid this caveat.55 In addition, the freedmen had
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to buy their supplies in advance on credit, meaning that these debts would be deducted from their
shares. The deductions often ended up being more than the shares, leaving the freedmen in debt,
which could never be made up from the meager crop shares and left the freedmen in perpetual
obligation to the planter. Sharecropping made it even more difficult for them to leave
exploitative employers, even though the free labor system supposedly meant the right for
employees to change jobs.56 The system of sharecropping set up by the Bureau reflected the
shortcomings of contraband policy and also failed to reflect the tenets of the free labor system
that supposedly guided Bureau policy.
Sharecropping evolved gradually throughout the South as a compromise between planters
and freedmen. According to historian Edward Royce, planters wanted to maintain the strictest
possible control over the labor of freedmen, and attempted to maintain gang labor during the
early stages of Reconstruction in order to ensure that freedmen remained a “subordinate
agricultural labor force.”57 In fact, argues Royce, “federal policy toward black labor during the
war… did not seek to alter the status of blacks as a dependent plantation labor force” due to fears
of dependency and racism among Bureau agents.58 As Royce states, the Bureau, “while not the
agent of planters, did in fact serve the interests of planters as against those of former slaves” in
the institution of labor policy, and attempted to use contracts to compel freedmen to work for
planters under gang labor systems.59 The planters could not maintain a system of gang labor due
to resistance by the freedmen, who wanted to avoid a labor system that seemed very similar to
slavery, due to its utilization of overseers, slave quarters, and even corporal punishment that
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persisted despite official bans of the practice in Bureau policy.60 The freedmen played a vital role
in the shift from gang labor to sharecropping in the Reconstruction South.
At first, freedmen believed that they would receive land through a Bureau-operated land
redistribution program. As one freedman in South Carolina stated, “It’s de white man’s turn ter
labor now. He ain’t got nuthin lef’ but his lan’, an’ de lan’ won’t be his n’ long, fur de
Guvernment is gwine ter gie ter ev’ry Nigger forty acres of lan’ an a mule.”61 When the Bureau
decided not to distribute land to the freedmen, they still asserted their independence due to the
fact that they had a monopoly on labor and could force the planters to accept their conditions for
signing contracts.62 The system of sharecropping represented a compromise where planters
maintained ownership of the land and could withhold compensation until the harvest, which
compelled freedmen to remain on the plantation for the year, and where freedmen maintained the
autonomy to set their own work schedule and live on a small plot of land away from the former
slave quarters. As one disgruntled planter stated, “The Negro practically decides the system
applied to farming” by insisting on sharecropping rather than gang labor.63 Planters also feared
that crop shares would not be a strong enough incentive to ensure that the freedmen worked for
the entire year, which echoes the Bureau’s opinion that only contracts with strict regulations
could ensure the regular labor of the freedmen.64
A couple of examples will demonstrate the positions taken by the planters in the
evolution of sharecropping, and the inability of the Bureau to stop their exploitation of freedmen.
F. G. Secrest, a planter in Sugar Land, Texas, stated that his freedmen “do nothing at all” and
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refused to perform their assigned tasks.65 He further argued that they “think they are all to fare
alike in the devission of the crop work or no work,” and he refused to continue issuing them
rations until they improved their work habits.66 He used racist arguments in his letter, arguing
that “African” laborers “could not understand any-thing” and had to be strictly controlled to
ensure that they would work.67 A Georgia planter, meanwhile, utilized similar arguments in his
petition to the Bureau. He stated that freedwomen refused to sign contracts if their husbands
worked, and that their husbands had to purchase clothing because the women did not make any
themselves.68 He argued that it “would be far better for them to go to work for reasonable wages
and their rations” rather than remain idle on the plantation.69 He argued that the husband’s wage
of twelve dollars a month was not enough to support an entire family, so the women should work
to earn extra money to properly support the family.70 He asked the Bureau to compel married
women to sign contracts for the year, both in order to avoid idleness among the freedmen but
also to reduce crime, as he believed that these women would have to steal for a living if they did
not work.71 These two planters demonstrate the overwhelming desire for strict control of labor
that contributed to the development of sharecropping and the continuation of the policy of
mandatory labor contracts, as planters feared that freedmen would not work unless compelled to
sign such contracts, even though they did not provide an avenue for freedmen to escape abusive
employers or a sufficient mechanism of enforcement.
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An examination of representative labor contracts will illuminate these shortcomings of
Bureau policy and their similarity to contracts signed in contraband camps. A contract signed on
December 15, 1868 between D.H. Middleton and several freedmen required the freedmen to live
in the plantation’s old slave quarters, which had to reduce the perception of free labor since the
freedmen did not get to construct their own houses but had to live in structures clearly associated
with slavery.72 They also had to provide their own fuel, meaning firewood, and perform any
necessary repairs on their houses, despite the fact the freedmen possessed almost no cash to pay
for these repairs.73 These conditions reflect the army’s insistence on deciding where contrabands
would live in the contraband camps, including the construction of barracks in Alexandria, the
housing of contrabands in slave quarters on leased plantations, and the housing of contrabands in
tents in several camps that faced overcrowding and a lack of available shelter. The contract’s
provisions for housing clearly reflected shortcomings in contraband camp policy that remained
permissible under Bureau policy, since all contracts had to be approved by Bureau agents, but
the inability to effectively supervise the plantations due to a lack of staff reduced the
effectiveness of Bureau oversight of contracts.
The contract specified that the freedmen would grow cotton for wages, which remained
the exception in an economy largely defined by sharecropping, and directly reflects the
plantation leasing models discussed earlier. It divided freedmen into full, one quarter, and onehalf hands based on their ability to perform agricultural labor, and their classification specified
the wages they would earn.74 They would not receive their wages until the end of the year, in
order to compel them to remain on the plantation for the duration of the contract. The planter
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reserved the right to evict the freedmen from the plantation at any time without paying any
wages if they violated any provision of the contract, including missing too much work, even if
they suffered from a prolonged illness or had other reasonable causes for missing work.75
Finally, freedmen who could furnish their own provisions, meaning food, clothing, and farm
implements, would receive higher wages, and the planter allowed them to grow corn and
potatoes on private plots to feed their families.76
These aspects of the contract also reflected the shortcomings of Bureau policy and its
connection to the contraband camps. The payment of all wages at the end of the year reflected
the military and the Bureau’s concerns that freedmen would not remain at one plantation for a
year and would instead leave and become vagrants requiring public support, so the Bureau
encouraged planters to withhold wages until the end of the contract year. In addition, the fact
that freedmen would receive higher wages if they provided their own provisions reflects the
concern over issuing rations that pervaded both contraband camp and Bureau policy. Army
officers and Bureau agents feared that providing rations to freedmen would only promote
dependency and make the freedmen unwilling to work, so contracts that incentivized freedmen to
provide their own rations were strongly encouraged by the Bureau. The provision that freedmen
could be evicted without wages reflects the Bureau’s fear that freedmen would not uphold their
ends of the contract due to a perceived inability to work without coercion, especially after the
ban on corporal punishment. As discussed in a later section of this chapter, most freedmen who
were evicted without wages faced difficulty in persuading the Bureau to restore their wages, as
the Bureau tended to side with planters during labor disputes either due to racism or to fears of
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vagrancy and dependency, as will be discussed in more detail below. This labor contract
demonstrates several aspects of Bureau policy that originated in contraband camps and tended to
work against freedmen in labor disputes with planters, indicating that fears of dependency often
dictated the formation of policy both in contraband camps and under the Bureau.
Another contract, written earlier in 1866, also demonstrates the shortcomings of the
Bureau’s oversight of contract labor. Planters George McDuile and E.W. Hubard signed a
contract with several freedmen to work on his plantation during the 1867 season. The contract
required the freedmen to work from sunrise to sunset either growing crops or tending the
livestock. They also had to “perform their work well and cheerfully” at all times and always
obey their employer or overseer.77 This system of labor very closely resembled slavery and
indicates that the Bureau would tolerate harsh labor conditions in order to guarantee that the
contrabands remained self-sufficient and off of government support, even though, according to
Hahn, the contrabands saw their “freedom as incomplete unless it brought access to land” and a
way to obtain economic autonomy where they could choose their employer and terms of labor.78
The contract clearly demonstrates that the Bureau placed fears of dependency and the desire to
reduce government expenditures above the freedmen’s desire for economic autonomy and access
to land, and willingly imposed harsh and restrictive labor regimes that directly contradicted the
free labor ideology in order to ensure that the contrabands worked. These restrictions began in
the contraband camps during the Civil War, which gives even more evidence that the
shortcomings of Bureau policy originated in the contraband camps, and also that the Bureau
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failed to learn from very similar failures in the contraband camps when implementing their own
policies.
Other provisions of the contract further demonstrate the restrictions of Bureau contract
policy by restricting the mobility of freedmen, who wanted to move to reunite families or find
better economic opportunity. The freedmen working for McDuile and Hubard could not have
any visitors except family members, mainly due to fears of labor agents attempting to entice the
freedmen to leave the plantation early.79 As will be discussed in much more detail below, the
Bureau remained concerned throughout Reconstruction that freedmen would not remain on a
plantation for the entire year without coercion, and especially feared labor recruiters from the
North coming onto plantations and enticing the freedmen away from plantations before the
harvest. The restrictions on visitors reflect an ongoing fear of vagrancy that pervaded policies
from the earliest contraband camp regulations throughout Reconstruction, despite ample
evidence that freedmen were willing to obey their labor contracts and stay on plantations for the
entire year, as will be discussed in the section on contract enforcement, and the lack thereof,
below.
The other provisions of this contract constituted typical aspects of labor contracts and
reflected the shortcomings of Bureau policy along with its connection to the regulations
established in contraband camps. The freedmen had to provide their own firewood and medical
care, despite the fact that they would not receive any wages until the end of the year. They
would lose all wages if they violated the contract in any way, not just by leaving the plantation
early. Their wages would also be deducted for missed days of work, even for factors out of the
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freedmen’s control such as weather and illness. Finally, the value of their rations would be
deducted from their wages at the end of the year, but these freedmen did not have the option of
providing their own rations to avoid the wage deduction or even access to a garden plot to grow
provisions to supplement or even replace their rations.80
These provisions of the contract demonstrate how Bureau policy originated in the
contraband camps. The fact that freedmen had to provide their own firewood and medical care
and had rations deducted from their wages reflects the constant effort in the contraband camps to
cut the issuance of supplies and rations to the contrabands due to both fears of dependency and
the desire to reduce government expenditures, especially as the camps began to close at the end
of the war. The provision that wages would be deducted for missed days reflects the continued
lack of proper wage payments in the contraband camps, as the government often owed
contrabands months or years of back pay that they often never received, while deducting wages
for factors such as weather reflects the same attitude towards denying the freedmen the wages
they needed to obtain economic autonomy, and then complaining that they could not achieve
self-sufficiency. The Bureau’s contract provisions demonstrate the overwhelming focus on
avoiding dependency, even to the degree of undermining the free labor system that the
Republicans supposedly wanted to institute in the South. In addition, it demonstrates that the
same problems that plagued the contraband camps continued to undermine Bureau policy. Fears
of dependency led to contracts with harsh terms that quickly reduced the freedmen to debt
relationships with planters that led to a cycle of poverty which became nearly impossible to
escape. The hesitancy of the Bureau to intervene on behalf of the freedmen in the thousands of
contract disputes that emerged across the South further undermined the freedmen as planters
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tried every tactic they could to exploit the freedmen even further than the already harsh contract
terms permitted.
While the Bureau required agents to approve contracts and carried out this task relatively
effectively, they faced significant difficulty in enforcing the terms of these contracts. Due to a
lack of adequate staff across the South, Bureau agents quickly became overwhelmed with cases,
and were hamstrung by a near complete lack of cooperation by the local judicial system. Local
courts remained hesitant to accept black testimony or to hear cases brought by freedmen,
meaning that the overwhelmed Bureau courts became the only recourse for freedmen. When
Bureau courts began to close as the civil courts resumed operating across the South, they rarely
tried cases involving freedmen fairly if they addressed them at all. The rapid closure of the
Bureau courts greatly undermined the agency’s ability to protect freedmen and to institute a free
labor system, and illustrates how failures of Bureau policy on a national level had significant
implications on the ground. In addition, it demonstrates how the Bureau’s desire to return control
of the South to local authorities directly undercut its ability to institute its own policies and
programs, as free labor initiatives had little chance to succeed when planters could exploit
freedmen with no consequence.
A couple of examples will demonstrate the consequences of the Bureau’s failure to
ensure equal justice for the freedmen in judicial proceedings. Freedmen in Kentucky petitioned
the military to maintain martial law to protect them from white violence. They argued that “were
the Strong arm of Military Power no longer to curb her- Her jails and workhouses would Groan
with the Numbers of our people immured within their walls” due to unfair verdicts from local
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courts.81 Laws “too barbarous Even for a community of savages” that discriminated against
freedmen remained in force and would be strictly upheld under local jurisdiction, meaning that
the freedmen would have little chance of redress against abusive employers.82 In fact, it
remained illegal for freedmen in Kentucky to enter a free state, and that “crime” carried a penalty
of one year in the penitentiary, which clearly demonstrates the restrictions on freedmen upheld
by the local courts.83 A similar petition by freedmen in Tennessee also demonstrates that the
same discriminatory justice system remained in place in a state that had ended slavery. The
freedmen argued that the courts, which did not accept black testimony, provided no chance for
equal justice and that only the Bureau courts could protect their rights. As evidence, they cited
several freedmen who had been turned off of plantations without any wages or crop shares for a
year of labor, numerous instances of corporal punishment, including “as many as four or five
hundred lashes,” and arrests for trivial offenses that carried harsh sentences.84 By citing their
loyalty and service to the Union during the war, they requested the Bureau to ensure that they
would be “secured as others, in the just fruits of our toil, protected from unjust, and illegal
punishments” and allowed to pursue economic autonomy without facing exploitation by planters
and unjust local courts and law enforcement.85 These two petitions clearly demonstrate the
importance of Bureau courts to the protection of the freedmen and their ability to succeed in the
new free labor system. Local courts could not be relied on to prevent exploitation and abuse by
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employers, a fact well-known to the Bureau when the agency dismantled its own courts, which
indicates yet another failure of Bureau policy during Reconstruction.
In Kentucky, where slavery remained legal until late 1865, the situation was even worse,
as masters often refused to relinquish control over their slaves and the Bureau agents, operating
with a vastly reduced military, faced severe difficulties in compelling the masters to release their
slaves. One example from Louisville illustrates the problems faced by the Bureau in Kentucky.
Flora Ewing, of Oldham County, complained that her employer, Dorsey Young, refused to pay
her any wages and beat her severely for asking for the wages that she was entitled to as a free
laborer. The state courts rejected black testimony, and the “case did not constitute a sufficiently
serious offense for federal prosecution in the overburdened United States District Court in
Louisville,” meaning that Ewing could not even gain justice in the federal court that would
supposedly be impartial.86 The Bureau imposed a twenty-dollar fine and required Young to pay
for Ewing’s medical care, but no record exists of whether he complied with these terms,
indicating that the Bureau most likely failed to enforce its own punishment.87
Ewing’s case was far from unique, as freedmen across the South constantly filed
complaints with the Bureau in hopes of gaining relief from abusive employers and exploitative
contracts, and overwhelmed Bureau agents struggled to help even when they truly wanted to
protect the freedmen. The most common punishment for mistreatment of freedmen consisted of
a fine, which encouraged the planters to keep mistreating the freedmen as the Bureau would do
little to stop it, and the litany of complaints of exploitation that did not have a clear resolution
fills thousands of pages of Bureau correspondence. These examples clearly indicate that Bureau
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agents, hamstrung by a lack of staff, inadequate military support, and a near total lack of
cooperation from the civil courts faced severe difficulties in enforcing their own contract terms,
to the detriment of freedmen who often lost the chance to gain economic autonomy due to
unaddressed exploitation by employers who quickly realized that the Bureau could not
effectively prevent them from taking advantage of freedmen.
A few examples will demonstrate the difficulties facing the Bureau. In 1866, freedmen
owed over one hundred twenty-six dollars in wages by Alf White complained to the Bureau
agent at Memphis, who ordered him to pay the freedmen. When White failed to pay, the Bureau
re-issued the order, but then the case disappears from Bureau correspondence, indicating that
agents did not ensure that White ever paid the wages due.88 In April 1866, meanwhile, Mary
Moore complained that her employer owed her one hundred dollars for ten months of labor. The
Bureau ordered her employer to pay her only ninety-eight dollars and gave no reason for the
deduction. Bureau agents were not supposed to charge freedmen for filing a complaint, so the
agent should not have deducted a fee from the freedmen’s wages. There is no record of the
Bureau ensuring that the wages were actually paid, which again illustrates the inability of the
Bureau to enforce even its own court verdicts and the terms of contracts that they had approved,
and also raises the possibility of corrupt agents deducting illegal fees from monetary awards
granted to freedmen.89 In May 1866, the Memphis agent only awarded a freedman owed twentyfive dollars in wages eighteen dollars, and again gave no reason for such a large deduction,
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which again points to the possibility of corruption in the Memphis agency, which went
unaddressed by the similarly overwhelmed Bureau headquarters in Washington.90
In a final example, a freedman in Weldon, North Carolina, persisted in his attempts to
gain back wages owned by his employer despite the refusal of both local courts and the Bureau
to adjudicate his case. In his petition to the Bureau Assistant Commissioner for the Subdistrict
of Weldon, he argued that Thomas Bolden failed to pay him and his two sons either crop shares
or wages for their labor in 1866. At the end of the harvest, Bolden drove them off of the
plantation with no compensation even though they “made a good crop for him and have never
received even a stitch of clothes for their work.”91 The Bureau agent, Captain Foot, referred his
case to the civil authorities due to the fact that Bureau courts no longer operated in eastern North
Carolina. The local courts refused to adjudicate the case and Maggett persisted in asking the
Bureau to take up the case since the civil authorities refused to provide fair and equal justice. By
November 1867, the Bureau succeeded in convincing a local judge to order Bolden to pay the
wages due.92 Maggett’s case is a rare example of the Bureau intervening to compel a local court
to treat a freedman fairly. Most freedmen would not be so lucky, as their cases languished in
civil courts who had little interest in addressing their claims.
The failure to properly address complaints also extended to freedmen who complained of
physical abuse by their employers, which often went unpunished by Bureau agents who knew
that the civil courts would offer the freedmen little chance of justice and also that Bureau courts
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simply faced too many cases to effectively investigate cases and enforce their verdicts, and it
also reflects the inability of the army to stop violence against contrabands on leased plantations.
A Mr. Keith beat a small girl with a stick and only faced a ten-dollar fine and no jail time and
also no prosecution in the civil courts for such a senseless act of abuse.93 A.M. Smith shot
freedman Willis Hays “without provocation” over a contract dispute and only faced a fifty dollar
fine and also no jail time, and the record does not indicate whether he even paid this small fine or
whether Hays survived his wounds.94 Freedman S. Robinson’s employer whipped him fifty
times with a switch despite a contract that prohibited corporal punishment, and Robinson even
drew a gun on him at one point. His employer only faced a nominal fine, and the Bureau did not
release Robinson from the contract despite clear evidence of abuse, and the record again fails to
indicate whether the employer paid this nominal fine.95 These examples from Memphis are very
typical of the Bureau across the South, as freedmen faced difficulties obtaining justice from the
one resource that they hoped would take their side in labor disputes and protect them from
abusive employers, but often failed due to a lack of staff, inadequate or even non-existent
support from the army, and a total lack of cooperation from the civil courts. The failure to
properly enforce contracts clearly demonstrates the shortcomings of the Bureau’s labor policies
and their origins in the contraband camps of the Civil War.
Another aspect of Bureau policy that restricted the economic autonomy and even the very
freedom of the freedmen and that originated in the contraband camps was the apprenticeship,
also termed indenture by the Bureau, of children to white employers, often their former owners.
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The Bureau, according to historian J. Michael Rhyne, viewed apprenticeships as a way to
inculcate Victorian values of free labor and hard work in freedmen, and often refused to
intervene when local courts apprenticed children without parental consent.96 Local county courts
across the South apprenticed children, and the Bureau would not intervene even in cases of
obvious abuse. For example, in Kentucky, Josephine Bedford was beaten repeatedly by her new
master after being apprenticed by the county court, and the Bureau would not intervene since
they viewed the apprenticeship as the best guarantee of self-sufficiency.97 The Bureau would not
grant custody of orphans to grandparents or other kin, and instead indentured them to whites,
most often their former owners. Children of single mothers also faced forced indenture without
parental consent, as the Bureau viewed all single mothers as incapable of raising children and
teaching them the values of free labor.98 The system of indenture and apprenticeship became
illegal under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but the Bureau continued it anyway due to the
overwhelming desire to achieve self-sufficiency among the freedmen, even if it meant forcibly
separating children from parents. Indenture and apprenticeship, according to historian Lynda
Morgan, constituted a “new and pernicious semi-slavery” instituted by a Bureau ostensibly
intended to secure the very freedom of the freedpeople and protect them from re-enslavement or
forced family separation.99
The policy of apprenticeship originated in the impressment of labor that took place in
contraband camps across the South, as men, women, and children faced separation from their
families to work on fortifications or other military projects far from the camps. They often
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received no wages to support their families back in the camps who depended on their incomes
for survival. Impressment has been discussed in ample detail, but a couple more examples here
will demonstrate the concept and its similarity to forced indenture and apprenticeship. In
Beaufort, North Carolina, contrabands faced impressment to work on the local public works
without compensation, which kept them close to their families but still left them with no way to
pay rent or even to feed their families, who had difficulty finding jobs in the vastly overcrowded
camp.100 Finally, in the most striking example, camp superintendents in Baltimore bound
contraband children to white employers as apprentices, and the army failed to provide oversight,
as masters whipped their apprentices and denied them wages while the army failed to
intervene.101 The policy of apprenticeship directly reflected the policies of impressment and
indenture that developed in the contraband camps during the Civil War, and demonstrates that
the focus on self-sufficiency that dominated the policies of the contraband camps continued to
dictate Bureau policy, even when it led to virtual re-enslavement of freed children and the
separation of families. This family separation had constituted one of the worst aspects of slavery
and freedmen believed would no longer happen. An examination of indenture contracts will
further demonstrate the connections between Bureau indenture policy, the near complete lack of
oversight that allowed abuses of both impressed contrabands and indentured freedmen, and the
free-labor ideology that dictated policy both during the Civil War and Reconstruction to the
detriment of the economic autonomy of the freedmen.
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In July 1866, for example, the Bureau in Kentucky, led by John Ely, issued a circular
outlining the indenture program and its harsh restrictions on freedmen. Boys could be
apprenticed until they reached the age of twenty-one, while girls would only be apprenticed until
age eighteen. The Bureau would only apprentice children whose “relations are unable or
unwilling to provide,” although no specific guidelines were provided to determine whether
parents or guardians could provide for their children or what constituted the definition of a fit
parent. Finally, the circular compelled masters to educate their apprentices free of charge.102
The circular did not include any mechanism of enforcement, meaning that the Bureau did not
create a way to ensure masters treated apprentices decently, or a way to remove freedmen from
abusive masters. The apprenticeship system created the same problems of enforcement and
opportunity for exploitation as the contract system, as masters quickly realized that the Bureau
would not frequently investigate their treatment of freedmen, so they often cut corners on the
conditions of the indenture despite specific regulations laid out in indenture contracts, which also
reflects the shortcomings of plantation leasing and impressment policies formulated in the
contraband camps.
A sample apprenticeship document comes from Kentucky, where the indenture system
constituted a major component of the Bureau’s self-sufficiency policy. The Bureau apprenticed
Flora Taylor, age eleven, to William Howell due to the fact that her mother, Amanda Hite, could
not support her adequately in the eyes of the local Bureau agents. Per the indenture contract,
Howell had to teach Taylor the trade of housewifery, provide her with food, clothing, medical
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care, and teach reading and writing or provide Taylor with access to a school, and treat her “with
humanity.”103 Another apprenticeship document from Kentucky, signed in January 1868, during
the very end of Bureau control of freedmen’s labor in Kentucky, had even stricter conditions for
Nancy Martin, who the Bureau apprenticed to Douglas Zimmerman until she turned eighteen.
Martin would be trained in housework, provided with housing, food, clothing, and access to a
church and a school, and treated “humanely and kindly,” according to the contract. However,
she would not marry, visit “disreputable places,” gamble, or damage any property belonging to
Zimmerman.104
Finally, the example of Carter Holmes provides the most striking evidence of the
inadequacies of the Bureau’s apprenticeship program and the failure of agents to enforce the
indenture contracts that had promised seemingly good conditions for apprentices, including
decent treatment, education, and adequate food, clothing, and shelter. Without adequate
enforcement, these promises often failed to materialize. Carter Holmes was only one of many
apprentices who suffered from the Bureau’s inability to enforce its own contracts, and he
provided a rare first-hand account of mistreatment in his petition to the Bureau for redress.
Holmes, aged twelve, lived in Washington, DC, and was indentured by Nicholls, the agent in
charge of Mason’s Island, during the Civil War in 1864, which provides stark evidence that
Bureau policies and shortcomings both emerged from the contraband camps.105 Holmes’s new
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master, James Suit, promised to treat him humanely and otherwise abide by the contract
approved first by the army and then by the Bureau. Suit failed to provide adequate clothing and
also did not provide Holmes with any education or access to a school.106 Suit whipped Holmes
repeatedly despite the ban on corporal punishment, and also struck him in the head with a shovel,
which caused severe injury. Holmes fled from Suit and sought recompense from the Bureau,
who sent him to the Orphans Home, meaning that he still faced the threat of future indenture to a
new master, and the Bureau did not discipline Suit or declare him ineligible to obtain future
apprentices. The Bureau failed to solve the problem and Suit would be free to abuse freedmen in
the future since he received no punishment for such a blatant violation of Bureau policy.107
Holmes’s petition demonstrates the inadequacies of the Bureau’s legal and approved
apprenticeship program, but the problems of exploitation and abuse became even worse when
local courts began to approve apprenticeships without Bureau approval, and children often faced
removal from their families without consent and faced horribly abusive apprenticeships that the
Bureau struggled to eliminate throughout Reconstruction.
In addition to apprenticeships approved by the Bureau, local courts often apprenticed
children, usually to their former owners, without any Bureau intervention and often without
parental consent. These apprenticeships often separated families rather than apprenticed orphans
or other children who came from unstable households, and removed children that families
desperately needed to perform the farm labor necessary for the family’s survival. The Bureau
struggled throughout Reconstruction to undo these apprenticeships, as overwhelmed agents faced
stiff opposition from civil authorities, white masters, and the local populace as a whole. Many
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freedmen faced retaliatory violence when they attempted to regain their children, which the
Bureau often could not prevent due to the infinitesimal military detachments in many rural areas
of the South. Without any Bureau supervision to ensure decent and humane treatment of the
freedmen, apprentices also faced the prospect of virtually limitless exploitation and abuse
without any regulation unless they could escape and reach a Bureau agent to lodge a complaint.
The persistence of local indentures clearly demonstrates the shortcomings of Bureau policy and
its origins in the contraband camps, as families often faced separation in plantation leasing and
impressment programs, often also without the consent of the parents and with inadequate
oversight to prevent abuse or exploitation of the contrabands, as local authorities remained
disinterested in protecting the freedmen both during the Civil War and Reconstruction.
A few examples will demonstrate the scale of the local apprenticeship problem and the
desperate efforts of the freedmen to recover their children. In Duplin County, near Wilmington
in North Carolina, Joe Bright, a mason, leased forty acres from Joe Beason for two-thirds of the
crop, and he needed his six children to perform agricultural labor to cultivate a sufficient crop.
The county court removed his children and apprenticed them to their former owners without
Bright’s consent, and he managed to reach a Bureau agent to complain and request the agent’s
help in reclaiming his children.108 The former owner, W.A. Mathis, argued that Bright “was not
a proper person to have charge of children” and the Bureau ordered the children to remain with
Mathis while the case was adjudicated, indicating bias in favor of white employers over freed
children.109 Polly, Joe’s wife, also testified before the Bureau, arguing that no “other person has
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a better right to them than him or me we are able to support and keep them,” and both Brights
also tried to argue their case before the same civil courts that had apprenticed the children.110 The
Bureau finally ruled that the apprenticeship was illegal since Bright had not given his consent
and ordered that Mathis return all of the children immediately, but no further record exists as to
the fate of the children, which likely indicates that the Bureau failed to enforce its own orders.111
The case of Bright’s children illustrates the problems the Bureau faced in dealing with
discriminatory state and local laws that often hampered their efforts to end the practice of local
apprenticeships, especially those without parental consent, and also connects to the inability of
the army to prevent separation of families in the camps. In North Carolina, an 1866 law declared
“all persons of color entitled to the same privileges and subject to the same burthen and
disabilities as by the laws of the State were conferred on, or were attached to, free persons of
color, prior to the ordinance of emancipation,” which seems to indicate progress in ensuring the
rights of freedmen.112 This law meant that the old apprenticeship law remained in force, and it
gave broad justifications for apprenticing freed children without parental consent. The law stated
that children whose parents were unmarried or who “do not habitually employ their time in some
honest, industrious occupation” could be apprenticed by the local courts with preference given to
former owners, and the local courts seized on this law to apprentice children across the state.113
In response, the Bureau superintendent, Colonel Eliphalet Whittlesey, ordered agents to
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“exercise the utmost care that none except orphans, or children whose parents give their consent,
be bound out as apprentices” and prohibited the separation of families without consent.114 The
Bureau struggled to apply these instructions due to the intransigence of civil courts and a
shortage of agents across the South, as the below examples will further demonstrate. Illegal
apprenticeships plagued the Bureau in states across the South and not just North Carolina.
In Maryland, Rindy M. Allen complained to the Bureau that the orphans’ court
confiscated the children she hired to work for pay along with food and clothing and returned
them to Ira Young, their former owner, even though they clearly had a job and were selfsufficient without any governmental assistance. A local justice of the peace certified the
apprenticeship without any intervention by the Bureau, and according to Joseph Hall, who
represented the boy in court, Young treated the child “worse than a dog” and refused to provide
food or clothing, both of which would have been stipulated in a Bureau- approved contract.115
The boy managed to escape but his master recaptured and whipped him despite Bureau
regulations prohibiting corporal punishment of freedmen no matter what the labor
arrangement.116 The local police arrested white Unionists who helped him escape his abusive
master and held them in jail without bond, which indicates the degree to which state authorities
undermined Bureau efforts to ensure freedmen were fairly treated in apprenticeship
arrangements.117 In fact, as Hall states, the freedmen needed to be able to hire their children out
for wages to become self-sufficient, so forced apprenticeships directly undermined the ability of
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the freedmen to escape dependence on the Bureau. He wrote, “The Colored people in this
county, Can and would do very well if they Can have what they ought to have… to get their
children un bound or restored to them… in order that they can help now to support their parents
in order that they may not become a burthen upon the government.”118 The Bureau lacked
adequate staff to address the sheer number of local apprenticeships in Maryland even though it
was so close to the national headquarters in Washington. Masters continued to abuse apprentices
without much intervention by the Bureau, which again followed the example set in impressment
arrangements in the contraband camps during the Civil War, indicating that the Bureau did not
learn from the failures of contraband camp policy when establishing its own responses to state
policies that directly hampered Bureau programs.
The final example of apprenticeships comes from Kentucky, another state that only
abolished slavery after the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, meaning that owners remained
very reluctant to let go of their former slaves, which only worsened the problem of illegal
apprenticeships. In 1867, a Bureau circular cited a statewide trend of local courts apprenticing
children by force and without parental consent. The circular placed the burden of gaining
Bureau intervention on the parents, who faced the great risk of retaliatory violence for
complaining to the Bureau or to the federal courts.119 To recover their children, parents had to
request a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court, which could be very difficult for
freedmen living in rural areas far from a major city. The Bureau promised to return children to
their parents following the issuance of a court order, and also to attempt to change Kentucky law
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to make the apprenticeship of children much more difficult.120 The lack of adequate agents and
the continued intransigence of the citizenry and the state and local courts made such action
almost impossible and Kentucky freedmen continued to face the threat of illegal indentures
throughout Reconstruction.
One year later in 1867, Sam Wilmington complained to the Bureau in Louisville that the
local courts bound his children without consent, and the Bureau ordered them returned
immediately or their master, John Neal, would face immediate arrest. No record exists of
whether Wilmington ever received his children back.121 In one of the most shocking cases of
illegal apprenticeship coupled with wanton violence against freedmen, local courts illegally
apprenticed Jerry Bird’s brother to Berel Howell without parental consent, and Howell refused to
release the twelve-year-old boy when the rest of the family wanted to move to Illinois. When
Bird confronted Howell to request the return of his brother, Howell shot and killed the young
boy, and he never faced any criminal punishment for his horrific act of violence.122 While most
apprenticeships did not end in murder, the Bureau’s records, especially registers of complaints,
are packed with cases of children apprenticed without consent, but not nearly as much detail on
Bureau actions to recover those children. In addition, masters often defied Bureau orders to
return children to their parents, and agents faced difficulty in enforcing their orders without
sufficient military support. For example, Celia Hill’s children were apprenticed to Jesse Evans
against her will, and Evans refused to return them even after receiving a direct order from the
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Bureau, and the agent referred the case to higher levels of the Bureau for investigation, which
could take extended amounts of time, and no record exists of whether the children ever returned
to their mother.123
Apprenticeships reflect several shortcomings of Bureau policy that originated in
contraband camps. The separation of families originated with impressment and plantation
leasing, even though the freedmen believed that emancipation would guarantee the integrity of
their families. Apprenticeship indicates the limitations of Bureau enforcement of its own
regulations, which also followed the precedent set by the army’s poor oversight of impressed
laborers and leased plantations. Apprenticeships also reflect the overwhelming fear of
dependency on the government that shaped both contraband camp and Bureau policy, even when
it directly undermined the ability of the freedmen to obtain economic autonomy by removing the
labor of children from families who desperately needed to make ends meet. Finally,
apprenticeships reflected the gender ideals of the Bureau, as single mothers often found
themselves deemed unfit parents and therefore faced the loss of their children, no matter what
their income or the ability to support their children. Apprenticeships clearly demonstrate that
both Bureau policy and its shortcomings originated in the contraband camps, and the next aspect
of the Bureau to be discussed in this chapter, the inability to prevent violence against freedmen,
further demonstrates the connection between contraband camps and the Bureau.
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The Bureau’s Inability to Stop Violence against Freedmen
The problem of violence against freedmen plagued the South both during the Civil War
and Reconstruction, and neither the army nor the Bureau could effectively address it due to the
lack of staff, racist agents, and an insufficient military presence. Bureau agents were swamped
with complaints of violence, termed “outrages,” and also a near-complete lack of cooperation
from the civil courts in the arrest and prosecution of perpetrators. The lack of adequate response
to violence under the Bureau reflects the guerrilla warfare that plagued contraband camps across
the South, especially in camps that sent contrabands to leased plantations or to farm abandoned
land. Freedmen who lived in rural areas faced the worst violence, as they had great difficulty
reaching agents who were based in large cities, and also the fact that small army garrisons could
not protect rural plantations due to the distance from large cities. The failure to stop violence
further demonstrates the connection between the problems that plagued contraband camp
administration and the problems that plagued Bureau administration throughout Reconstruction.
An examination of the Bureau’s outrage reports clearly demonstrates the Bureau’s inability to
protect freedmen from attacks that undermined their ability to obtain economic autonomy and
the self-sufficiency that the Bureau so desperately wanted for the freedmen.
The outrage reports to be examined come from Kentucky, a state plagued with nearconstant violence against freedmen, especially since slavery did not end there until late 1865 and
many masters tried to retain control of their former slaves by force. The Bureau undermined its
own ability to protect freedmen by imposing maximum sentences of a one-hundred dollar fine or
thirty days in jail with hard labor, no matter the severity of the offense. These light sentences did
little to deter whites determined to restore as system as close to slavery as possible through
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violent intimidation of freedmen.124 The situation worsened when white “Regulators,” or violent
para-military groups formed to attack freedmen, formed across the state in 1867 and 1868.
These groups repeatedly perpetrated heinous offenses against freedmen, and faced light
sentences if the local courts prosecuted them at all, and the Bureau struggled badly to mount
even a minimal response to their violent acts.
A report from Louisville written in 1867 demonstrates the scale of the Regulator problem
facing the Bureau in Kentucky. The agent wrote that many wealthy and so-called “respectable
people” joined the mobs, and that hardly anyone dared oppose the actions of the Regulators,
indicating how strongly the white population of Kentucky opposed the Bureau and the difficulty
the Bureau faced in arresting or prosecuting Regulators, which was very similar to the problems
the army faced in trying to track down guerrillas who attacked contraband camps during the
Civil War.125 The Regulators targeted freedmen across the state, and severely beat freedmen
who dared report their actions to the Bureau. They also attacked Union veterans and any whites
suspected of helping freedmen obtain economic autonomy, including Bureau agents who left
their headquarters without adequate military guard.126 Regulators lynched one freedman for
hosting a party at his house, whipped the guests, and threatened them with lynching if they
attended any more social gatherings.127 In nearby Georgetown, meanwhile, Regulators shot two
freedmen and stole their wages that they had just received for the previous year’s labor, and the
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same occurred in Henry County at the same time.128 The civil authorities, meanwhile, supported
the Regulators and did little to nothing to arrest or prosecute the perpetrators, which greatly
undermined the ability of the Bureau to protect freedmen when they could not receive any help
from local law enforcement and had to rely on small army detachments to protect freedmen
spread over large rural areas.129 The agent in Louisville admitted that the Bureau had largely
failed to prevent most acts of violence against freedmen, and could do little to prevent retaliation
against freedmen who dared to report the attacks to the Bureau.130 The same story would emerge
from outrage reports both from Kentucky and across the South, clearly revealing the scale of the
violence against freedmen and the Bureau’s woefully inadequate response throughout the
Reconstruction period, demonstrating that the Bureau learned little from the failures to protect
contraband camps and leased plantations from Confederate guerrillas during the Civil War.
Freedmen also faced violence from their employers, who often attacked them for
attempting to obtain their wages, rations, medical care, or other terms specified in the very
contracts the planters had signed. The freedmen could report these offenses to the Bureau, but
they faced the threat of retaliation from whites plus the inability of the Bureau to adequately
respond to such outrages, arrest the perpetrators, and protect the freedmen from future violence.
Freedmen faced severe violence from whites when they reported outrages to the Bureau, and the
undermanned military garrison could do little or nothing to prevent it, which reflects the inability
of the army to protect contraband camps during the Civil War. The outrages they reported were
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near-constant and overwhelmed Bureau agents who could not rely on the military or the local
and state courts for support, to the detriment of the freedmen who desperately needed protection
from vengeful whites.131
A few examples from outrage reports, written for Bureau agents in Washington, DC,
demonstrate the scale of the violence problem facing the Bureau in the Reconstruction South.
First, some more examples from Kentucky, and then the discussion will be extended to the rest
of the South. In May 1865, soon after the end of the Civil War, Andy Ramsey beat Richard with
a hand spike when he demanded fifty-five days of unpaid wages, and Richard remained senseless
for days and also lost his job at Ramsey’s plantation. As is too often the case, no record exists of
any Bureau action against Ramsey.132 One year later, in November 1866, Thomas Dedmore
testified to a Bureau agent that his employer tied him up to a tree by his hands so his feet did not
touch the ground, and then whipped him so severely that “blood ran down to his shoes” because
he went to church on a Sunday morning before starting work.133 In May 1868, as Bureau
operations began to wind down, a freedman only identified as Hewing was shot by his employer
when he asked for his wages at the end of the month, and Hewing later died from his injuries.
The Bureau agent promised to investigate the case and arrest the murderers, but local law
enforcement and courts refused to cooperate and no record exists of any Bureau action.134
Finally, in October 1866, several whites attacked George Chambers with an axe while he
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collected driftwood to use as fuel. The local courts threw out the case because they refused to
accept black testimony despite the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the perpetrators fled before the
Bureau could track them down.135 These cases from Kentucky demonstrate the Bureau’s
inability to protect freedmen from white violence, especially given the lack of cooperation from
the civil courts and law enforcement, and the continual reductions of military garrisons across
the South, especially in 1868. Violence against freedmen was far from a particular Kentucky
problem. An analysis of outrage reports from across the South will demonstrate that the Bureau
as a whole could not stop violence, demonstrating again the connections between the
shortcomings of Bureau policy and the failures of contraband camp administration.
In Memphis, Tennessee, freedman John Hardy risked his life to name his attackers to the
local Bureau agent after they shot and severely beat him, and pistol-whipped his son, in Hardy’s
own home. The Bureau records do not indicate if the perpetrators were arrested, but this case
demonstrates the scale of violence in the South when freedmen faced violence in their own
homes, and the sheer inability of the army and the Bureau to protect freedmen from constant
white violence.136 In May 1866, a perpetrator identified in the record only as Mr. Keith,
assaulted a little girl named Francis Pullman, and Keith only had to pay a ten-dollar fine and did
not serve any jail time.137 Such minimal sentences did little to deter violence against freedmen,
and indicated that even the Bureau courts did not fulfill their duty to protect freedmen when the
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civil courts would not cooperate. In September 1865, A.M. Smith shot freedman Willis Hays
with “no provocation,” according to the Bureau agent, and only had to pay a fifty-dollar fine for
attempted murder.138 The record does not indicate if Hays survived or even if the fine was paid,
but the case still clearly demonstrates that light sentences constituted a major reason why the
Bureau could never put a dent in the constant attacks on freedmen. The light sentences were not
only a problem in Memphis, as agents imposed similar small fines across the South.
In Louisiana, freedman Green Jones testified that night riders, similar to the Kentucky
Regulators, shot into his house, whipped him three hundred times, and fled into the night without
receiving any punishment. The Bureau listened to his complaint but did not manage to arrest the
perpetrators, and local courts would not cooperate so they escaped to attack more freedmen.
This attack demonstrates the problem the Bureau faced with organized paramilitary groups, as
attackers could blend back into society during the day and then attack at night when military
garrisons were unlikely to operate, making it nearly impossible for the Bureau to stop these
attacks, especially after the formation of the Ku Klux Klan during the later years of
Reconstruction.139 Regulators in Tennessee posted broadsides warning freedmen of violence if
they did not submit to white control, and the “negroes are held in such a state of terror that they
dare not tell” the Bureau about violence, according to an army officer posted to the area.140 The
inability of the Bureau to arrest these regulators, despite several orders to do so from higher
military commands, demonstrates clearly both the complete inability of the Bureau to rein in
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white violence, and the connections between the inability to stop Regulator attacks during
Reconstruction and the repeated failures of the army to prevent guerrilla attacks on the
contraband camps during the Civil War. 141
The problem of violence against freedmen indicates how shortcomings of Bureau policy
originated in contraband camps, as Bureau agents and the army learned little from the constant
failure to protect contraband camps and leased plantations from guerrillas, and continued to post
inadequate military garrisons that could not reach isolated rural areas, to impose sentences that
were so light that they were almost meaningless, and to continue to refer cases to civil courts that
clearly discriminated against freedmen. They often failed to ensure that those found guilty of
violence against freedmen did not participate in future attacks, as they often could retain their
positions as employers of freedmen despite clear evidence of violent behavior. Freedmen under
contracts also could not leave those contracts due to white violence, which starkly demonstrates
the exploitative nature of the mandatory labor contract system, which also originated in the
contraband camps as demonstrated above. Freedmen would face an even worse threat from
violence starting in 1868, as the Bureau began to close down operations in most southern states
to focus on education, leaving freedmen with almost no protection against white exploitation and
violence, and often repeating the problems that plagued the process of closing down camps.
Even the end of the Bureau contained policies and problems that emerged in the contraband
camps of the Civil War.
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Abandoning the Freedmen: The Bureau Leaves the South
By 1868, the Bureau’s commitment to helping the freedmen began to wane dramatically,
as Bureau agents believed that freedmen should now be able to support themselves without any
help from the government. The Bureau believed that the freedmen had now secured jobs and no
longer needed economic assistance, especially due to the system of mandatory labor contracts.
The federal government also wanted to avoid encouraging dependency, and believed that
withdrawing the Bureau would compel the freedmen to maintain employment and selfsufficiency. According to historian David Williams, northerners never really committed to the
Bureau, and focused more on restoring business ties to the South, primarily cotton production.142
In addition, the racism that plagued the North during the Civil War continued during
Reconstruction, as northerners resented job competition from free blacks and maintained
segregation in schools, transportation, and also often restricted blacks to the most menial jobs,
which also reduced support for using federal funds to prop up freedmen in the South who,
according to Northerners, should have been able to support themselves much more quickly after
the war.143 While the Bureau did not permanently shut down all operations until 1872, most
services began to wind down in 1868 as the Bureau began to focus almost entirely on supporting
freedmen’s schools rather than intervening in labor disputes or prosecuting cases of violence
against individual freedmen.144
Right as the Bureau began to cease operations, the Ku Klux Klan began a “reign of
terror” across the South, and the rapidly shrinking Bureau could do nothing to protect
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freedmen.145 In Virginia, for example, “some planters killed their workers so they would not
have to honor the labor contracts” that had been approved by the Bureau, and the Klan also
attacked the schools that the Bureau had supposedly invested most of its limited resources in
protecting.146 The Bureau, with only nine hundred agents across the South in 1868 and only one
hundred fifty eight employees across the whole region at the beginning of 1869, had no chance
of reining in the Klan and other violent groups. The contracts that the Bureau formulated for the
1868 contract year could not be enforced, leaving the freedmen trapped in labor arrangements
with employers free to exploit or abuse them with absolutely no fear of consequences from the
Bureau.147 When the Bureau restored all pending cases to the civil courts, freedmen lost all hope
of justice for acts of white violence, and whites knew that attacks on freedmen would often go
unpunished by racist state and local courts that often refused to even prosecute whites for
exploiting or abusing freedmen.148 Finally, the parents of children caught in illegal
apprenticeships could no longer use Bureau courts to regain custody of their children, meaning
that the practice of apprenticeship flourished after the Bureau’s demise and even became more
prominent as a means for local and state courts to control the freedmen.
The end of the Bureau allowed white southerners to institute any means they wished to
exploit the freedmen and prevent them from gaining the economic autonomy that they had
sought since gaining their freedom at the end of the Civil War. Vagrancy laws, lynching,
sharecropping, debt peonage, convict leasing, and disenfranchisement all emerged as ways to
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keep freedmen impoverished, prevent them from participating in politics, and to ensure a captive
labor force for white southern planters.149 While the details of these policies of individual states
and localities are beyond the scope of this dissertation since the narrative ends with the closure of
the Bureau in 1868, they do clearly demonstrate the consequences of shortcomings in Bureau
policy that prevented the establishment of true economic autonomy for the freedmen and trapped
them in a system very close to slavery that would last until the Civil Rights Movement of the
1960s, which demonstrates the very long-term consequences of policies that emerged in the
contraband camps of the Civil War a century before.
Conclusion
The various policies of the Bureau, including the closure of contraband camps,
mandatory labor contracts, enforced apprenticeships and the failure to adequately address illegal
apprenticeships, inadequate responses to violence, and the abrupt end of Bureau assistance that
left the freedmen without protection, demonstrate the connections between the shortcomings of
Bureau policy and the shortcomings of contraband camp administration. The army instituted
labor contracts, especially on leased plantations, separated families through indentures, and did
little to nothing to prevent guerilla attacks on the camps and leased plantations, resulting in the
death or re-enslavement of thousands of contrabands. The Bureau, meanwhile, learned little
from these failures of contraband camp policy and instituted many of the exact same policies,
and then did not adequately address the consequences of these failures, including freedmen
trapped in abusive contracts, children apprenticed without parental consent, and freedmen
attacked or even killed by white mobs. The end of the Bureau faced many of the same problems
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that faced the closure of contraband camps, including the abrupt withdrawal of agents with little
notice to freedmen, the abrupt closure of remaining home farms without any housing or job
placement assistance, and a failure to address pending cases of illegal apprenticeships or
employer abuse. Once the Bureau left most areas of the South in 1868 and disbanded for good in
1872, freedmen faced a century of poverty, convict leasing, sharecropping, and lynching that
erased almost all of the gains made during Reconstruction and even undermined their very
freedom, as convict leasing and exploitative contracts created a system very close to slavery,
leading to the same question that contrabands in Mississippi had asked only five years before: Is
this freedom? Due to the failures of contraband camp and Freedmen’s Bureau policy, the answer
to this question during the years after Reconstruction was, at best, maybe.

271

CONCLUSION

The connection between the contraband camps and Freedmen’s Bureau policies during
the Civil War and Reconstruction are clear. Policies implemented in the camps, such as
mandatory labor contracts, the impressment of contrabands for labor, curtailment of rations, and
the rapid closure of the camps late in the war all foreshadowed policies instituted by the Bureau
during Reconstruction. The failures of contraband camp policy, such as the failure to permit the
contrabands to find their own employment, the lack of adequate wages, the forced relocations of
contrabands to other camps or leased plantations, and the inability to protect contrabands from
violence committed by soldiers also clearly predicted the failures of the Bureau. Even more
significant, the argument that the Bureau did not know the problems inherent in their policies and
cannot be blamed for their failures is definitively disproven by this dissertation. It distinctly
demonstrates that the Bureau had numerous models to follow from the failures of contraband
camp policies but learned little from them.
In addition, the dissertation illustrates the failures of contraband camp administration
itself, as the lack of a coherent and uniform federal policy permitted local camp commanders to
institute whatever policies and programs they saw fit. As a result, policy failures such as the
sudden closure of Camp Nelson, the problematic institution of leasing in Mississippi and
Louisiana, and the denial of land to contrabands on Roanoke Island often went unaddressed by
the federal government until it was too late, if they were addressed at all. In addition, many
blatant violations of federal law, especially returning fugitives to their owners in violation of an
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Article of War, went unpunished by both the army bureaucracy and the federal government,
which demonstrates the low priority of the contrabands to the military and the government. The
Bureau, meanwhile, did institute a national policy for its agents, but an ineffective enforcement
mechanism and a lack of personnel meant that it was little better than no policy at all. The
dissertation lucidly indicates that policy failures plagued both contraband camps and the Bureau
and restricted the opportunities of contrabands and freedmen to gain the economic autonomy that
they truly needed.
The dissertation also indicates the importance of studying multiple camps and regions to
gain a truly complete perspective on the implementation of contraband camp policy. Especially
due to the lack of a coherent federal policy, each camp had its own policies and programs, all of
which provide their own insights into the connections between contraband camps and Bureau
policy. Leasing in Mississippi and Louisiana, contraband colonies in North Carolina, land
preemption in South Carolina, and urban contraband settlements in Washington, DC, are all vital
to understanding the implementation and failures of camp policy and its connections to the
Bureau. Discussing each camp geographically as this dissertation does provides the best analysis
of the nuances of these policy connections and their long-term consequences after
Reconstruction.
By making these arguments, the dissertation makes several interventions in the
historiography of the Civil War and Reconstruction. It mainly addresses a major gap in the
literature that treats the contraband camps and the Bureau as separate entities rather than
analyzing their connections in policy. It also discusses numerous contraband camps in extensive
detail, rather than focusing on a case study of one or two particular camps. In addition, the
dissertation analyzes the difference between national policy implemented in Washington and the
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on the ground reality in the camps to a degree not before reached in the literature, particularly for
the contraband camps before the establishment of the Bureau. The dissertation fills significant
gaps in the literature of the Civil War and Reconstruction that still exist more than one hundred
fifty years after the conclusion of the conflict.
The arguments made in the dissertation can also extend later in history than its official
ending point of 1868. The inadequacy of Bureau policy only intensified as agents pulled out of
the South until only Bureau schools remained. The freedmen now had no recourse to protect
them from exploitation by planters, violence by southern whites, and separation of their families
by the apprenticeship system. Planters began to institute even stricter sharecropping contracts,
which almost always led to massive debt for the freedmen. Since they had to pay for farm
implements, rations, clothing, and seed on credit, they always ended up owing more to the
planter than they made from the proceeds of the crop. The freedmen ended up in debt peonage,
meaning that they could never escape the exploitative sharecropping arrangements.1 These
sharecropping arrangements continued until the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, which
indicates how the Bureau’s implementation of mandatory labor contracts, which began in the
contraband camps, undermined the ability of African-Americans to gain economic autonomy for
almost a century.
In addition, another long-term consequence of the failure of Bureau and contraband camp
policy was the failure of the Bureau to implement equality under the law in southern courts. As
discussed in chapter five, when the Bureau courts closed and civil courts resumed in the southern
states, freedmen quickly faced discriminatory verdicts and prohibitions from sitting on juries or
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testifying against whites, both of which the Bureau had attempted to enforce in its own courts.
Police officers across the South quickly began to arrest African-Americans for petty and often
fabricated crimes such as vagrancy, disrespecting a white person, loitering, or petty theft. The
defendants would be brought before all-white juries, which imposed heavy fines that they could
not pay, and then they would be leased to private businesses who would pay their fines in
exchange for the convict’s labor for a lengthy period of time that far outstripped the seriousness
of the crime. This system, known as convict leasing, provided hefty profits for the businesses,
but led to the constant threat of arrest for African-Americans and the forceful separation of
convicts from their families who often depended on their support. The Bureau’s failure to ensure
equality in southern courts led to unequal justice for African-Americans that also continued until
the Civil Rights Movement, which highlights the importance of understanding the connections
between contraband camp and Bureau policy during Reconstruction.2
Another long-term consequence of the Bureau’s policy failure was continued violence
across the South during the later phase of Reconstruction and after 1877. The Bureau and the
army never had enough personnel to stop the rampant violence against freedmen. The Ku Klux
Klan and other racist paramilitary organizations terrorized freedmen across the South, and the
northern public quickly became tired of spending federal resources on protecting AfricanAmericans, especially during the Panic of 1873. As a result, the military left the South after
1877, and freedmen faced a constant threat of violence even after the Klan faded away in the late
1870s. In particular, lynching rapidly spread across the South, as African-Americans who
obtained economic autonomy, especially land ownership, faced the threat of violent mob

For more detail here, see Douglas Blackmon, Slavery by Another Name: The Re-Enslavement of Black Americans
from the Civil War to World War Two (New York: Vintage Books, 2008).
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retaliation or worse, and no law enforcement agency did anything to stop it. Also, massive race
riots erupted across the South in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with Atlanta,
New Orleans, Washington, DC, and Norfolk as only a few examples. The perpetrators of these
violent acts almost never faced arrest due to the unequal judicial system described above, which
only encouraged further violent intimidation of the freedmen. The problem not only lasted for a
century but became even worse during the Civil Rights Movement, when a revitalized Klan
attacked both black and white civil rights activists in a desperate attempt to stem the tide of racial
equality. The Bureau’s failure to stop violence also had long-term consequences that not only
greatly undermined the ability of freedmen to gain economic autonomy and basic civil rights, but
also put their very lives in peril.3
In contrast to the Bureau’s inaction, the federal government did attempt to stop violence
committed by the Klan after the Bureau’s departure in 1868. The Enforcement Acts made it
illegal to hinder freedmen from voting or registering to vote or to “band or conspire together, or
go in disguise upon the public highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to… injure,
oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen” from using their Constitutional rights.4 Across the
South, federal marshals arrested suspected Klansmen and others suspected of violating the
freedmen’s rights, and achieved a relatively high conviction rate of fifty five percent in
Mississippi and twenty eight percent across the South as a whole.5 The fact that the federal
government utilized large numbers of personnel and even suspended habeas corpus in some
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areas to ensure the accused faced a jury trial indicates a much higher level of commitment to
stopping Klan violence than the Bureau had ever shown to protect the freedmen during early
Reconstruction, even though violence pervaded the South to a similar degree and the Bureau
could utilize the services of an occupying army. The relative success of the Enforcement Acts
even further highlights the Bureau’s failure to protect the freedmen, and the continued lack of
support from the army for the protection of freedmen that reflects the ongoing inability of the
army to protect contraband camps from guerrillas. The federal government could have made
more of a commitment to protecting the freedmen during Reconstruction, and its failure indicates
the low priority of contrabands and freedmen in federal policymaking during the Civil War and
Reconstruction.
Another long-term consequence of Bureau policy failure is unequal education. When the
Bureau ended its support of freedmen’s schools, they lost their only source of funding, as local
school boards remained reluctant to support black schools. When they did obtain support from
local governments, it was vastly less than that given to white schools, and this funding gap
persisted until Brown v. Board began the slow process of school integration in 1954. The lower
quality education given to freedmen reduced their ability to move up the economic ladder, as
they often lacked the skills necessary for higher-paying jobs and remained trapped in the
exploitative sharecropping arrangements discussed above. In some communities, meanwhile,
black schools faced violence from the Klan and other paramilitary organizations, and they had no
protection after the Bureau and military withdrew from the South, meaning that even children
faced the threat of mob violence. Education inequality is another clear demonstration that the
Bureau’s failures led to consequences lasting long after they withdrew from the South in 1868.
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Historians often left the shortcomings of the Bureau out of textbooks. Most textbooks
written prior to the Civil Rights Movement focused on the Klan and often left out any extensive
discussion of the Bureau, especially how its failures contributed to increased levels of violence
against the freedmen. As historian Elaine Parsons writes, the Klan became a convenient
scapegoat for all violence against freedmen, which ignored the important role played not only by
the Bureau and the army, but by individual white southerners completely unaffiliated with the
Klan who also perpetrated violent actions against African-Americans for decades after the Civil
War.6 As Parsons writes, “Using the Klan as a stand-in for these pervasive violent practices also
assigns responsibility for black oppression to the subset of southern white men who joined the
Ku-Klux” and avoids giving any responsibility to the Bureau and to the army for its inability to
protect the freedmen from violence, or to individual white southerners who perpetrated a large
proportion of the attacks on freedmen.7 In addition, textbooks with these ideas did not remain
confined to the South. In fact, these ideas reached students nationwide, including in northern
states that had been bastions of abolitionism.8 The focus on the Klan in textbooks means that the
Bureau’s role in worsening southern violence remained largely forgotten, even by northerners,
and that the story of the freedmen themselves faced consignment to the shadows of history until
the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s.
These four long-term consequences of Bureau failures clearly indicate that the problems
with contraband camp policy during the Civil War, which went almost completely unaddressed
by the Bureau, led to almost unrestricted exploitation of southern African Americans for almost a
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century. The institution of mandatory labor contracts led to sharecropping and other exploitative
economic arrangements, the failure to institute equal justice in the courts led to convict leasing,
the failure to stem violence against freedmen encouraged the rise of the Klan and other
paramilitary groups, and the termination of support for freedmen’s schools contributed greatly to
school segregation and the large funding disparities between white and black schools.
Understanding the connections between contraband camp and Bureau policy is clearly not only
essential for understanding the Civil War and Reconstruction periods, but also for understanding
African American history from Reconstruction to the Civil Rights Movement.
The long-term consequences of Bureau policy also have significance in the political
debates of today. The fear of dependency on the government that shaped much of Bureau policy
is at the heart of the modern debates over welfare. The idea of instituting work requirements for
welfare, such as food stamps, subsidized health insurance, childcare assistance, etc., reflect the
Bureau’s insistence that freedmen sign mandatory labor contracts to receive any support for their
families, even if they had served in the military. In addition, it reflects the drastic ration cuts
after the war, as the Bureau believed that the freedmen should work and support themselves
rather than rely on government assistance. The idea of privatizing welfare also reflects Bureau
policy. The Bureau’s reliance on missionaries and private aid societies for aid such as clothing
and support of education directly foreshadows the current debates on privatizing welfare, and the
failures of these policies should serve as a cautionary tale. The government’s attempts at welfare
did not work a century and a half ago and they do not work now, which demonstrates that
government welfare has improved little since the Civil War. The story of contraband camp and
Bureau policy is not only a story for historians, but also a story necessary to understand very
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important political and economic debates today more than a century and a half after the last
Bureau agents withdrew from the South.
The stories of the contraband camps and the Freedmen’s Bureau thus remain relevant
today, and are essential to a complete understanding of United States history as a whole, not just
Civil War or African American history. As the stories of Carter Holmes, the freedmen who
petitioned against impressment in Virginia, and the numerous freedmen who filed complaints
with the Bureau effectively demonstrate, contrabands and freedmen faced numerous obstacles to
their very freedom, and the military and the Bureau did little to address these grievances during
the nine years of civil war and Reconstruction. Their failures had consequences that carried over
to the Civil Rights Movement almost a century later. The stories of the contrabands and
freedmen who, from Fort Monroe in Virginia to the Sea Islands of South Carolina to the cotton
fields of Mississippi to the barren sand islands of North Carolina, overcame pervasive
exploitation by the federal government to assert their status as free Americans, remain vital today
not just to historians and legal scholars, but to all Americans.
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